Opinion
CIV-22-448-SM
08-03-2023
JOHN D. HORTON, et al., Plaintiff, v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SUZANNE MITCHELL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff John D. Horton initiated this action on behalf of himself and his mother, Dolores M. Horton, arguing that Defendant Social Security Administration had intentionally delayed processing his and his mother's applications for Social Security benefits, filed in December 2021. Doc. 1. He seeks as relief “a writ of mandamus directing the defendant Social Security Administration to process in a timely fashion in the next 90 days both the plaintiff John Horton's application for Social Security Retirement Benefits and plaintiff Dolores Horton's application for Social Security Survivor Benefits.” Id. at 6.
Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless otherwise indicated.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction, among other defects. Doc. 23. Plaintiff then moved to voluntarily dismiss the claims relating to his own benefits, as the Social Security Administration granted his requested benefits. Doc. 24, at 1-2. Plaintiff also asked the Court to impose sanctions on counsel for the Social Security Administration.
The undersigned recommends the Court: (1) grant Plaintiff's request to voluntarily dismiss the claims relating to his own benefits; (2) grant Defendant's motion to dismiss the remainder of the complaint; and (3) deny Plaintiff's motion for sanctions.
I. Plaintiff John D. Horton's voluntary dismissal of the claims related to his own benefits.
Plaintiff attests that “[t]he relief sought in the petition related to John Horton's Social Security Retirement Benefits was granted in 2022 by the defendant,” so “[t]his portion of this case relating to John Horton's Social Security Benefits for himself is now moot.” Doc. 24, at 2. The undersigned recommends dismissal of the complaint as it relates to Plaintiff John D. Horton's benefits.
II. This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining claims.
Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Doc. 23, at 3-7.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, as such, must have a statutory basis to exercise jurisdiction.” Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002). The Court presumes a case “lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction”-Plaintiff, in this case. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citation omitted).
“Absent express waiver of sovereign immunity, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over suits against the United States.” Harrell v. United States, 443 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2006). This includes suits against federal agencies. See High Country Citizens All. v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2006) (“It is well settled that the Plaintiffs can only sue the BLM to the extent it waived its sovereign immunity.” (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). So, a party bringing a claim against a federal agency must “point to a specific waiver of immunity in order to establish jurisdiction.” Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 554 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff points to no such waiver here.
Plaintiff seeks to establish jurisdiction via 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which gives federal district courts “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” Doc. 1, at 2 n.2, and presumably 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which gives federal district courts “original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus,” see id. at 6. Neither of these provisions is an express waiver of sovereign immunity. Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1444 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Sovereign immunity is not waived by general jurisdictional statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) . . . [or] 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (action to compel a government officer to perform his duty).”).
“A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff also alludes to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 500, et seq., asserting “remedies under the [APA] have been exhausted.” Doc. 1, at 2. “The APA serves as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, not a grant of subject matter jurisdiction.” High Country Citizens All., 454 F.3d at 1181. Rather, “[f]ederal courts have limited statutory power to review decisions of the Social Security Commissioner and may review the Commissioner's decisions only as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 405.” Elliott v. Barnhart, 117 Fed.Appx. 659, 660 (10th Cir. 2004). “Section 405(g) limits judicial review to final decisions that are made after a hearing. Indeed, a final decision made after a hearing is central to a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction under § 405(g).” Id.; see also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1975) (The § 405(g) judicial review requirement of “a final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing” is interpreted “to be central to the requisite grant of subject-matter jurisdiction-the statute empowers district courts to review a particular type of decision by the Secretary, that type being those which are ‘final' and ‘made after a hearing.'”). Plaintiff does not invoke § 405 to confer jurisdiction, nor does he purport to be litigating a final agency decision. To the contrary, he purports to be challenging the Social Security Administration's delay in processing his mother's benefits.
Because Plaintiff has failed to establish this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over his claims, the undersigned recommends dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1).
III. Alternatively, Plaintiff John D. Horton fails to state a claim related to his mother's benefits, as a pro se litigant cannot pursue a federal lawsuit on another's behalf.
Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as Plaintiff John D. Horton is not authorized to sue on behalf of his mother. Doc. 23, at 11-12. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2010).
After voluntary dismissal of the claims related to Plaintiff John D. Horton's benefits, the only remaining claims are those brought by Plaintiff John D. Horton on behalf of his mother Dolores M. Horton. See Doc. 1. But “[n]on-attorney pro se litigants cannot represent other pro se parties.” Perry v. Stout, 20 Fed.Appx. 780, 782 (10th Cir. 2001); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a) (“Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's name-or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.”). Plaintiff appears to acknowledge his limited authority in his objection to Defendant's motion to dismiss, in which he asks the Court to grant him “a limited power of attorney to file the Social Security Survivor's Benefit application on behalf of the incompetent Dolores Horton.” Doc. 24, at 2.
The undersigned therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), and dismissal on this ground would also be appropriate. See Cain v. Aragon, 632 Fed.Appx. 517, 518 (10th Cir. 2016) (agreeing with the district court that plaintiff “has not ‘state[d] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'” because he “can only claim violations of his own constitutional rights” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)); Espinoza v. City of Fort Worth, 32 Fed.Appx. 131, 2002 WL 335278 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) because plaintiff “is attempting to proceed pro se in asserting claims on behalf of [ ] a closely-held corporation in which he was an officer and a shareholder, and not claims on his own behalf,” which “he cannot do” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654)).
IV. Alternatively, Plaintiff John D. Horton lacks standing to bring a claim on his mother's behalf.
As “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction,” Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing he has standing to bring a claim on his mother's behalf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). “The doctrine of standing asks whether a litigant is entitled to have a federal court resolve his grievance. This inquiry involves ‘both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.'” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128 (2004) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
A threshold to the question of standing is prudential standing. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (2005) (“[T]he prudential standing doctrine represents the sort of ‘threshold question' [the Court] has recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction.”). This is “a judicially-created set of principles that, like constitutional standing, places ‘limits on the class of persons who may invoke the courts' decisional and remedial powers.'” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs. of Sweetwater Cnty. v. Geringer, 297 F.3d 1108, 1112 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499). One of these principles is that “a plaintiff must assert his ‘own rights, rather than those belonging to third parties.'” Sweetwater Cnty., 297 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Sac & Fox Nation of Missouri v. Pierce, 213 F.3d 566, 573 (10th Cir. 2000)). A plaintiff may still assert the rights of another under the third-party standing doctrine if he can make two showings: first, that he “has a ‘close' relationship with the person who possesses the right,” and second, that “there is a ‘hindrance' to the possessor's ability to protect [her] own interests.” Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)).
Plaintiff makes no such showing here. In his objection to Defendant's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff alleges that his mother “is not competent to petition for Social Security Survivor's Benefits due to her advanced senility and Alzheimer's Disease.” Doc. 24, at 2. Liberally construing this allegation as an assertion of a hindrance related to prudential standing, Plaintiff has still not alleged he has a close relationship with his mother, let alone provided any proof of such a close relationship. He therefore cannot overcome the prudential standing principle that a plaintiff may only assert his own rights and so has no standing to bring a claim on behalf of his mother.
V. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions is meritless.
Plaintiff asks the Court to impose sanctions on Assistant United States Attorney R.D. Evans, Jr., “for failing to make any attempt to amicably settle this case” and for allegedly “direct[ing] the U.S. Marshal for the Western District of Oklahoma to locate the plaintiff without the benefit of a search, wiretapping or electronic surveillance warrant issued by this court,” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff alleges Evans dispatched a United States Marshal to an internet service provider used by Plaintiff “and requested geolocation information regarding the routers used by the plaintiff in serving via email copies of documents associated with this or other cases on the U.S. Attorney.” Id. The undersigned recommends the Court deny Plaintiff's motion for sanctions, as it does not comply with the procedural requirements for a motion for sanctions.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, “[a] motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(2). Plaintiff requested sanctions as part of a combined pleading that also contains his motion to dismiss his claims related to his own benefits and his objections to Defendant's motion to dismiss. Doc. 24.
As well, Plaintiff disregarded the Rule 11 “safe harbor” provision, which requires “a copy of the actual motion for sanctions to be served on the person(s) accused of sanctionable behavior at least twenty-one days prior to the filing of that motion.” Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(2). This provision is intended to ensure “that a party will not be subject to sanctions on the basis of another party's motion unless, after receiving the motion, it refuses to withdraw that position or to acknowledge candidly that it does not currently have evidence to support a specified allegation.” Roth, 466 F.3d at 1192 (emphasis added) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, advisory committee notes to 1993 amendments).
Pro se plaintiffs must follow the same rules as any other litigant. See Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Although we construe [Plaintiff's] pleadings liberally because he is a pro se litigant, he nevertheless must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.”). The undersigned therefore recommends denial of Plaintiff's motion for sanctions.
VI. Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the complaint in its entirety and denial of Plaintiff's motion for sanctions.
The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this report and recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before August 17, 2023, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to make a timely objection to this report and recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).