The standard for determining the validity of a plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to the defendant. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); Hopkins v. State, 1988 OK CR 257, ¶ 2, 764 P.2d 215, 216. When a defendant claims that his or her plea was entered through inadvertence, ignorance, influence or without deliberation, he has the burden of showing that the plea was entered as a result of one of these reasons and that there is a defense that should be presented to the jury. Estell v. State, 1988 OK CR 287, ¶ 7, 766 P.2d 1380, 1383.
¶6 The standard for determining the validity of a plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to the defendant. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); Hopkins v. State, 1988 OK CR 257, ¶ 2, 764 P.2d 215, 216. The Supreme Court has defined a "voluntary" guilty plea in pertinent part as one made by a defendant who is "fully aware of the direct consequences[.]" Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (internal quotation omitted).
Fields v. Gibson, 277 F.3d 1203, 1212 (10th Cir. 2002). In rejecting petitioner's challenge to the validity of his guilty pleas, the OCCA cited Hopkins v. State, 764 P.2d 215, 216 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988), for the proposition that the legal "standard for determining the validity of [a] guilty plea is whether [the] plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the courses of action open to the defendant." Dkt. # 10-5, OCCA Op., at 3.
The standard for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to the defendant. North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970) ; Hopkins v. State , 1988 OK CR 257, ¶ 2, 764 P.2d 215, 216. On this record, Petitioner fails to show that his plea was invalid.
The decision to allow the withdrawal of a plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court and we will not interfere unless we find an abuse of discretion. Hopkins v. State, 764 P.2d 215 (Okla. Cr. 1988); Vuletich v. State, 735 P.2d 568 (Okla. Cr. 1987); Ligon v. State, 712 P.2d 74 (Okla. Cr. 1986). There is no error identified here which would justify a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's request to withdraw the plea.
In fact, the documents before us indicate just the opposite. The decision to allow the withdrawal of a plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court and we will not interfere unless we find an abuse of discretion. Hopkins v. State, 764 P.2d 215 (Okla. Cr. 1988); Vuletich v. State, 735 P.2d 568 (Okla. Cr. 1987); Ligon v. State, 712 P.2d 74 (Okla. Cr. 1986). Insofar as we have not identified any insufficiencies in the procedures followed, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. Sentencing Stage
Having considered the errors which Appellant raises in connection with our review of the trial court's denial of Appellant's request to withdraw his guilty plea, we cannot reach the conclusion that the trial court erred. The decision to allow the withdrawal of a plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court and we will not interfere unless we find an abuse of discretion. Hopkins v. State, 764 P.2d 215 (Okla. Cr. 1988); Vuletich v. State, 735 P.2d 568 (Okla. Cr. 1987); Ligon v. State, 712 P.2d 74 (Okla. Cr. 1986); Darnell v. State, 623 P.2d 617 (Okla. Cr. 1981). Insofar as Petitioner has failed to allege any irregularities which would indicate that his plea was involuntary, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. With the validity of Appellant's plea established, we shift our consideration to the penalty portion of the proceedings.
No legal reason has been presented which compels us to find that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Petitioner's request to withdraw his plea. Hopkins v. State, 764 P.2d 215 (Okla. Cr. 1988); Vuletich v. State, 735 P.2d 568 (Okla. Cr. 1987); Ligon v. State, 712 P.2d 74 (Okla. Cr. 1986). The fact that Petitioner may have had some defense to the commission of the crime is of no consequence to a determination of the voluntariness of a guilty plea.