lan v. Continental Assurance Co., 690 F. Supp. 792 (W.D.Ark. 1988); Perry v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 872 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1989); Idaho Plumbers and Pipefitters Health and Welfare Fund v. United Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 875 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989); Totton v. New York Life Ins. Co., 685 F. Supp. 27 (D.Conn. 1987); Tesch v. General Motors Corp., 685 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D.Wis. 1988); Southern California Meat Cutters Unions Food Employers Pension Trust Fund v. Investors Research Co., 687 F. Supp. 506 (C.D.Cal. 1988); Hall v. Pennwalt Group Comprehensive Medical Expense Benefits Plan, (E.D.Pa. 1989); Schultz v. Boesken Elec. Co., 703 F. Supp. 656 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Urban Health Services, Ltd. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 53 (N.D.Ill. 1989); Holmes v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 706 F. Supp. 733 (C.D.Cal. 1989); Seafarers' Welfare Plan v. Dixon, 512 So.2d 53 (Ala. 1987); Davidian v. Southern California Meat Cutters Union Food Employees Benefit Fund, 859 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1988); Hood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 522 So.2d 265 (Ala. 1988); Landy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 530 So.2d 214 (Ala. 1988); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1668, 104 L.Ed.2d 98, (Mass. 1989).

Circuit has not been silent with regard to the issue before us. Relying primarily on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987), the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly (and very recently) held that, under its interpretation of the phrase "regulates insurance" as used in the ERISA savings clause (a federal statute), our tort of bad faith does not "regulate insurance" and therefore is not saved from preemption.Walker v. Southern Co. Servs., Inc., 279 F.3d 1289, 1291-94 (11th Cir. 2002); Gilbert v. Alta Health Life Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 1292, 1296-1301 (11th Cir. 2001); Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999); Amos v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, 868 F.2d 430, 431-33 (11th Cir. 1989); Belasco v. W.K.P. Wilson Sons, Inc., 833 F.2d 277, 279-81 (11th Cir. 1987). Applying Pilot Life, this Court reached the same conclusion inSeafarers' Welfare Plan v. Dixon, 512 So.2d 53, 54-55 (Ala. 1987), and inHood v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 522 So.2d 265, 266 (Ala. 1988). Furthermore, relevant to the first issue in the certified question, in the most recent of these decisions the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed this conclusion while assuming that our tort of bad faith is "limited solely to insurers."

868 F.2d at 433. We note that the Alabama Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in light of Pilot Life. Seafarers' Welfare Plan v. Dixon, 512 So.2d 53 (Ala. 1987) (in light of Pilot Life and Metropolitan Life overturning earlier decision and holding that the tort of bad faith refusal to pay is preempted by ERISA); see also Hood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. [ Hood II], 522 So.2d 265 (Ala. 1988) (reversing earlier decision). The district court, however, followed a decision from the Northern District of Alabama, Hill v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala., 117 F.Supp.2d 1209 (N.D.Ala. 2000), which erroneously concluded that the Supreme Court decision in Ward was in conflict with our prior precedent.

See Belasco v. W.K.P. Wilson Sons, Inc., 833 F.2d 277, 281 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987)). See also Hood v. Prudential Ins. Co., 522 So.2d 265 (Ala. 1988). In addition, even assuming the preemption doctrine inapplicable, the denial of recovery under plaintiff's bad faith claim is still required.

Dedeaux, 107 S.Ct. at 1554. In applying the Dedeaux case to Alabama's bad faith provisions, both the Eleventh Circuit and the Alabama Supreme Court have concluded that the tort is preempted by ERISA. Belasco, 833 F.2d at 281; Hood v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 522 So.2d 265 (Ala. 1988). Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) (affirmed preemption of state contract claims alleging improper processing of benefit claims arising out of an employer's termination of disability benefits); Salomon v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 801 F.2d 659 (4th Cir. 1986) (state law estoppel and breach of contract claim preempted by ERISA); Holland v. National Steel Corp., 791 F.2d 1132 (4th Cir. 1986) (state breach of contract claim for vacation benefits preempted); Gilbert v. Burlington Industries, 765 F.2d 320 (2nd Cir. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3267, 91 L.Ed.2d 558 (1986) (state breach of contract claim for denial of severance pay covered under plan preempted); Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985) (state contract claims for denial of severance benefits preempted).

This court is not unaware of the anomaly arising from the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama (without considering Belasco or Bishop) when that court recently held that punitive and extracontractual damages are not recoverable under ERISA. Hood v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 522 So.2d 265 (1988). Potentially, the Amos' former state tort claims, now ERISA claims, will call for the imposition of punitive damages despite the fact that according to Bishop, ERISA itself, as distinct from state claims converted by ERISA, does not authorize punitive damages.

Consistent with this focus of subchapter I, cases in which this Court has found § 1144(a) defensive preemption involved claims by a beneficiary to enforce rights under a policy or to compensate for harm resulting from an insurer's improper administration of a policy. See Seafarers’ Welfare Plan v. Dixon, 512 So. 2d 53, 54–55 (Ala. 1987) (explaining that a life-insurance beneficiary's "state common law causes of action claiming benefits under an employee benefit plan regulated by ERISA [were] preempted by ERISA, and that the proper recourse [was] to utilize the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA"); Weems v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 905, 909 (Ala. 1995) (beneficiaries’ claims for breach of contract, bad faith, fraud, negligence, wantonness, and willfulness); Landy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 530 So. 2d 214, 215 (Ala. 1988) (beneficiary's breach-of-contract claim); Hood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 522 So. 2d 265 (Ala. 1988) (beneficiary's claim alleging bad-faith refusal to pay insurance benefits). In contrast, this Court has recognized that § 1144(a) does not preempt certain claims that merely tangentially implicate a beneficiary's rights.

The insurance business is affected with a public interest, and it is within the police power of the state to govern and regulate insurance companies. Hood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 460 So.2d 1227 (Ala. 1984), appeal after remand, 522 So.2d 265 (Ala. 1988). The United States Supreme Court has recognized the purpose of statutes regulating the insurance business as:

See also Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 87 L.Ed.2d 96 (1985). In Seafarers' Welfare Plan v. Dixon, 512 So.2d 53 (Ala. 1987), and Hood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 522 So.2d 265 (Ala. 1988), this Court followed those two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is clear from the record that the benefits sought by Landy come from an employee welfare benefit program regulated by ERISA.