Opinion
No. 31243.
May 14, 1934.
1. JUDGMENT.
Thing adjudicated, not reasons therefor, is that which makes previous decision operate as estoppel.
2. JUDGMENT.
Decision concerning taxes for particular year is not res judicata of suit for taxes of another year, although same contentions are involved and evidence is largely same.
3. JUDGMENT.
Judgment holding grantor of timber rights entitled to recover 1930 taxes from grantee under contract requiring grantee to pay taxes until he surrendered timber rights held not res judicata of grantor's right to recover from grantee 1931 taxes paid by grantor.
APPEAL from Circuit Court of Adams County.
Jones Stockett, of Woodville, for appellant.
It is our contention that the judgment in the first suit is res adjudicata between these parties, and that error was committed in allowing any testimony to be adduced in alleged support of the notice under the general issue. No assault was even attempted to be made on the first judgment.
Bates v. Strickland, 139 Miss. 636; Starling v. Sorrell, 134 Miss. 782, 100 So. 10; Duncan v. McNeil, 31 Miss. 704; Henderson v. Winchester, 31 Miss. 290; Cannon v. Cooper, 39 Miss. 784, 80 Am. Dec. 101; Dean v. Board of Supervisors, 135 Miss. 268, 99 So. 563; Vinson v. Colonial U.S. Mortgage Co., 116 Miss. 59, 76 So. 827; Harrison v. Turner, 116 Miss. 550, 77 So. 528; Hardy v. O'Pry, 102 Miss. 197, 59 So. 73; Fisher v. Browning, 107 Miss. 729, 66 So. 132, Ann. Cas. 1917C 466; Cotton v. Walker, 164 Miss. 208, 144 So. 45; 34 C.J. 854; Van Zandt v. Braxton, 149 Miss. 461; Y. M.V.R. Co. v. Sibley, 111 Miss. 21; Fair v. Dickerson, 164 Miss. 432; Miller v. Buckely, 85 Miss. 706.
Every defense to this case had been submitted in the first case, and had been decided and adjudicated.
Darrow v. Moore, 163 Miss. 705, 142 So. 447.
L.A. Whittington, of Natchez, for appellee.
There can be no difference of opinion as to the scope and effect of the doctrine of res judicata. Our contention in this case is simply that it has no application here.
Under the law as announced by this court in the former case in which J.M. Jones was sued for the taxes of 1930, he had no defense to such suit, and any defense which he might have raised under the facts in this case would have been unavailing to him.
There was but one judgment therefore which could have been rendered in that case and that was a judgment against the defendant for the taxes of 1930.
The taxes for 1931 was not involved in that suit. No defense could be made against the payment of the taxes for 1931, and certainly, since the taxes for each year became separate liabilities, until J.M. Jones had brought himself within the exemption of the provision relieving him from the liability for taxes he could not assert such defense.
The taxes for 1931, the thing sued for in the present suit, were not involved and could not have been involved in the former suit; and J.M. Jones' liability therefor, therefore, was not involved and could not have been involved in the former suit.
Argued orally by A.H. Jones, for appellant, and by L.A. Whittington, for appellee.
Appellant brought this action against appellee in the circuit court of Adams county to recover the sum of one thousand forty-seven dollars and seventy-three cents, the taxes on certain lands in Wilkinson county for the year 1931, which taxes appellant alleged it had paid, but which, under stipulations in deeds by it theretofore conveying the timber rights on the land to appellee, the latter was obligated to pay.
Appellee's defense was that under the stipulations in the deeds it was only liable for the taxes on the lands up to the time it surrendered its timber rights to appellant, and that such rights were surrendered in December, 1930. The stipulations in the deeds from appellant to appellee conveying the timber rights on the lands are in this language: "It is further stipulated and agreed that hereafter during the life of this instrument, the vendee, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns, except as in writing may be agreed upon, shall pay all taxes hereafter accruing against the lands and timber hereinabove described during the life of this instrument, but not for more than five years from the date hereof. But, notwithstanding, it is further specifically stipulated herein and hereby that if vendee, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns, shall cut and remove all the timber herein and hereby conveyed from said lands prior to the expiration of five years, and shall surrender all rights hereunder, save and except the right to operate a railroad or tram road over, through and across said lands for removing other timber, and release all claims against said timber, if any there be standing or remaining on said lands, then the vendee shall not be required thereafter to pay any further taxes on said lands." Appellee proved that in December, 1930, it surrendered to appellant all rights under the timber deeds, except the right to operate a railroad or tram road over the lands for removing other timber.
Appellant's main, if not only, contention is that the question involved is res adjudicata. Appellant first sued appellee for the 1930 taxes on the land. The defense in that case was that, in December, 1930, appellee surrendered to appellant his timber rights, and, therefore, he was not liable for the taxes for that year. The trial resulted in a judgment against appellee. From that judgment appellee appealed to this court. Jones Lumber Co. v. Homochitto Development Co., 163 Miss. 305, 141 So. 589. The judgment appealed from was affirmed upon the ground that when appellee surrendered his timber rights in December, 1930, the taxes for that year had already accrued. Under the statute, they had accrued and become a lien on the land on the 1st day of February of that year. It was not adjudicated in that case — the question was not involved — that appellee was liable for the taxes on the land for all time to come. The thing adjudicated and not the reasons therefor is that which makes a previous decision operate as an estoppel. Although the same contentions be involved, a decision concerning the taxes for a particular year is not res adjudicata so as to preclude suit for the taxes of another year. Adams, State Revenue Agent, v. Y. M.V.R.R. Co., 77 Miss. 194, 24 So. 200, 317, 28 So. 956, 959, 60 L.R.A. 33.
The evidence showed that appellee's timber rights had been surrendered before the taxes for 1931 accrued. Under the plain provisions of the deeds appellee was not liable for any taxes on the lands after those of 1930. The fact that the evidence in both cases is largely the same is not conclusive that the judgment in the first suit bars the second. The taxes for the year 1931 were not sued for in the first action and could not have been.
Affirmed.