Hooker v. Wooten

4 Citing cases

  1. Cloke v. Findlan

    165 A.D.3d 1545 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)   Cited 11 times

    Further, the contract contains no provision for a grace period, nor does it require that defendant provide plaintiff with an opportunity to cure the breach (seeAwards.com, LLC v. Kinko' s, Inc. 14 N.Y.3d 791, 793, 899 N.Y.S.2d 123, 925 N.E.2d 926 [2010] ). Thus, contrary to the conclusion reached by Supreme Court, plaintiff's failure to pay the property taxes on the date specified constituted a material breach of the contract precluding him from obtaining specific performance (seeGrace v. Nappa, 46 N.Y.2d 560, 567, 415 N.Y.S.2d 793, 389 N.E.2d 107 [1979] ; Satra Realty, LLC v. Knovel Corp., 93 A.D.3d at 1130, 941 N.Y.S.2d 333 ; Mosdos Oraysa, Inc. v. Sausto, 13 A.D.3d 838, 840–841, 787 N.Y.S.2d 160 [2004], lv dismissed and denied 5 N.Y.3d 749, 800 N.Y.S.2d 867, 834 N.E.2d 777 [2005] ; Hooker v. Wooten, 237 A.D.2d 572, 572, 655 N.Y.S.2d 995 [1997] ; Swezey v. Marra, 143 A.D.2d 827, 828, 533 N.Y.S.2d 244 [1988] ).

  2. Awards.com v. Kinko's

    42 A.D.3d 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 149 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that contractual provision specifying there was no waiver of a provision of the contract unless the provision was waived in writing meant that acceptance of late payments did not effectuate a waiver of the requirement for timely payments

    In so ruling, Supreme Court erred in several respects. As the court recognized, the monthly fee was the primary consideration under the agreement; indeed, it was the sole consideration for Kinko's. A party's default in payment under similar circumstances is routinely held to constitute a material breach, justifying contract termination ( see e.g. Fifty States Mgt. Corp. v Pioneer Auto Parks, 46 NY2d 573, 578 ["covenant to pay rent at a specified time . . . is an essential part of the bargain as it represents the consideration to be received for permitting the tenant to remain in possession of the property of the landlord"]; Johnson v Phelan, 281 AD2d 394 [failure to make annual installment payments constituted a material breach of the contract]; Hooker v Wooten, 237 AD2d 572 [failure to make monthly installment payment constitutes a material breach]; Daiichi Seihan USA v Infinity USA, 214 AD2d 487 [summary judgment warranted where defendant failed to continue to make monthly payments]). Contrary to the motion court's ruling, Inspire's subjective intention or willingness to perform its obligations is irrelevant; the issue is whether Inspire paid the August monthly fee, not whether it was willing or able to do so.

  3. ADC Orange, Inc. v. Coyote Acres, Inc.

    20 A.D.3d 493 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 6 times

    The contract stated that the foregoing payment was to be made "[u]pon the later of the preliminary [subdivision] approval having been received . . . or December 31, 2001 but in no event later than December 31, 2001." The plaintiff's failure to perform in accordance with this term constituted a material breach of the contract precluding it from obtaining specific performance ( see Grace v. Nappa, 46 NY2d 560, 567; Hooker v. Wooten, 237 AD2d 572; Swezey v. Marra, 143 AD2d 827).

  4. Johnson v. Phelan

    281 A.D.2d 394 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 44 times

    Before specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property may be granted, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it substantially performed its contractual obligations and that it is ready, willing, and able to satisfy those obligations not yet performed, regardless of any alleged anticipatory breach by the defendant (see, Bowen v. Horgan, 259 N.Y. 267, 269; Petrelli Assocs. v. Germano, 268 A.D.2d 513). It is undisputed that the purchasers defaulted in making the annual installment payments required under the contract. The purchasers' failure to do so constituted a material breach of the agreement precluding them from obtaining specific performance (see, Grace v. Nappa, 46 N.Y.2d 560, 567; Hooker v. Wooten, 237 A.D.2d 572). The purchasers also failed to demonstrate that they were ready, willing, and able to perform and had the funds necessary to purchase the property (see, Petrelli Assocs. v. Germano, supra; Ober v. Bey, 266 A.D.2d 441; Goller Place Corp. v. Cacase, 251 A.D.2d 287). Accordingly, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Under the circumstance of this case, the Supreme Court also erred in denying summary judgment to the defendants on their counterclaims for ejectment and a declaration that the installment contract was null and void (cf., Heritage Art Galleries v. Raia, 173 A.D.2d 441, 442; Bean v. Walker, 95 A.D.2d 70).