Hope v. Kranc

9 Citing cases

  1. Dutton v. United States

    6:13-cv-58 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 25, 2014)

    Only doctors with the requisite knowledge and experience in the relevant area of practice are "authorized to judge another doctor's performance in that area of practice," because to permit otherwise "would eviscerate [O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c)]'s purpose of assuring that a medical professional is not held negligent in the absence of evidence that he violated a standard of care established by his peers." Hope v. Kranc, 696 S.E.2d 128, 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); see also Emory-Adventist, Inc. v. Hunter, 687 S.E.2d 267, 270 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (finding it "clear that the words 'active practice' . . . relate to practice in an area of medical specialty showing expertise therein not licensure to practice medicine generally"). Here, the relevant area of specialty at issue is managing the care of a patient suffering from critical ischemia.

  2. Adams v. Lab. Corp. of America

    1:10-cv-3309-WSD (N.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 2012)   Cited 6 times

    "Only a doctor who has an appropriate level of knowledge, as determined by the judge, and who has significant familiarity with the area of practice in which the expert opinion is to be given is authorized to judge another doctor's performance in that area of practice." Hope v. Kranc, 696 S.E.2d 128, 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (internal quotation and citations omitted). Plaintiffs' Complaint here asserts that the negligence of Defendant's cytotechnologists and pathologist caused or contributed to the delay in diagnosing and treating Adams' cancer.

  3. Blake v. KES, Inc.

    336 Ga. App. 43 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 3 times

    Hope v. Kranc, 304 Ga.App. 367, 370(1), 696 S.E.2d 128 (2010).Hankla v. Postell, 293 Ga. 692, 693, 749 S.E.2d 726 (2013).

  4. Brantley v. DuBois

    327 Ga. App. 14 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 2 times
    In Brantley v. Dubois, 327 Ga.App. 14, 755 S.E.2d 351 (2014), the Court of Appeals held that a surgeon was not qualified as a matter of law under Rule 702(c)(2)(A) to give expert testimony about negligence in connection with a laparoscopic procedure to repair an umbilical hernia because he had not performed more than one laparoscopic procedure to repair an umbilical hernia in the last five years, notwithstanding that the surgeon had performed many other abdominal laparoscopic procedures during that time.

    (Citation omitted.) Hope v. Kranc, 304 Ga.App. 367, 370(1), 696 S.E.2d 128 (2010). Construed in Mr. Dubois's favor, the evidence shows that Dr. Swartz is a general surgeon with extensive experience in performing open umbilical hernia repairs and that he was familiar with the standard of care applicable to the repair at issue.

  5. Brantley v. DuBois

    A13A2175 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2014)

    (Citation omitted.) Hope v. Kranc, 304 Ga. App. 367, 370 (1) (696 SE2d 128) (2010). Construed in Mr. DuBois's favor, the evidence shows that Dr. Swartz is a general surgeon with extensive experience in performing open umbilical hernia repairs and that he was familiar with the standard of care applicable to the repair at issue.

  6. Aguilar v. Children's Healthcare of Atlanta, Inc.

    320 Ga. App. 663 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 9 times
    Distinguishing the expert's lack of qualifications from those of the expert in Emory–Adventist because, although both were residents during the requisite time period, the expert in Emory–Adventist “had regularly engaged in the repeated performance of acts relevant to the acts or omissions alleged to constitute malpractice”

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hope v. Kranc, 304 Ga.App. 367, 370(1)(b), 696 S.E.2d 128 (2010). Further,

  7. Aguilar v. Children's Healthcare of Atlanta, Inc.

    A12A1790 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2013)

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hope v. Kranc, 304 Ga. App. 367, 370 (1) (b) (696 SE2d 128) (2010). Further, "it is not sufficient that the expert have just a minimum level of knowledge in the area in which the opinion is to be given. Instead, the expert must have regularly engaged in the active practice of the area of specialty in which the opinion is to be given" and must have done so with sufficient frequency to establish an appropriate level of knowledge.

  8. Vaughan v. Wellstar Health System

    304 Ga. App. 596 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 19 times
    Affirming the grant of summary judgment to defendant hospital because the plaintiff failed to establish that the nurses violated the standard of care

    Id. See Hope v. Kranc, 304 Ga. App. 367, 370 (1) (a) ( 696 SE2d 128) (2010) (trial court's ruling on motion to dismiss that expert was unqualified reviewed for abuse of discretion). Here, as in Craigo, the trial court held a hearing on the issue of the expert's qualifications.

  9. Callaway v. O'Connell

    44 F. Supp. 3d 1316 (M.D. Ga. 2014)   Cited 6 times

    Instead, the appropriate inquiry is whether the expert has professional knowledge and experience regarding the specific issues on which the expert intends to testify. Compare Cartledge v. Montano, 325 Ga.App. 322, 326–27, 750 S.E.2d 772, 776–77 (2013) (holding that an expert who was board certified in obstetrics and gynecology for over 30 years was not precluded from testifying against the defendant gynecologist regarding issues surrounding the performance of surgery even if the expert had not performed the same procedure at issue), with Bonds v. Nesbitt, 322 Ga.App. 852, 858, 747 S.E.2d 40, 46 (2013) (finding that an expert who specialized in pulmonary and critical care medicine who did not regularly practice in the emergency room could not testify regarding an ER physician's standard of care), and Hope v. Kranc, 304 Ga.App. 367, 369–70, 696 S.E.2d 128, 130–31 (2010) (holding that a veteran general practitioner was precluded from evaluating the performance of a specialist, regardless of whether the issues involved procedures or referrals). Here, O'Connell and Dr. Hood are both community-based otolaryngologists who treat patients with laryngeal cancer.