Opinion
06-23-00029-CR
08-29-2023
LAUREN MARIE HOPFENSPIRGER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do Not Publish
Date Submitted: August 28, 2023
On Appeal from the 336th District Court Fannin County, Texas Trial Court No. CR-20-27705
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JEFF RAMBIN, JUSTICE
Pursuant to an agreement with the State, Lauren Marie Hopfenspirger entered open pleas of guilty to (1) aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, (2) family violence assault by impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the person by blocking the complainant's nose or mouth, and (3) intentionally or knowingly causing serious injury to a child. After a unitary hearing, the trial court found Hopfenspirger guilty of the first and second charges and sentenced her to eighteen years' and ten years' imprisonment, respectively. On the third charge, the trial court found Hopfenspirger guilty of the lesser-included offense of attempt to intentionally or knowingly causing serious injury to a child and sentenced her to eighteen years' imprisonment. All sentences ran concurrently.
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2) (Supp.).
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(b)(2)(B) (Supp.).
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(e) (Supp.).
In this appeal, Hopfenspirger appeals her conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. In a single issue applicable to each appeal, Hopfenspirger contends that, by finding her guilty of the lesser-included offense of attempt to intentionally or knowingly cause serious injury to a child, the trial court went beyond her agreement with the State and violated her due process right to withdraw her guilty pleas to all three charges. Because Hopfenspirger waived her right to appeal any issue except punishment issues, we are without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. As a result, we dismiss this appeal.
In our cause number 06-23-00030-CR, Hopfenspirger appeals her conviction for family violence assault by impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the person by blocking the complainant's nose or mouth. In our cause number 06-23-00031-CR, she appeals her conviction for attempt to intentionally or knowingly cause serious injury to a child.
Hopfenspirger entered into separate agreements as to each charge. The agreements were identical, except as to the stated charge, the degree of the offense, and the range of punishment.
In each of the written agreements with the State, Hopfenspirger agreed to plead guilty to the charged offense and waived, among other things, her right to appeal. As Hopfenspirger acknowledged in her brief, the agreements also provided that the State, "upon the acceptance and approval by the Court of the defendant's waivers and stipulations of fact . . ., waive[d] its right to a trial by jury." Hopfenspirger also acknowledged that, by waiving its right to a jury trial, the State left open the option of deferred adjudication and community supervision.
At the plea hearing, the trial court confirmed with Hopfenspirger that, when she signed the agreements with the State, she understood that she was waiving her right to appeal the guilt/innocence phase only. As Hopfenspirger acknowledged in her brief, the trial court confirmed that Hopfenspirger understood that she could only appeal issues related to punishment. Both the State and Hopfenspirger's trial counsel also indicated that that accurately reflected her appellate rights. In accordance with that understanding of the agreements, the trial court executed certifications of defendant's right of appeal in each case that certified that Hopfenspirger had waived the right to appeal as to guilt/innocence and confirmed that she had the right to appeal punishment issues.
"[A] defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive [her] appeal as part of a plea when consideration is given by the State, even when sentencing is not agreed upon." Carson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 489, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (orig. proceeding)); see Jones v. State, 488 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Under these facts, we find that Hopfenspirger validly waived her right to appeal. Absent permission to appeal from the trial court, a valid waiver of appeal prevents a defendant from appealing any issue in the case. Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). In this case, the agreement between Hopfenspirger and the State presented to the trial court limited her right to appeal to punishment issues. As a result, her valid waiver of appeal prevented her from appealing any other issue. Consequently, because Hopfenspirger did not assert any issue on appeal related to punishment, we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.