Opinion
NO. 09-18-00466-CV
11-25-2020
HOMETOWN MOTORS, LLC, Appellant v. EDWARD JONES JR., Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 132557
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Edward Jones Jr. (Jones or Appellee) filed a pro se petition against Hometown Motors, LLC (Hometown Motors or Appellant), alleging that the vehicle he purchased from Hometown Motors broke down by the time he made it home from the used car lot and seeking $2500 in damages. The Justice of the Peace signed a default judgment in favor of Jones and ordered Hometown Motors to pay $2500, plus interest and court costs. Hometown Motors appealed the default judgment with the County Court at Law No. 1 of Jefferson County, Texas. Hometown Motors filed an Answer generally denying the allegations in the petition and asserting affirmative defenses. Hometown Motors alleged there was a failure of consideration because Jones failed to obtain full coverage insurance and failed to pay the remaining down payment as required by the contract and purchase agreement, and Hometown alleged estoppel because the purchase contract did not allow for refunds of purchases, and a failure to exercise right to redeem under the contract. Jones appeared pro se at trial and Hometown Motors was represented by an attorney. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Jones and ordered Hometown Motors to pay Jones $1500 plus post-judgment interest.
Because an appeal from the Justice Court is de novo, we will refer to the County Court at Law No. 1 as the trial court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 506.3.
On appeal, Hometown Motors argues in two issues that the trial court erred in (1) "setting aside a contract and refunding money to a party who may have shown some damage to the vehicle under contract when he was in breach due to failure to obtain full-coverage insurance[]" and (2) "altering the contract because Appellee could not afford his contractual obligations[.]" We interpret his issues on appeal as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the judgment. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Jones did not file an appellate brief.
At the bench trial, Jones's father testified that he was with Jones when Jones test drove and purchased the 2008 BMW 750i at Hometown Motors. According to his father, the vehicle drove "pretty bad[]" on the test drive and "was doing a lot of shaking when you hit the brakes, like something wasn't adjusting right in it." Jones's father testified that the vehicle did not "kill" on the test drive but the vehicle was shaking when the brakes were applied "like it needed a tune-up or something[.]" His father testified that when they returned from the test drive and told the salesman, "Mr. Joe," everything that was wrong with the car, Mr. Joe told Jones he would fix everything and the vehicle was going to "get all of it maintenance[d], change all the four disks includ[ing] wheels that was on it . . . fix the door, brought the car down and everything." His father testified that they left the car and went to the bank to get the down payment. According to Jones's father, Jones paid the down payment and left in the vehicle in that condition because the salesman said he was going to fix everything. His father testified that he was outside the office when Jones signed the paperwork with Mr. Joe. His father testified that the vehicle Jones purchased was not driving well, had unmatched wheels, was shaking when the brakes were pressed, and "once you hit the brakes, it want to kill." Jones's father testified that a couple of days later he made arrangements to bring the vehicle back to Hometown Motors for repairs and Mr. Joe said he would have someone transport Jones's father home, but when Jones's father brought the vehicle in, Mr. Joe was not there and they could not bring Jones's father home so he left with the vehicle. Jones's father testified that within the next couple of days he called and made arrangements to bring the car back and when he arrived that evening, Hometown Motors was closing, Mr. Joe was leaving and asked him to park the vehicle, and Mr. Joe said he was going to fix everything. According to Jones's father, he left the vehicle with Hometown Motors for the repairs within a week from when they had promised they would make the repairs and he paid the down payment. When Jones's father left the car with Hometown Motors, the car "when you hit the brake, it [would] kill[,]" and the car stopped running on the way but "cranked back up." Jones's father testified he never spoke to Mr. Joe again.
Ella Mae Chatman testified that she was with Jones when he tried to get insurance on the BMW and that the insurance company wanted "800 some odd dollars a month for insurance[,]" and that the vehicle would need to be brought to the agent in order for Jones to get full coverage on the vehicle. According to Chatman, Hometown Motors did not offer to bring the vehicle to the insurance company. Chatman testified that she was present when Crystal Carter from Hometown Motors called Jones about having a meeting at the dealership and that Jones was trying to get a refund from Hometown Motors on the car because after the vehicle was left with Hometown Motors, they had allowed rain to get into the car. Chatman testified that she and Jones talked to a man on the lot and he said he could not give a refund because he was not the owner. According to Chatman, during the meeting with Carter that Chatman attended with Jones, Carter wanted Jones to "take another vehicle[]" and Jones explained to her that he was not able to purchase another vehicle. Chatman testified that during the meeting Carter had a phone call, Carter answered the call, and Carter told the caller that Chatman and Jones were already there and Carter told the caller she "was trying to save their butts" in regards to having to deal with the situation, and she said that "the ball was dropped on this case as far as the car goes." Chatman testified that Jones had purchased the liability insurance but was told he had to have full coverage instead of liability and "wasn't going to get all his money back from the liability coverage."
Crystal Carter testified that she is the custodian of records for Hometown Motors. Carter testified about documents admitted into evidence, including the agreement Jones entered into stating that the purchaser had to provide proof of insurance within a few days of purchase and that Hometown Motors had a right of repossession if the purchaser fails to timely secure insurance or is late on payments. Even though Jones denied receiving the letter, Carter testified that a letter was sent to Jones on June 13th letting him know that he had not picked up the vehicle, that Hometown Motors had not received what it needed, and that if Jones did not pick up the car it would be a voluntary repossession. Carter testified about the purchase contract, which was admitted into evidence and which included payment terms and a provision that he purchased the vehicle "as-is without a warranty." According to Carter, Jones paid a $2500 down payment for the vehicle. Carter testified that the Hometown Motors documents show that Jones purchased the vehicle on June 4th and the vehicle was brought back on June 8th to repair a dent in a door that Hometown Motors had agreed to fix at the time of the sale by Joe McArthur. Carter testified that on June 11th she was notified that Jones had been informed his vehicle was ready to be picked up after the door repair and that he would have to have full coverage insurance on the vehicle to pick it up. Carter testified that Jones arrived at Hometown Motors with only liability insurance and she instructed the office manager, Nohemi Aleman, to instruct Jones that he would not be able to pick up the vehicle until he had full coverage. Carter testified that she was informed that Jones had an exchange with someone at Hometown Motors regarding him wanting his money back, they tried to explain the laws of Texas to him, and Carter said that Jones could come talk to her. Carter admitted there was no writing of any kind that acknowledges any type of repairs to the vehicle but that "[i]f he would have asked, I would have told him to give it to him in writing; but it wasn't asked. It was agreed upon." Carter testified that when Jones met with her, his reason for wanting his money back was that the full coverage insurance on the vehicle was too expensive. She asked him if it was so expensive because he did not have a driver's license, he said yes, and she offered to help him trade the BMW in for a smaller, less expensive vehicle with cheaper insurance, but he declined because he could not afford it due to "life circumstances." Carter acknowledged that she contacted Jones first to meet with her and that she was not present when Mr. Joe discussed the repairs with Jones at the time of purchase, and she denied receiving a phone call during the meeting with Jones. According to Carter, the vehicle has now been resold and the present owner has made no complaints.
Nohemi Aleman, the manager at Hometown Motors, testified that she executed the documents for the sale of the vehicle to Jones. According to Aleman, Jones test drove the vehicle, gave the down payment, she went over the purchase contract with him, he never complained to her about the vehicle's performance, when she went over the as-is and warranty portion of the contract Jones stated the door was going to get replaced, she verified the door repair by calling Carter, and Jones came back four days after the purchase to have the door repaired. Aleman testified that on June 11th she called Jones and told him that he needed to have full coverage insurance so that he could pick up the vehicle, he arrived with only liability coverage and said he could not afford full coverage, and when she said she could not accept liability coverage he got upset and asked for his money back. According to Aleman, she and Jones both called the police, and Jones was upset and trying to fight the salesman.
At the conclusion of the bench trial, before entering the judgment, the trial court judge stated his understanding of the case and generally that Jones should not have purchased the vehicle, he made a bad deal, the car "had problems with it[,]" and he had insurance problems. The trial court also stated:
I don't know about how well you carried the burden of proof, but I am going to award the plaintiff $1,500. I don't think you ought to get all your money back. But you're entitled to get $1,500 back.The trial court asked the defendant to prepare and submit a final judgment. In the Final Judgment the trial court found that "Judgment should be taken in favor of Plaintiff" and that Plaintiff "recover the amount of $1,500.00 from Defendant and that interest shall accrue at a rate of 6% per annum[.]"
There are no findings of facts or conclusions of law included in our record and the record does not reveal whether either party requested findings and conclusions. In a nonjury trial, when findings of fact and conclusions of law are neither filed nor timely requested, all necessary findings in support of the trial court's judgment are implied. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992). When a reporter's record is filed, an appellant may challenge implied findings by factual or legal sufficiency points, just as it could challenge jury findings or a trial court's written findings of fact. Id. at 84. If the evidence supports the implied findings, we must uphold the trial court's judgment on any theory of law applicable to the case. In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam).
When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on which the party did not have the burden of proof, the party must demonstrate on appeal that no evidence supports the finding. Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Peña, 442 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex. 2014). We credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). Evidence is legally sufficient if it "would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review." Id. The factfinder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and is responsible for resolving any conflicts in the evidence, weighing the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. at 819-21; Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 625 (Tex. 2004). When considering a legal sufficiency point, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810. Even if evidence is undisputed, it is the province of the fact finder to draw from such evidence whatever inferences it wishes so long as more than one inference is possible. Id. at 821. But if the evidence allows only one inference, neither the trier of fact nor the reviewing court may disregard it. Id. at 822. When there is conflicting evidence, it is the province of the trier of fact to resolve such conflicts. Id. at 820. In every circumstance in which a reasonable trier of fact could resolve conflicting evidence either way, the reviewing court must presume it did so in favor of the prevailing party and disregard the conflicting evidence in its sufficiency review. Id. at 821. If the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions, then the fact finder must be allowed to do so. Id. at 822. So long as the evidence falls within this zone of reasonable disagreement, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Id. The ultimate test for legal sufficiency is whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review. Id. at 827.
When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to a finding on which the party did not have the burden of proof, we may set aside the finding only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Bennett v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 489 S.W.3d 58, 66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). We consider all the evidence, but we will not reverse the judgment unless "the evidence which supports the [] finding is so weak as to [make the finding] clearly wrong and manifestly unjust." Star Enter. v. Marze, 61 S.W.3d 449, 462 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied); see also Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). When examining factual sufficiency, we examine the entire record, and the amount of evidence necessary to affirm a judgment is far less than the amount necessary to reverse a judgment. GTE Mobilnet of S. Tex. Ltd. P'ship v. Pascouet, 61 S.W.3d 599, 616 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet denied).
This Court is not a factfinder. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex. 1998). Instead, the trier of fact—in this case the trial court—is the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight afforded their testimony. GTE Mobilnet, 61 S.W.3d at 615-16. Therefore, we may not pass upon the witnesses' credibility or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, even if the evidence would also support a different result. Id. "If we determine that the evidence is factually insufficient, we must detail the evidence relevant to the issue and state in what regard the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence in support of the challenged finding; we need not do so when we affirm." Bennett, 489 S.W.3d at 66.
The trial court heard Jones's testimony that he told the Hometown Motors representative, Mr. Joe, after the test drive what was wrong with the car and Mr. Joe told him that they would fix everything if Jones purchased the car. The trial court heard Jones's father's testimony about what he witnessed at the lot and Chatman's testimony that she overheard the conversation between Carter and the man from the lot that she was having to "save their butts" regarding the car deal. The trial court heard testimony that Jones was promised as part of the deal that the door would be repaired even though the repair was not noted as part of the deal in the contract and the trial court could have believed that repairs were not performed as promised, and that Hometown Motors had breached the agreement made with Jones and caused damages to Jones in the amount of at least $1500. The trial court, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, could have believed some or all of the testimony from Jones and his father, as well as Chatman. After crediting all the favorable evidence a reasonable fact finder could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not, we conclude that the evidence would enable a reasonable and fair-minded person to conclude that Hometown Motors breached the contract with Jones. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. Alternatively, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that both parties failed to comply with the agreement but that Jones should be awarded on an equitable basis the $1500 portion of his down payment for a car he had for less than a week, that had major mechanical problems, and that was later resold by the defendant to someone else. See, e.g., Fortune Prod. Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 671, 684 (Tex. 2000) (damages may be awarded in equity to prevent a party from obtaining a benefit by unjust enrichment).
Furthermore, after considering and weighing all the evidence, we conclude that that evidence is not so weak nor is the finding so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See Star Enter., 61 S.W.3d at 462; see also Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176. Therefore, the evidence is factually sufficient. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice Submitted on November 20, 2019
Opinion Delivered November 25, 2020 Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.