Opinion
B203608
9-29-2008
JERRY T. HOPKINS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DAVID MACK et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Stuart Law Firm, Antony Stuart and E. Glenn Anaiscourt for Plaintiff and Appellant. Brown & White, Thomas M. Brown, Kenneth P. White, Katherine C. McBroom and Alfredo X. Jarrin for Defendants and Respondents.
Not to be Published
In this action for damages for fraud in the sale of health insurance, the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendants and respondents Phil Quinn (Quinn), Quinn Division, David Mack (Mack), and Mack Region (collectively, the demurring defendants) to all causes of action against them contained in plaintiff and appellant Jerry T. Hopkinss first amended complaint (FAC). As Hopkins waived his right to amend, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice. Hopkins contends he sufficiently pleaded the demurring defendants were liable for damages based on coconspirator liability. We hold the FAC fails to allege facts sufficient to impose liability on the demurring defendants on a conspiracy theory and accordingly affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Allegations of the FAC
Hopkins and his wife, Linda L. Hopkins, filed a complaint for damages against the demurring defendants, Mega Life and Health Insurance Company (Mega), the National Association for the Self-Employed (NASE), Lisa Bauer (Bauer), Specialized Association Services (SAS), and Robert Hughes (Hughes) (collectively, defendants). In the FAC, Hopkins alleged the demurring defendants and Bauer were independent contractors or corporations, not employees of any other defendant. Bauer, Quinn, and Mack were licensed insurance agents. Bauer was licensed to sell insurance for one company, Mega. SAS was a corporation engaged in the sale of health insurance. Hughes was president and a member of the Board of Directors of NASE.
Linda Hopkins died during the pendency of the action. Hopkins alleged he succeeded to her causes of action.
In paragraph 16 of the FAC, Hopkins alleged on information and belief that defendants were "under common control and ownership, and operate[d] as a unified business arrangement" that had been created by Ronald Jensen, a former chairman of the board of HealthMarkets (formerly, UICI Marketing, Inc. (UICI)). Jensen developed an arrangement known as the "`association method of marketing individually written health insurance policies." "Under the `association method of marketing individually written health insurance policies, . . . NASE permits its name to be used by insurance agents, and for said insurance agents to act as its `representatives and/or `enrollers in the presentation of the benefits of membership of . . . NASE, but whose primary purpose is to sell Mega health insurance policies, including the `Health Choice Benefit Plan (the `Subject Policy)." HealthMarkets, the parent corporation of Mega, controlled NASE through SAS and Mega, for the purpose of marketing individually-written health insurance policies. Quinn Division and Mack Region were independent sales organizations.
HealthMarkets and UICI were originally named as defendants. In the opening brief, Hopkins states the trial court granted HealthMarkets and UICIs motions to quash service of summons.
In paragraph 17 of the FAC, Hopkins alleged "defendants[] `association method marketing scheme leads consumers to believe . . . NASE uses its status as a[n] independent, national, non-profit association to negotiate a valuable benefit for its members with a carefully selected insurance company, Mega. In their sales presentations, NASE representatives misrepresent the [Subject Policy] as obtained by . . . NASE at significant savings because of that associations `group buying power." The true fact is the selection of Mega is imposed upon NASE by NASEs relationship with SAS and Mega.
In paragraph 19 of the FAC, Hopkins alleged on information and belief that HealthMarkets, Mega, NASE, Bauer, the demurring defendants, and SAS "utilize the `association method marketing scheme in order to lend credibility" to the policies sold through NASE and to the sales presentation of the Subject Policy. This "association method" of marketing led consumers to believe NASE independently evaluates policies of different companies to determine which is best suited for its members. NASE endorses the Subject Policy and makes untrue representations on its website, in direct mail solicitations, and in advertisements. In correspondence with prospects, "Mega insurance agents/NASE representatives" represent NASE can negotiate deals just like the large corporations.
In paragraph 21 of the FAC, Hopkins alleged on information and belief that Mega, NASE, Bauer, the demurring defendants, and SAS recruit and train hundreds or thousands of agents in a training program designed by SAS, Mega, and NASE to ensure the sales presentations about the Subject Policy are conducted in accordance with the "association method" of marketing health insurance. Agents such as Bauer "are strictly dependent upon the defendants SAS, Mega, sales organizations including defendants Quinn Division and Mack Region, and sales leaders including [Quinn and Mack], for sales leads and for payment of their sales commissions, such that they are subject to complete control of their sales presentations as dictated to them by such other defendants and each of them." SAS and Mega operate a "commission only compensation program through a `pyramid style agent hierarchy that guarantees sales agents will follow the specific sales presentation techniques and messages required by said defendants[.]"
In early November 2004, Hopkins heard a radio advertisement by NASE offering the self-employed access to affordable health insurance. The Hopkinses were in the market for insurance. Hopkins responded to the advertisement. SAS, Mega, and NASE arranged for Bauer to deliver a sales presentation to the Hopkinses. During her presentation, Bauer made affirmative misrepresentations. She stated that NASE sought the best affordable insurance, provided significant savings through group buying power, and was able to negotiate benefits akin to the benefits enjoyed by employees of large corporations. In fact, NASE never offered a health insurance policy of any company that Jensen did not own or run, never considered offering policies other than policies of HealthMarkets subsidiaries or affiliates, did not provide significant savings on health insurance, did not exercise group buying power, and recommended policies that were individually underwritten, not a single group policy. NASE operated for the benefit of HealthMarkets, its subsidiaries and affiliates, rather than for its own members. NASE did not negotiate benefits typical of the benefits enjoyed by employees of large companies. The policies provided very little coverage in the event of a serious medical problem. "The defendants were aware of these facts and did not disclose them to prospective members, including the Hopkins."
Hopkins told Bauer he wanted the same coverage he had always had through his work, which was an 80/20 plan, under which the insurer paid 80 percent of medical costs after the insured paid a deductible. He stated he wanted the coverage to protect him from losing his house in the event of a serious medical condition requiring hospitalization. Bauer falsely represented NASE had a policy that satisfied these requirements. She sold Hopkins a policy that provided very little coverage in the event of a serious medical problem. The Subject Policy was not a typical 80/20 policy and did not pay 80 percent of medical costs after a deductible. The Subject Policys maximum daily benefits were below a hospitals typical charges, which left Hopkins and his wife responsible for significant uncovered amounts. The Subject Policy did not include the typical stop-loss provision that protects the insured from financial ruin in case of a serious illness.
Bauer had tools from the demurring defendants, HealthMarkets, SAS, and Mega for calculating the customers premiums. Bauer quoted the Hopkinses an initial premium of between $600 and $ 700 per month, which was an affirmative misrepresentation, because the premium was $1,136 per month. Bauer affirmatively misrepresented that she was a breast cancer survivor who was lucky she had good insurance.
The Hopkinses policy became effective on November 28, 2004. At her annual physical examination on November 29, 2004, Linda Hopkins was diagnosed with ovarian cancer and surgery was scheduled to remove the ovarian tumors on December 17, 2004.
On December 13, 2004, the Hopkinses received their policy and discovered the initial premium was $1,136. It was too late for the Hopkinses to cancel the policy and obtain other insurance before the surgery took place. The policy paid no more than a small fraction of the total medical bills for the cancer treatment and left the Hopkinses personally responsible for unpaid medical bills in excess of $200,000.
Hopkins alleged on information and belief that "management-level employees of each . . . defendant . . . authorized, approved and ratified the conduct of the defendants, and each of them." Defendants conduct is part of a nationwide fraudulent marketing scheme and civil conspiracy that continues to the present time. The acts resulting in damage to the Hopkinses were done in furtherance of the common design, with each participant responsible as joint tortfeasors for the damages ensuing from the wrongs without regard to whether they were direct actors.
Bauer, who was licensed to sell for Mega and authorized by Mega to sell insurance in its behalf, "omitted material facts and made affirmative misrepresentations as alleged herein in accordance with the training that she received from Mega, [the demurring defendants], SAS and . . . NASE." Mega trained Bauer to misrepresent the Subject Policy, and "all of the other defendants . . . conspired with . . . Bauer to deceive the Hopkins[es] through material omissions and affirmative misrepresentations."
Defendants promised the Hopkinses that if they became members of NASE, they "would enjoy significant savings on their health insurance to the . . . NASEs strength in numbers and group buying power that gave . . . NASE the ability to negotiate benefits akin to those that employees of large corporations typically enjoy."
The FAC alleged nine causes of action, including six against the demurring defendants. In the third cause of action for damages of intentional misrepresentation, Hopkins alleged defendants "and each of them, through their authorized agent . . . Bauer . . . made affirmative misrepresentations of material fact to the Hopkins[es] regarding the nature, scope and extent of their health insurance coverage," with knowledge the representations were false and an intent that the Hopkins[es] rely on these representations.
In the fourth cause of action for fraud by concealment, Hopkins alleged the demurring defendants, Mega, NASE, and SAS, "and each of them, through their authorized agent . . . Bauer . . . disclosed some facts to the Hopkins[es] but intentionally failed to disclose other important facts, making the disclosure deceptive."
The fifth cause of action for promissory fraud alleged defendants "and each of them" made promises to the Hopkinses that they relied on, that were affirmative misrepresentations, and which defendants had no intention of honoring.
The sixth cause of action for negligent misrepresentation alleged defendants misrepresented important facts, which defendants had no reasonable grounds to believe to be true and which were not true. The misrepresentations were made with the intent that the Hopkinses would rely on them, and they did. Bauer "made these misrepresentations in accordance with the training she received from" the demurring defendants, Mega, NASE, SAS, and Hughes. The demurring defendants, Mega, NASE, and SAS "ratified Bauers conduct vis-à-vis the Hopkins[es]. Moreover, all of the other defendants, and each of them, conspired with . . . Bauer to deceive the Hopkins[es] through material omissions and affirmative misrepresentations."
In the eighth cause of action for negligence, the FAC alleged that Mack Region, Quinn Division, Mega, NASE, SAS, and Hughes each owed a duty to the Hopkinses to disclose the true facts about the Subject Policy and breached this duty.
In the ninth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it was alleged defendants knew that a number of the insureds would contract a life-threatening illness and would only discover their families exposure to financial distress under the Subject Policy at a time when they were attempting to obtain medical care for their seriously-ill loved-ones. Defendants were aware that, as a result of their conduct, the threat of impending financial ruin would cause severe emotional distress. As a result of defendants conduct, Hopkins suffered severe mental and emotional distress.
Attached to the FAC was a copy of the Subject Policy. The Subject Policy does not name or reference the demurring defendants.
Demurrer to the FAC and Opposition to the Demurrer
The demurring defendants filed a demurrer to the FAC on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, because as to all causes of action asserted against them, the demurring defendants cannot be liable for the alleged misrepresentations of an independent contractor. As to the third, sixth, and eighth causes of action, the demurring defendants argued that Hopkins cannot show justifiable reliance and the alleged misrepresentations are not actionable. As to the fourth cause of action, the demurring defendants maintained that Hopkins failed to plead a duty to disclose and failed to plead facts to support he was unaware of the alleged omissions. As to the fifth cause of action, they argued Hopkins failed to plead the demurring defendants promised to perform some future act and Hopkins cannot demonstrate justifiable reliance. As to the ninth cause of action, fraudulent misrepresentations are not extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law and emotional distress damages are not available for fraud claims. Further, Hopkins failed to allege facts of an alter ego relationship.
Hopkins filed an opposition to the demurrer, contending the action arose from a conspiracy involving multiple defendants, and the demurring defendants are liable as coconspirators. The contention that Hopkins cannot show justifiable reliance depends on facts outside the complaint. Whether misrepresentations are mere puffing is a question of fact, not law. The demurring defendants owed Hopkins a duty to disclose material facts because Bauer was "part of the defendant sales organizations[.]" "[Bauers] actions and conduct vis-à-vis the Hopkins[es] are their actions and conduct." The allegations defendants made promises they had no intention to keep states a cause of action for promissory fraud. Whether the alleged conduct is sufficiently outrageous to warrant the recovery of mental distress damages is a question of fact.
Ruling on Demurrer
The trial court sustained the demurrer to each cause of action on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. The court stated: "Plaintiff alleges that . . . Quinn and . . . Mack are independent contractors, and that Quinn Division and Mack Region are independent sales organizations. None of these defendants is alleged to have knowledge of plaintiff before he bought the policy here, or to have made any representations to plaintiff, or to have had any dealings with plaintiff in relation to plaintiffs purchase of the health insurance policy in dispute here. Plaintiff alleges these defendants sell the same type of policy, using the same marketing methods as Lisa Bauer, another independent contractor who dealt with plaintiff in his purchase of the policy. Plaintiff alleges all defendants are co-conspirators in a plan to sell such policies, using sales techniques that plaintiff alleges are misleading. Plaintiff has not alleged any agreement among these defendants to engage in any activity to harm plaintiff. The allegations that all defendants agreed to market Mega policies through NASE do not establish an agreement or conspiracy to harm plaintiff. No facts are alleged to suggest these defendants had any means of harming plaintiff. The allegations that these defendants provided training for hundreds or thousands of agents nationwide are not reasonably susceptible of the inference that these defendants had any knowledge of this plaintiff, or any means of harming this plaintiff or owed any duty toward this plaintiff. `By its nature, tort liability arising from conspiracy presupposes that the co-conspirator is legally capable of committing the tort, i.e., that he or she owes a duty to plaintiff recognized by law and is potentially subject to liability for breach of that duty. [(Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503.)] `Conspiracy . . . allows tort recovery only against a party who already owes the duty . . . . [(Id. at p. 514.)]"
The trial court granted leave to amend, but Hopkins waived the right to amend the allegations. Judgment was entered in favor of the demurring defendants and against Hopkins as to the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, and ninth causes of action of the FAC. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
"In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. `We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.]" (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) "[W]e may affirm a trial court judgment on any basis presented by the record whether or not relied upon by the trial court." (Day v. Alta Bates Medical Center (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 & fn. 1.)
"Where there is any inconsistency between the specific allegations upon which a conclusion [or ultimate fact] must be based and the conclusion [or ultimate fact], the specific allegations control." (Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, Inc. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 416, 422; accord, B & P Development Corp. v. City of Saratoga (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 949, 953 [a court does not assume the truth of "pleaded contentions or legal conclusions. [Citations.] Specific factual allegations modify and limit inconsistent general statements."].) "[W]here there is ambiguity or uncertainty and the plaintiff refuses to amend after those defects are pointed out by demurrer, the ambiguities must be resolved against him[,] . . . if the ambiguous allegations were of equal strength. [Where] the ambiguity is between specific allegations and conclusions, . . . the former must control." (Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, Inc., supra, at p. 422.)
"A judgment based on an order sustaining a general demurrer must be affirmed if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken." (Longshore v. County of Ventura (1979) 25 Cal.3d 14, 21.)
Liability of the Demurring Defendants for Bauers Conduct as Coconspirators
Hopkins does not allege a direct relationship between the demurring defendants and the Hopkinses, or state a theory that the demurring defendants are directly liable to them for Bauers misrepresentations. Hopkins expressly disclaims any intent to assert a theory of respondeat superior.
In all of the causes of action against the demurring defendants, Hopkins asserts the demurring defendants are liable for damages to the Hopkinses resulting from Bauers misrepresentations to them. The demurring defendants contend the allegations do not establish that they are liable for harm caused by Bauers misrepresentations. Hopkins argues the demurring defendants are liable for Bauers misrepresentations because the demurring defendants were coconspirators with Bauer in a conspiracy to sell relatively worthless health insurance policies using fraudulent sales techniques. We conclude that, as Hopkins failed to allege facts showing a conspiratorial agreement between the demurring defendants and Bauer to harm the Hopkinses or a duty owed by the demurring defendants to them, the complaint fails to state a cause of action and the demurrer was properly sustained.
Elements of A Civil Conspiracy
"We have summarized the elements and significance of a civil conspiracy: `"The elements of an action for civil conspiracy are the formation and operation of the conspiracy and damage resulting to plaintiff from an act or acts done in furtherance of the common design. . . . In such an action the major significance of the conspiracy lies in the fact that it renders each participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrong, irrespective of whether or not he was a direct actor and regardless of the degree of his activity." [Citation.] [¶] By its nature, tort liability arising from conspiracy presupposes that the co-conspirator is legally capable of committing the tort, i.e., that he or she owes a duty to plaintiff recognized by law and is potentially subject to liability for breach of that duty." (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 511.) "The invocation of conspiracy does not alter this fundamental allocation of duty. Conspiracy is not an independent tort; it cannot create a duty or abrogate an immunity. It allows tort recovery only against a party who already owes the duty and is not immune from liability based on applicable substantive tort law principles." (Id. at p. 514.)
"The Supreme Courts Applied Equipment opinion plainly holds that before one can be held liable for civil conspiracy, he must be capable of being individually liable for the underlying wrong as a matter of substantive tort law. And that requirement, of course, means he must have owed a legal duty of care to the plaintiff, one that was breached to the latters injury." (Chavers v. Gatke Corp. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 606, 612.)
"In order to maintain an action for conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant had knowledge of and agreed to both the objective and the course of action that resulted in the injury, that there was a wrongful act committed pursuant to that agreement, and that there was resulting damage." (Berg & Berg Enterprises v. Sherwood Partners (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 802, 823.)
"In the absence of `overriding policy considerations . . . foreseeability of risk [is] of . . . primary importance in establishing the element of duty. [Citations.] As a classic opinion states: `The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed. (Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co. (1928) 248 N.Y. 339, 344.) Defendant owes a duty, in the sense of a potential liability for damages, only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous, and hence negligent, in the first instance. . . . [¶] Harper and James state the prevailing view. The obligation turns on whether `the offending conduct foreseeably involved unreasonably great risk of harm to the interests of someone other than the actor. . . . [The] obligation to refrain from . . . particular conduct is owed only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous. Duty, in other words, is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails. (2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts [(1956)] at p. 1018, fns. omitted.)" (Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 739.)
"In determining a dutys existence and scope, our precedents call for consideration of several factors: "`[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendants conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendants conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved." [Citation.] Foreseeability and the extent of the burden to the defendant are ordinarily the crucial considerations, but in a given case one or more of the other . . . factors may be determinative of the duty analysis." (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213.)
"As we read Applied Equipment and the antecedent case authorities on which it builds, in California a civil conspiracy to commit tortious acts can, as a matter of law, only be formed by parties who are already under a duty to the plaintiff, the breach of which will support a cause of action against them-individually and not as conspirators-in tort. (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 514.) Restated, in cases where the plaintiff alleges the existence of a civil conspiracy among the defendants to commit tortious acts, the source of substantive liability arises out of a preexisting legal duty and its breach; liability cannot arise out of participation in the conspiracy alone. Moreover, according to these authorities, it makes no difference in the analysis whether the underlying duty is imposed by statute (as in Doctors Co. [v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 39]) or by the common law (as in Applied Equipment). A duty, however, independent of the conspiracy itself, must exist in order for substantive liability to attach." (Chavers v. Gatke Corp., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 614.)
The FAC Did Not Sufficiently Allege the Demurring Defendants Were Members of a Conspiracy
Hopkins did not allege the demurring defendants had knowledge of and agreed to the objective of the conspiracy. In fact, no agreement by the demurring defendants is alleged. The allegation the demurring defendants recruited and trained agents in a training program designed by Mega, SAS, and NASE does not establish the demurring defendants had knowledge of and agreed to a conspiracy. The allegations the demurring defendants conspired with Bauer to deceive Hopkins, and the demurring defendants conduct is part of a nationwide fraudulent marketing scheme and civil conspiracy, are conclusions, not well-pleaded facts. The allegation the demurring defendants are "under common control and ownership, and operate as a unified business arrangement . . . created by Ronald Jensen . . . known as the `Association Method of marketing" is a conclusion which does not allege an agreement. The allegation the demurring defendants use the "`association method marketing scheme" does not allege an agreement.
Hopkins did not allege the demurring defendants had knowledge of and agreed to the course of action that resulted in the injury to the Hopkinses. The demurring defendants did not give Bauer the lead to make a sales presentation to the Hopkinses; the lead came from Mega, SAS, and NASE. The FAC did not allege the demurring defendants trained Bauer to make the misrepresentations and material omissions she made to the Hopkinses; it alleged "Mega trained Bauer to misrepresent the Subject Policy." To the extent the allegation that Bauer "omitted material facts and made affirmative misrepresentations as alleged herein in accordance with the training that she received from Mega, [the demurring defendants], SAS and . . . NASE" creates an ambiguity with the allegation that "Mega trained Bauer to misrepresent the Subject Policy," Hopkins did not clarify the ambiguity, and the latter, specific allegation controls. (See Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, Inc., supra, 44 Cal.2d at p. 422.) The allegation that Bauers sales presentations were under the "complete control" of the demurring defendants is a conclusion that is not well-pleaded and is not supported by the specific factual allegations that agents such as Bauer depended upon the demurring defendants for sales leads and commissions. Moreover, as noted above, Bauer did not get the Hopkinses sales lead from the demurring defendants.
As the FAC did not allege the demurring defendants had knowledge of and agreed to the objective of the conspiracy and the course of action that resulted in harm to the Hopkinses, liability of the demurring defendants as coconspirators does not lie.
The FAC Does Not Allege the Demurring Defendants Owed a Duty of Care to the Hopkinses
As noted above, tort liability based on a conspiracy cannot arise unless the coconspirator owed a legal duty to the plaintiff that would subject the coconspirator to liability for breach of the duty. The allegations of the FAC do not show that the demurring defendants owed a duty to the Hopkinses, because Bauers fraudulent presentation to them was not foreseeable to the demurring defendants. Bauer was an independent contractor. The demurring defendants did not train Bauer to make the offending misrepresentations. The demurring defendants did not give Bauer the lead to the Hopkinses or know she would make a presentation to the Hopkinses. The demurring defendants had no knowledge of the Hopkinses. In the absence of allegations showing the demurring defendants had a duty to the Hopkinses, the demurring defendants cannot be liable as coconspirators.
Since we conclude that all the causes of action fail to state a claim for relief because they do not allege coconspirator liability, we need not address the demurring defendants contentions regarding individual causes of action.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Phil Quinn, Quinn Division, David Mack, and Mack Region.
We concur:
TURNER, P. J.
ARMSTRONG, J.