Hooks v. State

11 Citing cases

  1. Farley v. State

    265 Ga. 622 (Ga. 1995)   Cited 93 times
    In Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622(2) (458 S.E.2d 643) (1995), we held that evidence of a prior aggravated battery committed by the defendant which was sufficiently similar to the crime charged "was relevant to rebut [defendant's] claim of self-defense in this case by showing that he has a propensity for initiating and continuing unprovoked encounters which result in bodily harm to those whom he attacks."

    the evidence of Farley's commission of a prior aggravated battery was erroneously admitted would require that we overrule not only Gentry, Stephens, Edwards, Haywood, Brock, Sport, and Saylors, but that we also overrule a host of other cases in which this court has held "other transactions" evidence to be admissible under comparable circumstances. See generally Ward v. State, 262 Ga. 293, 295 (2) ( 417 S.E.2d 130) (1992); Starks v. State, 262 Ga. 244, 245 (2) ( 416 S.E.2d 520) (1992); Chastain v. State, 260 Ga. 789, 790 (3) ( 400 S.E.2d 329) (1991); Bromley v. State, 259 Ga. 377, 381 (6) ( 380 S.E.2d 694) (1989); Mincey v. State, 257 Ga. 500, 505 (7) ( 360 S.E.2d 578) (1987); Byrd v. State, 255 Ga. 674 (2) (a) ( 341 S.E.2d 453) (1986); Harris v. State, 255 Ga. 500, 502 (3) ( 340 S.E.2d 4) (1986); Goodman v. State, 255 Ga. 226, 227 (5) ( 336 S.E.2d 757) (1985); Cunningham v. State, 255 Ga. 35, 37 (4) ( 334 S.E.2d 656) (1985); Rich v. State, 254 Ga. 11, 13 (1) ( 325 S.E.2d 761) (1985); Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141, 142 (2) ( 317 S.E.2d 531) (1984). After conducting a hearing in full compliance with the mandate of Williams v. State, supra, the trial court found that the prior aggravated battery was relevant and admissible for a limited purpose in determining appellant's guilt of the aggravated battery which was the underlying felony for the felony murder with which appellant was charged.

  2. Stansell v. State

    270 Ga. 147 (Ga. 1998)   Cited 46 times
    Applying Jackson v. Virginia standard of review to denial of motion for directed verdict of acquittal

    1. Stansell asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict of acquittal and his motion for new trial on the general grounds. Since the evidence summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Stansell guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder ( Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S.C. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979); Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141 (1) ( 317 S.E.2d 531) (1984)), there was no error in denying the motion for new trial, and since the same standard is applicable to the denial of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal ( Humphrey v. State, 252 Ga. 525 (1) ( 314 S.E.2d 436) (1984)), there was no error in denying that motion. 2.

  3. Dukes v. State

    375 S.E.2d 35 (Ga. 1989)

    In spite of incidentally placing defendant's character in issue, this rebuttal testimony was clearly admissible to show previous difficulties between Dukes and the victim and to rebut specific statements made by Dukes. See Cannon v. State, 257 Ga. 475, 478 ( 360 S.E.2d 592) (1987), Williams v. State, 257 Ga. 761, 762 ( 363 S.E.2d 535) (1988), and Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141, 143 ( 317 S.E.2d 531) (1984). Assuming the officer should not have volunteered the information about the drug test and possible cocaine charge, we find those statements harmless in light of the other evidence offered in rebuttal.

  4. Williams v. State

    363 S.E.2d 535 (Ga. 1988)   Cited 30 times

    "If a defendant testifies, he may be cross-examined by the prosecution like any other witness." Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141, 143 ( 317 S.E.2d 531) (1984). (c) That impeachment may proceed in the following manner:

  5. Haywood v. State

    256 Ga. 694 (Ga. 1987)   Cited 7 times

    However, we have held that evidence of prior similar acts is admissible for certain limited purposes such as showing identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, and course of conduct. Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141 (2) ( 317 S.E.2d 531) (1984). In the present case, at least two witnesses testified that approximately three weeks prior to this murder, Haywood, while intoxicated, fired his gun in the kitchen of Evelyn Ramsey's trailer.

  6. Crawford v. State

    351 S.E.2d 199 (Ga. 1987)   Cited 30 times

    It is highly improbable that the witness' remarks influenced the outcome of the case, in view of the strong weight of the evidence against the appellant, as discussed in Division 1, supra. See Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141 (4) ( 317 S.E.2d 531) (1984). Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial.

  7. Stitt v. State

    256 Ga. 155 (Ga. 1986)   Cited 12 times
    Holding where there is a single victim the defendant may not be convicted of both the underlying felony and felony murder, but this rule does not apply where there are separate victims

    Counsel's real desire may have been to get in some evidence of a second robber other than his client's pretrial statement. For this, the customer should have been called as a witness. The impeaching value of the statement as related to the officer's testimony was de minimus. Under these circumstances we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying cross-examination. Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141 (3) ( 317 S.E.2d 531) (1984). 3.

  8. Hambrick v. State

    256 Ga. 148 (Ga. 1986)   Cited 51 times
    In Hambrick, the defendant's act of pointing the pistol at the victims was the act underlying both the convictions for attempted armed robbery and for aggravated assault, so the convictions of aggravated assault merged with the attempted armed robberies. Under the evidence in this case, the defendant's act of pointing the gun at Fagler was the act underlying the armed robbery of Zimbrick, and the robbery was completed before the defendant committed an aggravated assault upon Zimbrick by pointing the gun at him.

    Under the facts of this case, the instructions were sufficient to cure the error, and the trial court did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. Wright v. State, 253 Ga. 1 (3) ( 316 S.E.2d 445) (1984); Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141 (4) ( 317 S.E.2d 531) (1984); Sabel v. State, 250 Ga. 640 (5) ( 300 S.E.2d 663) (1983). 2.

  9. Kitchens v. State

    256 Ga. 1 (Ga. 1986)   Cited 8 times

    In his fourth enumeration Kitchens contends that by sustaining the state's objection the trial court denied him his right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of William Jones. He specifically contends that the line of questioning he was pursuing was relevant to determine the sincerity of the victim's statement that he had "made peace with God," which, he says, was a ground for admitting his statement to William Jones into evidence as a dying declaration. It is well-settled that the scope of cross-examination rests largely within the discretion of the trial court, and that unless there has been an abuse of that discretion it will not be disturbed on appeal. Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141 (3) ( 317 S.E.2d 531) (1984). Jesse Jones' statement that he had "made peace with God" was relevant to show that he was conscious of his dying condition.

  10. Dunham v. State

    315 Ga. App. 901 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 3 times

    “OCGA § 24–9–64 provides that all parties to a criminal proceeding are entitled to a thorough, sifting cross-examination as to the witnesses called against him.... If a defendant testifies, he may be cross-examined by the prosecution like any other witness.” Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141, 143(3), 317 S.E.2d 531 (1984). In this case, the trial court had already determined that evidence of the similar transaction was admissible for a proper purpose and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, and in Division 1 we upheld that ruling. Thus, the issue was relevant to the case, and by choosing to testify, Dunham subjected himself to cross-examination about his prior actions. Id.