Opinion
C.A. No. 02-368 T
December 12, 2002
Report and Recommendation
Jeffrey Scott Hornoff, pro se, ("plaintiff"), has filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection fights. Plaintiff names as defendants Ashbel T. Wall, Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections ("R.I. DOC"), and Michael Reynolds, Deputy Warden of the R.I. DOC High Security Center. Both defendants are sued in their individual capacities.
This matter is currently before the Court on the defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has objected thereto. This matter has been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for a report and recommendation. For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the motion to dismiss be granted.
Background
The following are the factual allegations from the Complaint, which are taken as true for purposes of this motion:
At the times relevant in the Complaint, plaintiff was an inmate at the Adult Correctional Institutions, Cranston, Rhode Island. When plaintiff began his confinement, he was classified as a protective custody inmate, category "A", housed with other protective custody inmates in the Intake Service Center ("Intake"). On October 28, 2001, he and the rest of the protective custody inmates where transferred from Intake to the High Security Center ("HSC") — a more restrictive confinement facility. Plaintiff avers that the HSC is used to house Rhode Island's most dangerous inmates, most of whom are enemies of the protective custody inmates. Inmates housed in the HSC are "B" and "C" category inmates. Plaintiff avers that no hearing occurred prior to his transfer to the HSC, and he did not receive any disciplinary infractions or a reclassification of his inmate category prior to his transfer.
Another individual has since confessed to the murder for which the plaintiff was incarcerated. The plaintiff has been released from physical custody.
Although he maintained the same inmate classification, after being transferred to the HSC, plaintiff avers that he did not receive the same privileges as category "A" inmates in general population. Specifically, he asserts the following restrictions: (1) fewer visitation privileges, (2) fewer recreational privileges, (3) reduced access to rehabilitative and educational programs, (4) decreased pay for his employment as a prison law clerk, from $3.00 a day to $2.00 a day, (5) restrictions on the mail the could receive, and (6) a reduction in the material he could order from outside vendors (books, sneakers, etc.).
Based upon these allegations, plaintiff seeks relief under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. Defendants have moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed an opposition thereto.
Discussion
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of actions which fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept the well pleaded averments of the *** complaint as true, and construe these facts in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff]."Chongris v. Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1987). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will only be granted when, viewed in this manner, it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-6, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102 (1957). Under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a reviewing court is obliged neither to credit bald assertions, periphrastic circumlocutions, unsubstantiated conclusions, or outright vituperation, nor to honor subjective characterizations, optimistic predictions, or problematic suppositions." United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1992). Unverifiable conclusions, not supported by the stated facts, deserve no deference. Id. Thus, in ruling on the motion to dismiss, the pertinent inquiry is whether plaintiff's complaint sets forth sufficient factual allegations which, if proven, would support his claims of a deprivation of federal rights.
Plaintiff has brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Thus, in order to maintain a section 1983 action, the conduct complained must be committed by a person acting under color of state law and the conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right or a federal statutory right. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 (1980); see also, Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689 (1979) (constitutional deprivations); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502 (1980) (statutory deprivations). Here, there is no dispute that defendants acted under the color of state law. The only question that remains is whether the facts alleged set forth a constitutional deprivation.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution provides that a state may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend XIV. Here, plaintiff complains that the defendants infringed upon his liberty interest due to his transfer from Intake to the High Security Center. I disagree.
The due process rights of prisoners are subject to reasonable restrictions, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1979), and "the transfer of an inmate to a less amenable and more restrictive quarters for non-punitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence." Hewitt v. Helm, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983). The due process clause confers no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within the sentence imposed.Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995). It is well settled that the decision on where to place inmates within a correctional system is matter of discretion for prison officials. See e.g. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976). Accordingly, plaintiff's due process claim, based on his transfer to a different, more restrictive confinement facility, should fail. I so recommend.
D. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiff also asserts in his Complaint that the defendants violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The essence of equal protection is that "all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). The state may apply the law differently based on distinctive factual circumstances if the distinction is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. When, however, the distinction (or discrimination) is based upon a "suspect classification" or effects a fundamental right, the constitutional scrutiny sharpens its focus to determine whether the classification is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982). A fundamental right is one that is otherwise guaranteed in the constitution. Id. at 217 note 15.
Plaintiff complains that defendants moved him to the HSC as a protective custody, "A" category inmate, and refused to provide him the same privileges given to an "A" category, general population inmate. When there is an equal protection claim made against an individualized decision of a state official, the same analysis is applied as is commonly used in the context of allegedly unlawful legislative decisions. O'Bar v. Pinion, 953 F.2d 74, 81 (4th Cir. 1991). The defendants' power to draw a distinction between protective custody inmates, and the general population is subject to the constitutional requirement that the distinction be rational rather than arbitrary and capricious. Naduea v. Helgemore, 561 F.2d 411, 415 (1st Cir. 1977). Thus, the defendants must have a reason that is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose for the distinction.
Here one need not look further than the plaintiff's complaint to determine the reason for the distinction. Plaintiff avers that defendant Reynolds informed him that the reduction in privileges while housed in the HSC was required "in order to not upset the men" who were also housed in the HSC. Maintaining order in the prison is certainly a legitimate governmental purpose and by limiting privileges of inmates housed in a particular unit or facility is rationally related to that purpose. Accordingly, plaintiff's equal protection claim should be dismissed. I so recommend.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, I recommend that defendants' motion to dismiss be granted. Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be specific and must be filed with the Clerk of Court within ten days of its receipt. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Local Rule 32. Failure to file timely, specific objections to this report constitutes waiver of both the right to review by the district court and the right to appeal the district court's decision. United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1980).