Where a case has been tried and a final judgment rendered, in the absence of an assignment of error on the final judgment this court does not have jurisdiction to review an antecedent ruling of the trial court rendered more than 30 days prior to the appeal, even though the bill of exceptions shows that the case has been tried in the court below and that a final judgment was rendered therein. Hope v. Hudgins, 107 Ga. App. 265 ( 129 S.E.2d 576) and cases cited. Writ of error dismissed.

In Ateyeh, the Court cited decisions by courts in other states as persuasive: First-Citizens Bank Trust Company v. R G. ConstructionCompany, 24 N.C. App. 131, 132, 210 S.E.2d 97, 98 (1974) ("As a general rule an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an entry of default where judgment has not been entered is not a final order and is, therefore, not appealable."); Hope v. Hudgins, 107 Ga. App. 265, 266, 129 S.E.2d 576, 577 (1963) ("A judgment granting or refusing to grant a motion to open a default is not such a final judgment as can be made the subject of a bill of exceptions to this court within Code Ann. § 6-701 unless final judgment in the whole case has been entered. . . ."); Annot. 8 A.L.R. 3d 1272, 1278 (1966) ("[C]ourts are generally agreed that an order setting aside or refusing to set aside, a default where judgment has not been entered, is not a final order, and therefore is not appealable.").

Courts in other states, including our sister states of North Carolina and Georgia, have held that an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an entry of default is not appealable until after final judgment. See, e.g., First-Citizens Bank Trust Company v. R G Construction Company, 24 N.C. App. 131, 132, 210 S.E.2d 97, 98 (1974) ("As a general rule an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an entry of default where judgment has not been entered is not a final order and is, therefore, not appealable."); Hope v. Hudgins, 107 Ga. App. 265, 266, 129 S.E.2d 576, 577 (1963) ("A judgment granting or refusing to grant a motion to open a default is not such a final judgment as can be made the subject of a bill of exceptions to this court within Code Ann. § 6-701 unless final judgment in the whole case has been entered. . . ."); Annot. 8 A.L.R. 3d 1272, 1278 (1966) ("[C]ourts are generally agreed that an order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, a default where judgment has not been entered, is not a final order, and therefore is not appealable."). We find these decisions persuasive.