We must conclude that while the evidence, which is all circumstantial, may be consistent with guilt, is not wholly inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Horton v. State, Fla. 1956, 91 So.2d 304; Smoak v. State, Fla. 1956, 87 So.2d 513; and Raybon v. State, Fla. 1954, 75 So.2d 7. The verdict and judgment is reversed.

It will thus be seen that the evidence tending to connect the appellant, Ella Mae Patterson, with the crime was entirely circumstantial in character and, while it may have been consistent with guilt, it could not be considered inconsistent with innocence of the crime charged. See Horton v. State, Fla., 91 So.2d 304; Smoak v. State, Fla., 87 So.2d 513; and Raybon v. State, Fla., 75 So.2d 7. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded for new trial.

Where, as here, there is nothing more than circumstances which, at most, raise a suspicion that the accused committed the crime, we are not at liberty to uphold a finding of his guilt. See Horton v. State, 91 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1956); Smoak v. State, 87 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1956); J.L.J. v. State, 367 So.2d 699 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Accordingly, the adjudication of delinquency is reversed with directions to discharge the appellant.

A reversal of this adjudication is, accordingly, mandated under our law. See e.g. Horton v. State, 91 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1956); J.O. v. State, 384 So.2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); J.H. v. State, 370 So.2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 379 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1980). This reversal should not be interpreted, however, as condoning the juvenile's behavior in this cause as it was, to say the very least, highly suspicious.

The evidence does not eliminate the reasonable probability that the defendant moved out of the rented premises without stealing any of the property therein and that someone thereafter secured the key from the mailbox left by the defendant, entered the house and stole the property therein. Under well-settled principles of circumstantial evidence law governing criminal cases, such evidence of sudden and unexplained disappearance of property was insufficient to establish a case of grand larceny against the defendant and a judgment of acquittal should have been entered herein upon the defendant's motion. Horton v. State, 91 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1956); Smoak v. State, 87 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1956); Wallace v. State, 330 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); J.D.D. v. State, 268 So.2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Reynolds v. State, 186 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). The state argues that the deficiencies in the state's case were cured by a specific finding of the trial court that the defendant had lied in his testimony when he denied owing any back rent and denied having any conversation with the landlord just prior to leaving the house — facts to which the landlord had previously testified.