Opinion
14-P-1643
02-29-2016
MICHAEL HOOSTEIN v. MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION, INC.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Michael Hoostein, appeals from a Housing Court judgment dismissing his complaint, which sought various forms of relief against the Mental Health Association, Inc. (MHA), an entity that administers United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funding for housing for people with mental health issues. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
The plaintiff's daughter was a recipient of a shelter plus care subsidy. MHA entered into a lease to rent an apartment owned by the plaintiff on the daughter's behalf. After the daughter had a child, she became ineligible for the shelter plus care subsidy, because that subsidy is limited to units occupied only by one person.
The shelter plus care program serves homeless persons with disabilities through rental assistance and supportive services.
On March 19, 2013, MHA sent a letter to the plaintiff notifying him it would not renew the one-year lease, set to expire on June 30, 2013. On the same day, it notified the daughter that she would no longer be eligible for the shelter plus care subsidy beyond June 30, 2013, but would be provided with a new subsidy through the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health as of July 1, 2013. That subsidy, called a mobile rental voucher is administered through the Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development and does not limit family size. The one-year lease subsidized by the shelter plus care program expired by its terms on June 30, 2013; the MHA was current on its lease payments through that day.
On August 16, 2013, the plaintiff commenced this action against MHA in the Housing Court, seeking an emergency restraining order (1) requiring MHA to honor its signed lease and pay past due rent, (2) ordering MHA to cease and desist its unlawful termination of the daughter's shelter plus care subsidy, and (3) permitting him (the landlord and father) to file a certiorari complaint challenging MHA's decision to terminate the subsidy. In addition, the plaintiff also sought (1) enforcement of the lease and payment of back rent for July and August, 2013, (2) an order annulling MHA's termination of the subsidy, (3) an order compelling MHA to cease interfering with the tenant's right to quiet enjoyment, and (4) a request to move his complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) to the Housing Court.
Jerome Ray, an employee of MHA, who is not a lawyer, filed an answer to the complaint and asserted a counterclaim for $295 for the daughter's unpaid share of the last month's rent. The matter was tried before a Housing Court judge on August 30, 2013, with both parties proceeding pro se. Neither the trial judge nor the plaintiff objected to the MHA, a corporation, proceeding pro se, represented by an employee of the corporation. Ray and the plaintiff both testified at the trial and submitted documentary exhibits.
After disposing of issues over which she had no jurisdiction (the plaintiff's claims of violation of Federal and State antidiscrimination laws -- which had been previously adjudicated in the respective State and Federal agencies), the trial judge ruled that the only issue properly before her concerned the plaintiff's request to enforce the lease. On this point she found that the lease expired by its terms on June 30, 2013, and that it was not renewed by the MHA in accordance with the lease provisions. Further, although the lease did not require notice of nonrenewal, MHA gave notice that it would not renew the lease in March, 2013, three months prior to the lease's expiration. The judge also noted that the MHA offered to enter into a new lease for the plaintiff's apartment under the new subsidy program (the mobile rental voucher program), but the plaintiff declined to do so. Accordingly, no new lease between the parties was ever executed, and "[t]here was no lease in existence to enforce at the time this case was filed." Finally, as to the request to allow the plaintiff to file a petition for a writ of certiorari under G. L. c. 249, § 4, the judge ruled the Housing Court had no jurisdiction to act on any such petition or request for relief under the statute (which is limited to the Supreme Judicial Court, Superior Court, and, in some cases, the Land Court).
The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal from the ensuing judgment dismissing the case. On appeal, he has raised, for the first time, the issue of the propriety of Ray's representation of MHA during the proceedings. It was, unquestionably, improper. See Las Collection Mgmt. v. Pagan, 447 Mass. 847, 850-851 (2006). See also Varney Enterprises, Inc. v. WMF, Inc., 402 Mass. 79, 79 (1988) (corporate officer who is not an attorney may not represent corporation in judicial proceeding). However, in contrast to the foregoing cases, the plaintiff failed to raise this issue before the trial court and it could be deemed waived. See, e.g., NES Rentals v. Maine Drilling & Blasting, Inc., 465 Mass. 856, 861 n.8 (2013) (issue raised by appellant for first time on appeal is waived). Moreover, as noted by the MHA, participation by a nonattorney in the case does not render the proceedings void. See Henry L. Sawyer Co. v. Boyajian, 296 Mass. 215, 218 (1936).
An attorney appeared for MHA after the trial and filed some posttrial pleadings, including a posttrial legal brief, attaching exhibits filed during the trial.
The remaining issues raised by the plaintiff have no merit. He argues the judge erred in refusing to order MHA to continue paying rent in accordance with the lease contract. However, as found by the judge, the lease expired by its terms and was specifically not renewed. Accordingly, there was no valid lease contract to enforce.
Next, the plaintiff contends that the judge erred in refusing to grant an injunction against MHA compelling it to continue the shelter plus care subsidy, as the denial of that subsidy somehow violates his constitutional rights. As the judge noted, she had no jurisdiction over HUD and its decision to terminate the subsidy for the plaintiff's daughter. As noted by MHA, the plaintiff (or his daughter) has challenged the decision terminating the subsidy before HUD and the United States District Court.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that the judge erred in considering evidence in the form of documents from HUD and MCAD proceedings as hearsay. Even if we were to assume it was error to admit the documents, there was no prejudice because the only issue before the judge was enforcement of the lease, not the propriety of the termination of the subsidy or any allegations of discrimination.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Green, Vuono & Meade, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk Entered: February 29, 2016.