Hoos v. Hoos

19 Citing cases

  1. In re Marriage of Homan

    126 Ill. App. 3d 133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 9 times
    Explaining that "it is a well established rule that past-due instalments of child support are the vested right of the designated recipient"

    Thus, the court's jurisdiction is continuing and does not terminate with the entry of the divorce judgment. ( Hoos v. Hoos (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 817, 821, 408 N.E.2d 752, 755.) Although section 510(c) of the Act provides that the obligation to pay child support generally terminates upon emancipation, this does not mean that after emancipation the custodial parent is not entitled to child support arrearages.

  2. In re Marriage of Erickson

    136 Ill. App. 3d 907 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 30 times
    Approving retroactive modification of maintenance and support obligation to date of wife's remarriage

    The well-settled rule in this State is that past-due installments of child support are the vested right of the designated recipient; thus, the court lacks the authority to modify those amounts that have already accrued. ( Hoos v. Hoos (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 817, 821, 408 N.E.2d 752, 755; Jozwick v. Jozwick (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 17, 20, 390 N.E.2d 488, 490.) Furthermore, a party may not unilaterally terminate child support payments.

  3. Pudil v. Smart Buy, Inc.

    607 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1985)   Cited 16 times

    See Rynar, 560 F. Supp. at 625-26; Dale v. Groebe Co., 103 Ill. App.3d 649, 59 Ill.Dec. 350, 354, 431 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (1st Dist. 1981). In response, Pudil contends that such an unambiguous promise may be' found in the "totality of circumstances" here, including the defendants' conduct, citing Hoos v. Hoos, 86 Ill. App.3d 817, 42 Ill.Dec. 174, 180, 408 N.E.2d 752, 758 (1st Dist. 1980). This issue need not be decided.

  4. In re Marriage of Coufal

    156 Ill. App. 3d 814 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 7 times
    Agreeing that "the alleged consideration for the accord and satisfaction consisted wholly of pre-existing duties and, therefore, was not valid consideration."

    An oral agreement purportedly waiving the lump-sum distribution terms of a divorce judgment must be established by clear and unequivocal evidence similar to that required to prove a modification of child support. ( In re Marriage of Runge (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 356, 361, 430 N.E.2d 58; Hoos v. Hoos (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 817, 821, 408 N.E.2d 752; Needler v. Needler (1971), 131 Ill. App.2d 11, 268 N.E.2d 517.) Respondent contends that he has presented such proof, which consisted of his own perception of the terms of the alleged oral modification, his payment of $4,400 in arrears to petitioner, his payment of the son's college costs, petitioner's apparent acquiescence through silence to his nonpayment, and statements made by petitioner to a friend. • 2 The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be accorded their testimony, and the resolution of conflicting testimony are concerns peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact. Soucie v. Drago Amusements Co. (1986), 145 Ill. App.3d 348, 353, 495 N.E.2d 997; In re Estate of Stuhlfauth (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 974, 980, 410 N.E.2d 1063; Kavanaugh v. Estate of Dobrowolski (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 33, 42, 407 N.E.2d 856; Servbest Foods, Inc. v. Emessee Industries, Inc. (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 662, 676, 403 N.E.2d 1.

  5. In re Marriage of Feliciano

    431 N.E.2d 1120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 3 times

    The husband concedes that case law establishes that child support is a vested right of the child, although he urges that courts have applied this principle only where there has been a unilateral termination or a purported agreement to terminate child support. (See Hoos v. Hoos (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 817, 408 N.E.2d 752; In re Custody of Potts (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 518, 404 N.E.2d 446.) He contends that there is no showing that the child will benefit from the payment of the past-due child support and that if he is required to pay the arrearages, it will serve as punishment to him and reward to the wife. • 2 We view the contention of the husband to be without merit and agree with the position of the wife that under the circumstances of this case, section 510(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 510(a)) precludes any modification of child support payments which have accrued.

  6. In re Marriage of McDavid

    97 Ill. App. 3d 1044 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 13 times

    • 1 It is a general principle that past-due installments of child support are the vested right of the designated recipient and cannot be terminated by the defendant ( Matzen v. Matzen (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 69, 387 N.E.2d 14), and neither can they be modified as to amount or time of payment. Hoos v. Hoos (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 817, 408 N.E.2d 752. In an appropriate case, however, courts will give effect to either an agreement between the parties or to the doctrine of equitable estoppel to reduce the amount of child-support arrearages.

  7. In re Marriage of Heady

    924 N.E.2d 1187 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 4 times
    Describing HFS's enforcement functions

    " (Emphases added.) Hoos v. Hoos, 86 Ill. App. 3d 817, 821 (1980). The record reveals no basis for estopping the Department from collecting the child support arrearage, and any evidence of an agreement to permit repayment over time is equivocal at best.

  8. Illinois Dept. of Healthcare v. Wiszowaty

    394 Ill. App. 3d 49 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 2 times

    Even so, judgment against Mark for the arrearage was appropriate because (1) modification or termination of a child support obligation is a judicial function, to be administered prospectively and at the court's discretion; (2) Mark did not return to court in 1993 to obtain an order reflecting the parties' alleged new agreement; and (3) past-due installments of child support are a vested right of the recipient. Hoos v. Hoos, 86 Ill. App. 3d 817, 821, 408 N.E.2d 752, 755 (1980) (modification of child support is at the court's discretion and administered prospectively, as past-due amounts are the vested of the recipient); People ex rel. Winger v. Young, 78 Ill. App. 3d 512, 513, 397 N.E.2d 253, 254 (1979) (duty to make child support payments is independent of duty to permit visitation, proper remedy for violation of visitation rights is petition for rule to show cause why the noncomplying party should not be found in contempt of court). The trial judge could have also reasonably concluded from this record that discretionary interest prior to 2000 was unwarranted.

  9. Humphrey Property v. Village of Frankfort

    910 N.E.2d 193 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)

    So, for example, if Frankfort relied on plaintiff's predecessor's consent to forego statutory procedures, Frankfort may be able to demonstrate that it relied on the predecessor's course of conduct-in consenting to the amendment without compliance — to its injury, estopping plaintiff from challenging the validity of its zoning ordinance. Hoos v. Hoos, 86 Ill. App. 3d 817, 823, 408 N.E.2d 752, 756 (1980) ("estoppel arises where the voluntary conduct of one party results in good faith reliance and detrimental change of position by the other party. Where such circumstances exist, estoppel may act to bar the assertion of rights by the party whose voluntary acts led to the reliance").

  10. Humphrey Property v. Village of Frankfort

    392 Ill. App. 3d 611 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 4 times

    So, for example, if Frankfort relied on plaintiff's predecessor's consent to forego statutory procedures, Frankfort may be able to demonstrate that it relied on the predecessor's course of conduct — in consenting to the amendment without compliance — to its injury, estopping plaintiff from challenging the validity of its zoning ordinance. Hoos v. Hoos, 86 Ill. App. 3d 817, 823, 408 N.E.2d 752, 756 (1980) ("estoppel arises where the voluntary conduct of one party results in good faith reliance and detrimental change of position by the other party. Where such circumstances exist, estoppel may act to bar the assertion of rights by the party whose voluntary acts led to the reliance"). The scope of the estoppel applicable against the predecessor depends on the extent of the original parties' agreement.