"It seems pretty well established that a person can abandon an office. Horn v. Wells, 253 Ky. 494, 69 S.W.2d 1011; 46 C.J. 980, 981; 67 C.J.S., Officers, § 56. But it seems that in order to constitute an abandonment of an office it must be total and the conduct such as to clearly show a complete relinquishment. "Abandonment is not one of the regular and recognized ways of vacating an office and it is the view of this court that the courts should be slow to decree an abandonment unless there is fairly conclusive evidence of the intent to abandon, or the inference is inescapable that there was an abandonment.
There is also evidence of open use of intoxicating liquor in various of the precincts by workers. While as a general proposition appellee is not shown by the proof to have had general knowledge of the use of money or whisky for sinister purposes, his failure to explain what was done with the package of money given him by Ratliff, or to include it as a contribution in his expense account, or to otherwise account for its legal use, violated the provisions of the Corrupt Practice Act as construed in Horn v. Wells, 253 Ky. 494, 69 S.W.2d 1011, though as we have concluded, as manifested above, the records show that the illegal votes cast for him would reduce his majority by more than 12, the returned majority. However, this conclusion is far from justifying us in holding that appellant is entitled to a certificate of election, since it is clear that he violated the provisions of the act, and we need go no further than his own testimony to demonstrate the fact.
Caudill v. Prewitt, 250 Ky. 698, 63 S.W.2d 954; Lewis v. Sizemore, 274 Ky. 58, 118 S.W.2d 133; Wheeler v. Marshall, 280 Ky. 55, 132 S.W.2d 519. Counsel for appellant discusses our opinions in Charles v. Flanary, 192 Ky. 511, 233 S.W. 904; Asher v. Broughton, 231 Ky. 165, 21 S.W.2d 260; Smith v. Ward, 280 Ky. 173, 132 S.W.2d 762; Howard v. Whittaker, 250 Ky. 836, 64 S.W. 173; Horn v. Wells, 253 Ky. 494, 69 S.W.2d 1011, and perhaps other cognate cases. In reference to election contest cases it was written in Smith v. Ward [ 280 Ky. 173, 132 S.W.2d 765]: "Each case must be determined by its own facts and circumstances, as developed by the testimony."
In the case of McKinney v. Barker, 180 Ky. 526, 203 S.W. 303, L.R.A. 1918E, 581, we dealt extensively with the term "election" as used in our Constitution and statutes, and distinctly pointed out that the process of choosing officers for the administration of government by the people — which is called an election — is the exercise of a governmental right pursuant to a political policy adopted by the particular government. We have also held in the cases of Ridings v. Jones, 213 Ky. 810, 281 S.W. 999, Horn v. Wells, 253 Ky. 494, 69 S.W.2d 1011, and others that the provisions of our Corrupt Practices Act (Ky. Stats., sec. 1565b-1 et seq.) relating to candidates for election to school offices applied to them, although they are not required to be nominated at a primary election. In so holding we necessarily concluded that the object and purposes sought to be accomplished by the Corrupt Practices Act were as essential and necessary in the election of school officers as it was in the election of any other governmental officers.