Applicable here is the well established principle that "Injunction is an extraordinary process, and the most important one which courts of equity issue; being so, it should never be granted except where there is grave danger of impending injury to person or property rights, and a mere threat or bare fear of such injury is not sufficient." Thomas v. Mayor c. of Savannah, 209 Ga. 866 (3) ( 76 S.E.2d 796) (one Justice not participating); Todd v. City of Dublin, 212 Ga. 36, 37 ( 89 S.E.2d 889); Hood v. Winding-Vista Recreation, Inc., 222 Ga. 345, 347 ( 149 S.E.2d 784). It follows that this portion of the judgment was erroneous.
'" ( Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, supra, 29 Cal. 2d at p. 339, quoting from Zahn v. Board of Public Works (1927) 274 U.S. 325, at p. 328 [71 L.Ed. 1074, at p. 1076, 47 S.Ct. 594].) For examples of decisions in which commercial recreational uses have been sanctioned because the provisions of the zoning ordinance have been construed to permit such use, see: Schumm v. Board of Supervisors (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 874 [ 295 P.2d 934]; Hopping v. Cobb County Fair Association, Inc. (1966) 222 Ga. 704 [ 152 S.E.2d 356]; Hood v. Winding-Vista Recreation, Inc. (1966) 222 Ga. 345 [ 149 S.E.2d 784]; Berberich v. Concordia Gymnastic Society (Mo. App. 1966) 402 S.W.2d 582; In re Hart's Appeal (1963) 410 Pa. 439 [ 189 A.2d 167]; In re Appeal of Hawcrest Association (1960) 399 Pa. 84 [ 160 A.2d 240]; Montgomery County v. Merlands Club (1953) 202 Md. 279 [ 96 A.2d 261]; and Drennen v. Mason (1931) 222 Ala. 652 [ 133 So. 689]. See also general sources set forth in footnote 10 above.