Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:19-27
08-19-2019
JONATHAN M. HOSKINS, Plaintiff, v. ALLEGHENY HEALTH NETWORK, and ALLEGHENY COUNTY JAIL MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, Defendants.
District Judge Ranjan ECF Nos. 20 & 22 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Allegheny County Jail Medical Department (ECF No. 20) be granted. It is further recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Allegheny Health Network (ECF No. 22) be granted.
II. REPORT
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's original Complaint was filed on February 21, 2019, followed by his Amended Complaint on March 29, 2019. (ECF Nos. 6 & 12.) Both Defendants filed their Motions to Dismiss on May 14, 2019. Plaintiff was ordered to file a response to the Motions to Dismiss and was given a deadline of June 28, 2019. (ECF No. 25.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file his response (ECF No. 27), which was granted on June 28, 2019 (ECF No. 28). The new response deadline was set for July 29, 2019. (ECF No. 28.) As of the date of this Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff has filed no response to the Motions to Dismiss.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff, a pre-trial detainee, alleges that on December 27, at around 10:15 p.m., he was having "severe crushing chest pains" and pressed the emergency medical button. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 6.) A corrections officer answered Plaintiff's call and indicated that he had relayed the message to medical and that "the medical team were on their way." (ECF No. 12 ¶ 7.) After 15 minutes, Plaintiff pressed the button again and subsequently explained to the corrections officer that he started to feel numb on his left side, his vision was blurred, and that it was difficult to swallow. He also indicated that he was having cold sweats and was shaking uncontrollably. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 8.) Plaintiff pressed the emergency button a third time and inquired with the corrections officer whether he had called medical and whether he had logged the request; the corrections officer answered both inquiries in the affirmative. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 10.) "Soon after[,]" Plaintiff observed two nurses come to the block, but left because they did not have the appropriate equipment to check Plaintiff's vital signs or heart. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 11.) Plaintiff pressed the emergency button a fourth time and the corrections officer indicated that medical communicated they were coming next shift. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that medical did not come for 3 to 5 days because it was New Years. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 14.)
When medical started doing their rounds, Plaintiff alleges that he explained the problems he was having and medical wrote down his statements and continued doing rounds. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 15.) Plaintiff states that presently, the left side of his body feels numb all the time, his left pinky finger is bent, it's hard to swallow, and he is having blurred vision. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 16.)
B. LEGAL STANDARDS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Under the "notice pleading" standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward
with "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a "plausible" claim for relief, and "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Although "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff "need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18 (3d Cir. 2013).Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).
When considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution."). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
C. ANALYSIS
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct in the complaint was committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law and that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). Section 1983 does not create rights; it simply provides a remedy for violations of those rights created by the United States Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).
In Estelle v. Gamble, the United States Supreme Court noted that the most elementary principles underlying Eighth Amendment jurisprudence "establish the government's obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration." 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The Estelle court concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners. Id. at 104. The Court continued that a cause of action under § 1983 is thereby established "whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed." Id. at 104-05 (footnotes omitted).
Although Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, claims of denial of medical treatment by pretrial detainees are "evaluate[d] . . . under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the defendants from undertaking acts that amount to punishment." Thrower v. Alvies, 425 F. App'x 102, 104 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005)). However, the Third Circuit has held that the "Due Process Clause provides pretrial detainees with at least as much protection as is afforded to prisoners raising denial-of-medical-treatment claims under the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 105 (citing Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581-82 (3d Cir. 2003)).
It was not until 1994, however, in Farmer v. Brennan, that the United States Supreme Court clarified its meaning of the term "deliberate indifference." 511 U.S. 825 (1994). In Farmer, the Court held as follows:
We hold instead that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment . . . unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference . . . . But an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.Id. at 837-38. The Farmer court also discussed its reasoning in Estelle, noting that negligence in diagnosing or treating the medical conditions of prisoners will not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106).
A plaintiff must also demonstrate a medical need that is objectively "sufficiently serious." A medical need is "serious" if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person easily would recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).
Here, at most, Plaintiff has alleged mere negligence as to these Defendants. Plaintiff's allegations do not suggest that any of the jail or medical officials to whom he communicated his health complaints, knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff's health. Instead, Plaintiff's allegations indicate that the jail and medical officials did not perceive his health issues to constitute a significant risk such as to warrant immediate attention. Plaintiff avers that two (2) nurses did report to Plaintiff's block, but that they left after not having the appropriate equipment. Medical did return in 3-5 days and did not appear to perceive Plaintiff's condition as serious. "While no cause for commendation," medical's failure to perceive a significant risk to Plaintiff's health, if any, will not constitute deliberate indifference for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38.
In addition, Plaintiff appears to premise the liability of the Allegheny County Jail Medical Department on the theory of respondeat superior, which is not a viable basis of liability pursuant to § 1983 jurisprudence. (ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 4 & 5) ("Allegheny County Jail Medical Department . . . is contracted and ran threw [sic] Allegheny Health Network. Therefore . . . it's understood that Allegheny Health Network is responsible also.") See Monell v. Depart. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Moreover, Plaintiff does not suggest that a custom or policy of either Defendant caused his injuries. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 ("[I]t is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.").
Therefore, it is respectfully recommended that the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Allegheny County Jail Medical Department and Allegheny Health Network be granted. Any attempt to amend would be futile.
The Court notes that "[w]hen a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend a deficient complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, the court must inform the plaintiff that he has leave to amend within a set period of time, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile." Grayson v. Mayview Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,108 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, any attempt by Plaintiff to amend would be futile based on the factual allegations he has already stated, and as a matter of law. --------
III. CONCLUSION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Allegheny County Jail Medical Department (ECF No. 20) be granted. It is further recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Allegheny Health Network (ECF No. 22) be granted.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Dated: August 19, 2019
BY THE COURT
s/Lisa Pupo Lenihan
LISA PUPO LENIHAN
United States Magistrate Judge cc: Jonathan M. Hoskins
76287
Allegheny County Jail
950 2nd Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15219-3100