Opinion
CASE NO. 20-3080-SAC
07-22-2020
CODY HORTON, Plaintiff, v. CORIZON, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Norton Correctional Facility in Norton, Kansas, the claims giving rise to his Complaint occurred while he was incarcerated at the Lansing Correctional Facility in Lansing, Kansas ("LCF"). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff alleges that in June 2016, while housed at the Reception and Diagnostic Unit ("RDU") at El Dorado Correctional Facility, Plaintiff woke up one morning and was unable to see out of his left eye and was experiencing severe pain. Plaintiff informed a Corizon nurse ("Defendant 1") of his condition, and Defendant 1 did a basic eye exam and informed Plaintiff that they could not do anything for him. No further action was taken at that time. In October or November of 2016, while incarcerated at LCF, Plaintiff again sought medical attention for his left eye. Another Corizon nurse ("Defendant 2") gave Plaintiff the same response as Defendant 1. However, Defendant 2 did say that a call-out would be made for Plaintiff to see the facility eye doctor. A call-out was not made until several months later, after Plaintiff had voiced his concern to a teacher in a class Plaintiff was taking. A Corizon employee at LCF ("Defendant 3") is responsible for making the call-out list for the facility eye doctor. The facility eye doctor's exam revealed that Plaintiff had a detached retina in his left eye. A referral was made for Plaintiff to see an off-site provider at KUHC Eye Clinic in Prairie Village, Kansas. In March 2018, Plaintiff had a laser procedure to reattach the retina on his left eye. The procedure was unsuccessful in restoring his eye sight. Plaintiff alleges that he now has permanent loss of sight and pain in his left eye.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying and delaying his medical treatment, causing permanent blindness and pain. Plaintiff named Corizon and three unnamed Corizon staff members as defendants. Plaintiff seeks punitive and compensatory damages.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant's "conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained "that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated." Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court "will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf." Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts "look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief." Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, "a plaintiff must 'nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). "Plausible" in this context does not mean "likely to be true," but rather refers "to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent," then the plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
The Eighth Amendment guarantees a prisoner the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. "[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).
The "deliberate indifference" standard includes both an objective and a subjective component. Martinez v. Garden, 430 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In the objective analysis, the deprivation must be "sufficiently serious," and the inmate must show the presence of a "serious medical need," that is "a serious illness or injury." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 105; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994), Martinez, 430 F.3d at 1304 (citation omitted). A serious medical need includes "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Martinez, 430 F.3d at 1304 (quoting Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000)).
"The subjective component is met if a prison official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Id. (quoting Sealock, 218 F.3d at 1209). In measuring a prison official's state of mind, "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 1305 (quoting Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 1996)).
Delay in providing medical care does not violate the Eighth Amendment, unless there has been deliberate indifference resulting in substantial harm. Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1993). In situations where treatment was delayed rather than denied altogether, the Tenth Circuit requires a showing that the inmate suffered "substantial harm" as a result of the delay. Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). "The substantial harm requirement 'may be satisfied by lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or considerable pain.'" Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2001)).
The Court finds that the proper processing of Plaintiff's medical claim cannot be achieved without additional information from appropriate officials of LCF. See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978); see also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the Court orders the appropriate officials of LCF to prepare and file a Martinez Report. Once the report has been received, the Court can properly screen Plaintiff's claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that :
(1) The Clerk of Court shall send a waiver of service to Defendant Corizon.
(2) KDOC shall have sixty (60) days to prepare the Martinez Report.
(3) Officials responsible for the operation of LCF are directed to undertake a review of the subject matter of the Complaint:
a. To ascertain the facts and circumstances;
b. To consider whether any action can and should be taken by the institution to resolve the subject matter of the Complaint; and
c. To determine whether other like complaints, whether pending in this Court or elsewhere, are related to this Complaint and should be considered together.
(4) Upon completion of the review, a written report shall be compiled which shall be filed with the Court and served on Plaintiff. The KDOC must seek leave of the Court if it wishes to file certain exhibits or portions of the report under seal or without service on Plaintiff. Statements of all witnesses shall be in affidavit form. Copies of pertinent rules, regulations, official documents, and, wherever appropriate, the reports of medical or psychiatric examinations shall be included in the written report. Any recordings related to Plaintiff's claims shall also be included.
(5) Authorization is granted to the officials of LCF to interview all witnesses having knowledge of the facts, including Plaintiff.
(6) No answer or motion addressed to the Complaint shall be filed until the Martinez Report required herein has been prepared.
(7) Discovery by Plaintiff shall not commence until Plaintiff has received and reviewed Defendants' answer or response to the Complaint and the report ordered herein. This action is exempted from the requirements imposed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) and 26(f).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter KDOC as an interested party on the docket for the limited purpose of preparing the Martinez Report ordered herein. Upon the filing of that report, KDOC may move for termination from this action.
Copies of this order shall be transmitted to Plaintiff, to Defendants, and to the Attorney General for the State of Kansas.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated July 22, 2020, in Topeka, Kansas.
s/ Sam A. Crow
Sam A. Crow
U.S. Senior District Judge