Horton v. Halff

3 Citing cases

  1. Kenedy Pasture Co. v. State of Texas

    111 Tex. 200 (Tex. 1921)   Cited 19 times

    Many tracts of land are now supposed to be safely held under junior locations and patents, accompanied by three-year adverse possession, and such junior titles have been consistently sustained by the Courts of this State on the theory of three-year limitation. Grigsby v. May, 84 Tex. 240, 249; League v. Rogan, 59 Tex. 427, 432; Galan v. Goliad, 32 Tex. 776 [ 32 Tex. 776], 787; Charle v. Saffold, 13 Tex. 94 [ 13 Tex. 94], 109; Converse v. Langshaw, 81 Tex. 275 [ 81 Tex. 275], 278; Sabine, etc., Lumber Co. v. Cagle, 149 S.W. 697, 699-701; Payne v. Ellwood, 163 S.W. 93, 96; Campbell v. Gibbs, 161 S.W. 430, 436; Horton v. Halff, 147 S.W. 735. A survey was required by the Act of 1852, as a prerequisite to issuance of patent, and under the circumstances of the instant case, the surveys made for said purpose, followed by the issuance and delivery of the patents, must be held to have been authoritative compromises and adjustments of the true grant lines of the El Paistle and Las Barrosas. United States v. Roselius, 15 How., 31, 14 L.E., 587, 589; West v. Cochran, 58 U.S. 403, 15 L.E., 110, 115; Arguello v. United States, 59 U.S. 539, 15 L.E., 478, 481; Sideck v. Duran, 67 Tex. 256, 264.

  2. Allen v. Draper

    204 S.W. 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918)   Cited 3 times

    This patent did not convey to him the paramount title to the part of the land in conflict with survey No. 162, because of the priority of the survey of No. 162; but the patent is color of title from the sovereignty of the soil and is sufficient to enable the Drapers, the appellees, by three years' adverse possession of the conflict land, to secure to themselves a right thereto superior to the right of appellant Allen, though of course the Drapers, by this three years' limitation, cannot affect the right of the state to forfeiture for nonpayment. Gullett v. O'Connor, 54 Tex. 416; Grigsby v. May, 84 Tex. 240 -249, 19 S.W. 343; Horton v. Halff, 147 S.W. 735; Hulett v. Platt, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 377, 109 S.W. 207; Smith v. Power, 23 Tex. 34; Payne v. Ellwood, 163 S.W. 97; League v. Rogan, 59 Tex. 432; Anderson v. Jackson, 69 Tex. 346, 6 S.W. 575; Galan v. Town of Goliad, 32 Tex. 776; Williamson v. Brown, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 402, 109 S.W. 412; Converse v. Langshaw, 81 Tex. 275, 16 S.W. 1031; Houston Oil Co. v. Wm. M. Rice Ins. Co., 194 S.W. 415. There are several decisions by Texas Courts of Appeals that might be construed to hold that a patent to land appropriated by a survey made prior to the survey for which the patent issued is void, because forbidden by the Constitution, and being void such patent is not the color of title from the sovereignty required by the three-year statute of limitation.

  3. Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Wm. M. Rice

    194 S.W. 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917)   Cited 10 times

    We therefore hold that all junior patents issued by the state of Texas on lands, where the issuance of patents had not been expressly prohibited by law, are color of title, and will support the three years' statute of limitation, upon the ground that there being, on the date of the issuance of the patent to the Porter survey, no law expressly prohibiting the issuance of junior patents by the officers of the state of Texas, and the power of the officer existed to act in the issuance of a junior patent, his erroneous action in so acting would not be void, but at most would be only voidable; otherwise, any person may attack a patent for errors in the judgment of the officer empowered to issue it, and that which is intended to be among the highest evidence of title be open to question by anyone. League v. Rogan, 59 Tex. 430; Smith v. Power, 23 Tex. 30; Gullett v. O'Connor, 54 Tex. 416; Horton v. Halff, 147 S.W. 735; Grigsby v. May, 84 Tex. 240, 19 S.W. 345; Pohle v. Robertson, 102 Tex. 274, 115 S.W. 1167; Williamson v. Brown, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 402, 109 S.W. 412; Garrison v. Arnett, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 537, 126 S.W. 611; Williamson v, Miller-Vidor Lbr. Co., 178 S.W. 800. Appellant earnestly urges, under its third contention, that the tract claimed by appellee having been subdivided, the statute of limitation cannot be invoked by appellee to a subdivision of which it had never been in possession.