Opinion
No. 111,582.
2014-11-26
Rodney HOSKINS, Appellee, v. Kim KETNER, Appellant.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; Robert L. Serra, Judge.Ryan L. White and Timothy J. Evans, of Evans & Mullinix, P.A., of Shawnee, for appellant.Kyle A. Branson and Edward C. Gillette, of Gillette Law Firm, P.A ., of Mission, for appellee.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; Robert L. Serra, Judge.
Ryan L. White and Timothy J. Evans, of Evans & Mullinix, P.A., of Shawnee, for appellant. Kyle A. Branson and Edward C. Gillette, of Gillette Law Firm, P.A ., of Mission, for appellee.
Before PIERRON, P.J., BRUNS and SCHROEDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Kim Ketner appeals the district court's judgment against her directing her to return possession of the house in which she resides to Rodney Hoskins. Unfortunately, the record on appeal is—at best—sparse. In fact, there is no record of the testimony—if any—that was presented to the trial court. Likewise, there is no record of the exhibits—if any—offered or admitted into evidence. Moreover, the parties have referred to several alleged facts in their briefs as well as during oral argument that are not set forth in the record on appeal. Thus, because we conclude that the record before us is inadequate, we vacate the judgment entered on March 10, 2014, and we remand this case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the record.
Facts
To the extent that we can glean the facts from the record, it appears that the prior owners of real property located at 2415 S. 35th, Kansas City, Kansas, filed an unsuccessful eviction action against Ketner in 2013. In a Journal Entry of Judgment filed on November 22, 2013, the district court ordered that Ketner was “allowed to remain in possession of the premises ... and [was] ordered to pay the ongoing utilities, real-estate taxes, insurance, and similar expenses of said premises.” In addition, the district court denied Ketner's claim of an oral Family Settlement Agreement. Neither party appealed from the Journal Entry of Judgment.
A little over a month later, in January 2014, a deed was recorded indicating that the house had been sold to Hoskins and his wife. In a letter to Ketner dated January 16, 2014, Hoskins claimed that he was the new owner of the house and indicated that he was going to enter the premises on the following day to take pictures. Two weeks later, on January 30, 2014, a document entitled “Three–Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate” was served on Ketner in which Hoskins demanded that she “either pay the rent due in the amount of $900.00, or move out within three (3) days after [she] received this notice.” It is unclear from the record why Hoskins claimed that rent was due when there was no lease agreement between the parties and the Journal Entry of Judgment filed in the previous case did not require her to do so.
On February 7, 2014, Hoskins filed a forcible detainer action against Ketner pursuant to Chapter 61 of the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure. In response, Ketner filed an answer asserting that Hoskins' claim was barred by res judicata due to the prior judgment entered in November 2013. The case was evidently set on a docket held on March 3, 2014, but the trial was continued to March 10, 2014. Prior to trial, the district court entered an order—signed on March 5, 2014, and filed on March 7, 2014—which stated that “the rules of Chapter 60 shall apply.” Although there is a suggestion by the parties that the district court subsequently decided to go forward under Chapter 61, there is nothing in the record to support that this actually occurred.
Also on March 7, 2014, Ketner filed a motion for summary judgment. In her motion, she argued that the prior judgment had awarded her a “possessory interest” in the house and that as a matter of law Hoskins purchased the property subject to her right of possession. Ketner also argued that the prior judgment was a matter of public record and that the deed recording the sale of the property clearly stated that the sale was “subject to covenants, conditions, restrictions and easements if any, now of record.”
Interestingly, the record contains another order filed on March 7, 2014, that states: “[T]he court having before it Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and for good cause shown, the court finds that such relief should be granted.” The order further states “that Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant for possession of the property....” We can find nothing in the record on appeal to indicate that this order was ever withdrawn by the district court.
Notwithstanding the order granting summary judgment to Ketner, it appears that a court trial was held on March 10, 2014. Unfortunately, there is no trial transcript or exhibits in the record so it is impossible to know with certainty what occurred. While the appearance docket states, “Defendant fails to appear,” a document entitled “Judgment Form” indicates that Ketner did appear for trial. The “Judgment Form” also states that Ketner was found “[g]uilty of unlawful detention of premises” and granted “restitution” of the house to Hoskins. Nevertheless, the execution of the judgment was stayed until May 1, 2014. Thereafter, on March 14, 2014, Ketner timely filed her notice of appeal with this court.
Analysis
This case presents a procedural nightmare. From what we can piece together from the meager record on appeal, several inconsistent orders were entered. On the one hand, it appears that Ketner was granted summary judgment as a matter of law. On the other hand, it appears that Hoskins prevailed in a subsequent trial. Furthermore, no record was taken of the proceedings held on March 10, 2014. As a result, we cannot determine what testimony—if any—was presented nor can we determine what exhibits—if any—were introduced.
Clearly, district courts are courts of record. K.S.A. 20–301; see Roitz v. Brooks, 5 Kan.App.2d 534, 536, 619 P.2d 1169 (1980) (district courts in civil cases are courts of record). “Failure to [make an adequate record] can only result in confusion. Frequently, neither the litigants nor the appellate courts can decipher the ruling and uncover the genuine basis upon which the trial court entered the judgment.” First Land Brokerage Corporation v. Northern, 220 Kan. 48, 51, 551 P.2d 866 (1976). Here, the confusion is magnified by the inconsistent orders in the record.
We conclude that the lack of a sufficient record in this case precludes meaningful review. Specifically, we cannot discern from the scant and inconsistent record before us whether all of the issues presented below were decided or, if they were, whether they were properly decided. Thus, we vacate the judgment and remand this case to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the record.
Vacated and remanded with directions.