Opinion
Case No. 20020237-CA.
Filed April 24, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)
Original Proceeding in this Court.
Virginius Dabney, St. George, for Petitioner.
Alan Hennebold, Brad C. Betebenner, and Mark R. Sumsion, Salt Lake City, for Respondents.
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Greenwood.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
"We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings, and when there is substantial evidence to support the facts as found by the Commission, its order will not be disturbed." Entwistle Co. v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495, 498 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted).
Before the Commission, Petitioner argued that the payments received from Respondents were "relied upon . . . and [that] thereby [Petitioner] changed his position and thereby relinquished rights as a result thereof, which . . . estopps [sic] [Respondents] from arguing . . . that [the] 1995 industrial injury is not compensable." Petitioner's argument to the Commission was therefore based on principles of equitable estoppel. See Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41, 53 (Utah 1988) (setting forth the elements of equitable estoppel).
On appeal, Petitioner does not directly challenge the Commission's treatment of equitable estoppel. Instead, Petitioner argues collateral estoppel or res judicata. See Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978) (setting forth the requirements of collateral estoppel). Because res judicata was not raised below, we decline to analyze the issue on appeal. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346;cf. American Interstate Mortgage Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App 16, ¶ 34 n. 5, 41 P.3d 1142 (declining to analyze an equitable estoppel claim that was not preserved before the trial court).
The Commission concluded that "[P]etitioner's work activity at the time of [the] accident does not meet the Allen test for legal causation." See Allen v. Indus. Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 18 (Utah 1986) (concluding that the language found within the Workers' Compensation Act "requires that there be a causal connection between the injury and the employment"). We agree with the Commission. Petitioner had prior surgery on his back and had a "long history of back pain." "[A] claimant with a preexisting condition must show that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of his condition." Id. at 25. Petitioner fails to make such a showing. Furthermore, Petitioner also failed to "show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that the stress, strain, or exertion required by his . . . occupation led to the resulting injury or disability." Id. at 27. If a "claimant cannot show a medical causal connection, compensation should be denied." Id. (footnote omitted).
We therefore affirm.
WE CONCUR: Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding Judge, and Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge.