Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Napa County Super. Ct. No. 26-28129
Lambden, J.
Davidon Homes (Davidon) appeals from the lower court’s denial of its petition for writ of mandate. Davidon filed its petition after the City of Napa (Napa) rejected its application to develop 80.6 acres of undeveloped real property. Davidon claimed that, in rejecting its application, Napa violated the Map Filing Freeze Statute (Gov. Code, § 66474.2, subd. (a)) and that this violation prejudiced Davidon. The lower court found that Napa had violated the Map Filing Freeze Statute but Davidon had suffered no prejudice. It therefore denied Davidon’s petition. We affirm the lower court’s ruling.
BACKGROUND
On March 28, 1997, Davidon submitted to Napa an application for a tentative map to subdivide a site known as Napa Oaks, to create a residential development of large, single-family homes (Napa Oaks project). The Napa Oaks property consists of four undeveloped parcels totaling 80.6 acres at the southwestern edge of Napa. This property is adjacent to the city’s rural urban limit that designates the maximum extent of the city’s urban development. Two of the parcels, totaling 78 acres, contain a 336-foot ridge with a steep slope and 43 acres consist of native oak woodland. The 78-acre parcel is included in a group of properties known as Pod 123. On the east of these 78 acres is residential development and the remaining sides are bordered by working vineyards and open space. The remaining two parcels, totaling 2.6 acres, lie at the foot of the ridge to the east of the larger parcels.
The 85-unit project Davidon submitted to Napa in 1997 included applications to rezone the Napa Oaks site and for a tentative subdivision map, a hillside use permit, and architectural review (applications). Napa assigned “Project No. 97-035” to the application. Napa’s general plan at the time designated the site “single family residential,” which allowed development of from zero- to three-dwelling units per acre on the 70-acre hillside portion of the property and three-to six-dwelling units per acre on the flatter 2.6-acre portion. On October 20, 1997, Napa determined Davidon’s 85-unit map application to be complete.
The original application was for a 92-lot vesting tentative map.
Much of the Napa Oaks site was zoned “estate district,” which permitted one unit per acre. Napa Oaks was subject to Napa’s zoning ordinances, including Napa’s Hillside Development Overlay Zone (hillside overlay ordinance). (See Napa Muni. Code, § 17.40.030.) The hillside overlay ordinance restricts allowable development density and establishes special hillside development regulations, including requirements related to visibility, engineering and grading, and physical characteristics of residences to be constructed. Under the hillside overlay ordinance, a property owner has to obtain a use permit to build more than one residential unit per parcel. (Napa Muni. Code, § 17.40.030.) The permit is discretionary.
Napa’s zoning ordinance was recodified in 2003. Citations in this opinion are to the current code. The prior code provisions (Napa Muni. Code, Ch. 17.54) were renumbered without substantive change.
In January 1998, Napa undertook an Environmental Impact Report (EIR), which focused on the environmental effects of the Napa Oaks project. In December 1998, Napa adopted a new general plan (1998 general plan) and a new land-use category entitled resource area (RA). Napa applied the RA designation to seven properties in Pod 123, including the 78-acre ridge and hillside portion of the Napa Oaks project. The RA designation permitted limited, very low density residential use. It permitted one home per existing parcel as of right or, with discretionary approval from Napa, up to one unit per 20 acres as long as such use did not impact either the particular property’s character or a feature that Napa sought to preserve in designating the property RA. The remaining 2.6-acre portion of the Napa Oaks project retained the “single family residential” designation.
Napa and Davidon agreed that Napa would consider an application by Davidon to amend the 1998 general plan to restore the pre-1998 residential land use designation to Napa Oaks, while Davidon maintained its position that an amendment was not necessary and that the new RA designation could not apply to Napa Oaks. In September 1999, Napa circulated a draft EIR for Davidon’s project. The draft EIR determined that the project would have potentially significant environmental impacts; the EIR proposed 89 mitigation measures to reduce these impacts. These mitigation measures led to the development of what was known as the 53-lot “mitigated alternative,” which was an attempt to conceptually illustrate how the 89 mitigation measures could be implemented.
In March 2000, the final EIR was released and was considered by the Napa planning commission (planning commission). The planning commission held a public hearing on the Napa Oaks project on April 20, 2000, and received many comments about environmental impacts. Concerns included the loss of onsite wetlands and oak woodland habitat, detention basin design, traffic and safety issues, seismic issues, unstable slopes, visual impacts, drainage and runoff, grading, agricultural-urban conflicts, views of a proposed water tank, water quality impacts, and general plan consistency issues.
Davidon requested that the application process not continue as scheduled to allow it to redesign the Napa Oaks project. Davidon submitted a conceptual map for a revised project during September and October of 2000. It then submitted an application for a revised 65-unit subdivision; it reduced the number of acres to be graded by almost 40 percent; and it eliminated more than one-half of the proposed cut and fill. On April 11, 2001, Napa concluded that Davidon’s application for the revised 65-unit project was incomplete. After Davidon submitted additional materials, Napa deemed the application complete in December 2001.
Napa released a new final EIR, which concluded that the revised application materials submitted by Davidon presented a project that was quantitatively and qualitatively different from both the “mitigated alternative” proposed in the draft EIR and Davidon’s original project. It found that all environmental impacts were mitigated to a less-than-significant level except for those involving short-term tree loss, the change in the visual character of the site, and potential water quality impacts from storm runoff. Napa was especially concerned about the clustering of homes and lot location. The “mitigated alternative” proposed fewer homes clustered toward the center of the site to provide a substantial buffer from neighboring properties. Napa recommended that Davidon minimally remove proposed lots 19 and 32, which were both along the southern edge. Napa believed that the removal of these lots was necessary to reduce fragmentation in the newly-created oak woodland mitigation area. Davidon refused to remove these lots.
In addition to the removal of proposed lots 19 and 32, Napa was concerned with the location of proposed lots 15 and 16. In the revised plan, the homes on lots 15 and 16 would be located 80 to 100 feet from the edge of the site, but the homes on these lots in the mitigated alternative were 200 feet away. Additionally, there were concerns regarding excessive cutting, grading, and filling.
On October 17, 2002, Davidon’s revised application came before the planning commission. Davidon had further reduced the revised project to a total of 64 units. Scott Gregory, a principal with Lamphier-Gregory, the environmental consulting firm hired by Napa that prepared the EIR, summarized the revised project’s impacts. He stated that of the 89 mitigation measures recommended in the draft EIR, 17 recommended measures were incorporated into Davidon’s project either in whole or in part. He stated that there were 72 mitigation measures that were still applicable to the revised project. The planning commission voted three to two against amending the general plan to return the site to its residential land use designation. The commission recommended certification of the EIR.
Davidon’s revised subdivision application, the general plan amendment, and the EIR went before Napa’s city council (council) at a public hearing on December 3, 2002. At the conclusion, the council denied the project and the general plan amendment to change its land use designation to single-family residential. The council tentatively decided to certify the EIR for Napa Oaks. The council adopted extensive findings, which included the following: The RA was the appropriate land use classification for the Napa Oaks property; Davidon’s modified project was “clearly inconsistent” with the existing general plan land use designation for most of the site, as it proposed to develop much denser housing than would otherwise be allowed under the current designations for the property; the Napa Oaks site was too sensitive for Davidon’s revised subdivision; under the original single family residential general plan designation for the Napa Oaks project site, the council would probably have determined that the revised project was inconsistent with the Hillside Development Guidelines; the benefits of the project did not outweigh the significant and unavoidable impacts of the project enumerated in the EIR; and the project’s adverse and significant impacts on downstream water quality, the amount of grading proposed, the lack of adequate clustering of lots to avoid habitat areas and steep slopes, and the prospect of visible development within a scenic and environmentally sensitive hillside were issues of significant concern.
The council denied Davidon’s development applications. It also denied Davidon’s application to return the bulk of Napa Oaks to its prior general plan residential land use designation.
On January 21, 2005, Davidon filed its complaint against Napa for violating its constitutional rights and filed its petition for writ of mandate and for other equitable relief in the superior court. It filed a first amended complaint on June 14, 2005. The complaint challenged Napa’s 1998 legislative decision incorporating an RA designation for Napa Oaks, as well as the 2003 quasi-adjudicative decision denying Davidon’s subdivision map and other development applications for its proposed project.
The trial court heard Davidon’s petition for a writ of mandate on August 24, 2007. The court adopted its tentative ruling, making it the order of the court. The court found that the RA designation was not in effect when Napa determined that the initial map application was complete in 1997 and that Government Code section 66474.2 barred Napa from applying the RA designation in determining whether to approve or disapprove of the tentative map. The court ruled that Napa had thus failed to proceed in the manner required by law and abused its discretion.
The trial court, however, determined that Napa’s abuse of discretion was not prejudicial. The court found: Under Government Code section 66474, Napa “was required to deny approval of the tentative map if [Napa] made any one of several findings, including that the map was not consistent with the general plan or that the site is not physically suitable for the type of development or proposed density of development. In denying the tentative map in this case, [Napa] found both that the map was not consistent with the general plan and that ‘the site is too sensitive and constrained to develop as currently proposed by Davidon.’ The court interprets this latter statement as a finding that the site is not physically suitable for the Project as proposed.” The court concluded: The “finding that the site is too ‘sensitive and constrained,’ ” was “properly based on the physical attributes of the property itself, rather than an application of the RA designation. Thus, even if the improper findings were eliminated, [Napa] would have been required under [Government Code] section 66474 to deny the application. . . . Under these circumstances, the court finds that [Napa’s] abuse of discretion was not prejudicial and does not warrant a writ of mandate directing [it] to reconsider the project without application of the RA designation. . . .” The court determined that Davidon also failed to show any arbitrary or discriminatory action against it by Napa.
Judgment was entered on October 9, 2007. Davidon filed a timely notice of appeal.
Davidon filed a request for judicial notice of Napa Municipal Code section 16.04.150 and the 1964 report of the state planning law revision committee. Napa opposed the motion on the basis that neither document was presented at trial and neither is relevant. We will not consider new legal issues on appeal but, to the extent this evidence does not raise new legal issues and is relevant, we consider these documents. Accordingly, we grant judicial notice of these documents. Napa requested that, in the event we grant Davidon’s request for judicial notice, we take judicial notice of the complete chapters 16.04 and 16.20 of the Napa Municipal Code. We grant this request, too, and take judicial notice of these chapters of the Napa Municipal Code.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The decision regarding a subdivision application is an adjudicatory act. (Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 614.) A proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is the exclusive remedy for judicial review of the quasi-adjudicatory administrative action of local level agencies in these circumstances. (Saad v. City of Berkeley (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1211 (Saad).) The scope of judicial inquiry in such proceedings “extends to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)
“Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. In all other cases, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).)
“ ‘In applying the substantial evidence standard, “the reviewing court must resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative finding and decision.” ’ [Citation.] The appellate court’s role ‘is precisely the same as the trial court’s,’ and lower court’s findings are not ‘conclusive on appeal.’ [Citation.]” (San Joaquin Raptor/Wildlife Rescue Center v. County of Stanislaus (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 713, 722.) The burden is on the petitioner to show no substantial evidence supported the findings of the local agency. (Saad, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1212.)
Here, the trial court found that Napa violated the Map Filing Freeze Statute. However, it rejected Davidon’s petition for writ of mandate because it ruled that substantial evidence supported a finding that Napa’s decision did not prejudice Davidon. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b); Saad, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1215-1216.)
II. Substantial Evidence Supported the Finding of No Prejudicial Abuse of Discretion
A. The Map Filing Freeze Statute and the Facts of This Case
It is undisputed that on October 20, 1997, Napa determined that Davidon’s 85-unit map application was complete. This project included applications to rezone the Napa Oaks site and for a tentative subdivision map, a hillside use permit, and an architectural review. Subsequently, Napa adopted the 1998 general plan and a new land-use category entitled RA.
Following a public hearing on the Napa Oaks project held by the planning commission on April 20, 2000, Davidon requested that the application process not continue as scheduled to permit it to redesign its project. On April 11, 2001, Davidon concluded that this application for the revised 65-unit project was incomplete. After Davidon submitted additional materials, Napa deemed the application complete in December 2001.
Napa asserts that the 2001 application substantially revised the 1997 application and thus constituted a new application, which it deemed complete in 2001. Napa asserts that it therefore properly applied the 1998 general plan to this application completed in 2001. Davidon contends that it simply revised its original 1997 application and Napa abused its discretion and violated the Map Filing Freeze Statute (Gov. Code, § 66474.2) by applying the 1998 general plan designation to its 1997 application.
Government Code section 66474.2, subdivision (a) provides that, subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, “in determining whether to approve or disapprove an application for a tentative map, the local agency shall apply only those ordinances, policies, and standards in effect at the date the local agency has determined that the application is complete pursuant to Section 65943 . . . .” Government Code section 65943, subdivision (b) states: “Not later than 30 calendar days after receipt of the submitted materials, the public agency shall determine in writing whether they are complete and shall immediately transmit that determination to the applicant. If the written determination is not made within that 30-day period, the application together with the submitted materials shall be deemed complete for purposes of this chapter.”
Even if we were to presume that Davidon was entitled to have its revised application judged by the standards in effect when it filed its initial application in 1997, we conclude that Napa did not abuse its discretion because Davidon cannot show prejudice. The council’s findings supported its denial of Davidon’s application under the general plan in effect in 1997 (1997 general plan). As already noted, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, we will only reverse if there is a “prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (See also Gov. Code, § 65010, subd. (b) [no action by public agency will be set aside by court unless court finds error was prejudicial].)
B. Prejudice
Davidon must establish prejudice under both Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b), and Government Code section 65010. As already set forth, we review a governmental agency’s quasi-adjudicatory decision to determine “whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)
Government Code section 65010, subdivision (b) provides: “No action, inaction, or recommendation by any public agency or its legislative body or any of its administrative agencies or officials on any matter subject to this title shall be held invalid or set aside by any court on the ground of the improper admission or rejection of evidence or by reason of any error, irregularity, informality, neglect, or omission (hereafter, error) as to any matter pertaining to petitions, applications, notices, findings, records, hearings, reports, recommendations, appeals, or any matters of procedure subject to this title, unless the court finds that the error was prejudicial and that the party complaining or appealing suffered substantial injury from that error and that a different result would have been probable if the error had not occurred. There shall be no presumption that error is prejudicial or that injury was done if the error is shown.”
Here, Napa argued in the trial court that the council made three independent findings, which required it to deny Davidon’s application no matter whether it applied the 1997 or 1998 general plan. Napa maintained that council found a substantial likelihood that it would deny the project (1) based on Napa’s hillside development guidelines; (2) based on the Napa Oaks project having significant environmental impacts, which outweighed the benefits according to the project EIR; and (3) based on the site not being physically suitable for the type or density of development proposed.
Since we are reviewing the denial of an application for a subdivision, “ ‘it is not necessary to determine that each finding by the [council] was supported by substantial evidence. As long as the [council] made a finding that any one of the necessary elements enumerated in the ordinance[] was lacking, and this finding was itself supported by substantial evidence, the [council’s] denial of [Davidon’s] application must be upheld.’ ” (Saad, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1213-1214.) The Saad court explained: “If any one of the findings made by [Napa] is supported by substantial evidence and warrants denial of the permit under the ordinance, defects in other findings by [Napa] will not prejudice [Davidon]. [Napa] could simply eliminate the other findings and still prevail upon the one adequate finding of detriment. Unless the findings are so intertwined that a failure of one could reasonably lead [Napa] to reconsider its denial of the permit, [Davidon] cannot establish prejudice.” (Id. at p. 1215.)
The trial court found that Davidon cannot establish prejudice because the council would have rejected Davidon’s application had it applied the 1997 general plan because its findings required it to reject Davidon’s application under Government Code section 66474. We agree for the reasons set forth below.
Davidon does not present any evidence that these findings were intertwined, although it does quote this language in Saad, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at page 1215. Napa contends that the language of “intertwined” is dictum and should not be construed to create a “gaping loophole.” We need not consider whether, in some cases, the findings are so intertwined that one finding may contaminate the other findings, since Davidon presents no evidence to support this argument.
1. Site Not Physically Suitable for Type or Density of Proposed Development
Government Code section 66474, which was in effect when Davidon submitted its first application in 1997, provides in relevant part: “A legislative body of a city or county shall deny approval of a tentative map, or a parcel map for which a tentative map was not required, if it makes any of the following findings: [¶] . . . [¶] (c) That the site is not physically suitable for the type of development. [¶] (d) That the site is not physically suitable for the proposed density of development.” (Gov. Code, § 66474, subds. (c) & (d), italics added.)
Here, council specifically found, based on the Napa Oaks project EIR, that Napa Oaks “is too sensitive and constrained to develop as currently proposed by Davidon.” Council found that Napa Oaks “had serious constraints, including landslides and seismic hazards related to a fault running through the property.” Thus, if these findings are supported by evidence in the record, Napa was required to deny Davidon’s application under Government Code section 66474 no matter what general plan it applied.
Davidon does not argue that the foregoing findings are unsupported by substantial evidence. It therefore has failed to meet its burden of proving Napa’s findings were invalid and lacked substantial evidence. (See Breneric Associates v. City of Del Mar (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 166, 177.) Moreover, our independent review of the record confirms that substantial evidence did support this finding.
The record states that information included in the EIR and in studies prepared for previous project applications established that Napa Oaks has serious constraints to development due to slopes, significant stands of vegetation, habitat, seismic risks, water supply problems, and limited access. The Napa Oaks site is located on a visually prominent ridgeline and many of its slopes are quite steep (30 percent incline or greater). An initial study prepared in January 1998 described the property in the following manner: “ ‘The site is atop of a ridgeline within the western boundary of the City of Napa . . . . The hillside topography rises from 70 feet above sea level to four knolls separated by small valleys up to 336 feet in elevation. Vegetation is grassland interspersed with stands of trees, primarily oaks. Hillside slopes are extremely variable, with about 40% of the site having slopes of 9-15%, about 30% of the site having slopes ranging from 15-30%, and the remainder having slopes steeper than 30%. Geotechnical analysis has found areas of landsliding and potential slope instability, and fault traces through the site which may be related to the West Napa Fault Zone. . . .’ ”
The record contained ample evidence that Napa Oaks was not physically suitable for Davidon’s revised project. Davidon’s revised project proposed a new oak woodland on approximately 23.7 acres, but there was evidence that the planting and irrigation of young trees could undermine unstable slopes, exacerbate landslide conditions, or create unintended biological effects. Gregory, a principal with Lamphier-Gregory, the environmental consulting firm hired by Napa that prepared the EIR, stated that of the 89 mitigation measures recommended in the draft EIR, 17 recommended measures were incorporated into the revised project either in whole or in part. He stated that there were 72 mitigation measures that were still applicable to the revised project.
Accordingly, we conclude the record supported council’s findings that Napa Oaks was not physically suitable for the type of development Davidon proposed. Rather than provide any substantial evidence argument, Davidon mounts a challenge based on the council’s statement that it was making its ruling in its legislative capacity. When making its findings, council stated that its “decision whether or not to amend the general plan so as to allow Davidon’s development as proposed is purely discretionary and legislative in character.” When finding that the site was “too sensitive and constrained to develop as currently proposed by Davidon[,]” council stated the following: “For these reasons, [council], acting in its legislative capacity, does not believe it to be in the public interest at this time to amend the general plan as requested by Davidon.”
Davidon asserts that Napa’s site suitability finding was adopted as a legislative matter, and to permit this finding to serve as an adjudicatory ruling is to proceed contrary to law and therefore an abuse of discretion. Davidon points out that adjudicatory rulings, contrary to legislative rulings, measure facts against applicable standards.
We are not concerned with the actual language used by the council. The council decided to apply the RA designation to Napa Oaks in its legislative capacity, but it considered whether to deny Davidon’s application in its quasi-adjudicatory capacity. When deciding how to rule on Davidon’s application, council held a hearing, took evidence, and made findings. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, we review this decision to determine whether substantial evidence supported its findings and whether the findings “ ‘bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order.’ ” (Craik v. County of Santa Cruz (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 880, 884.) “The findings need not be stated with the precision required in judicial proceedings. [Citation.] They may properly incorporate matters by reference and even omissions may sometimes be filled by such relevant references as are available in the record. [Citation.] ‘Thus, where reference to the administrative record informs the parties and reviewing courts of the theory upon which an agency has arrived at its ultimate finding and decision it has long been recognized that the decision should be upheld if the agency “in truth found those facts which as a matter of law are essential to sustain its . . . [decision].” [Citations.]’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, the council, no matter what it called its action, made a quasi-adjudicatory ruling and supported its rejection of Davidon’s application with findings that are supported by the record. The record established that the council’s findings required it to reject Davidon’s application pursuant to Government Code section 66474. Accordingly, we conclude that, even if council erred in applying the 1998 general plan, Davidon suffered no prejudice as the result would not have been different even if council had applied the 1997 general plan.
2. Davidon’s Argument That the Council’s Decision to Apply the 1997 Plan Denied it a Fair Hearing
Davidon does not dispute that prejudice must be established under Government Code section 65010 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b). Davidon contends that these statutes apply only to technical or procedural errors. Here, Davidon maintains that the error was the application of the 1997 general plan, which is a substantive error. Davidon also contends that a determination of no prejudice requires this court to speculate as to what council would have done; it also complains that it did not receive a fair hearing.
Davidon asserts that in land use development cases a court cannot speculate as to what a city council might have done, as that violates the separation of powers doctrine. (See, e.g., Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515 [agency rendering the challenged decision must set forth finding so reviewing court not left to speculate as to administrative agency’s basis for decision]; Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 572; California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 212; Upton v. Gray (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 352; Sierra Club v. City of Hayward (1981) 28 Cal.3d 840, 859.) Davidon argues that speculating as to what a city council might have done is “tantamount to inventing findings the council never made.”
We agree that it is improper for a reviewing court to speculate as to what an agency might have done or to manufacture findings. Here, however, council made findings that required it under Government Code section 66474 to deny Davidon’s application. We do not have to speculate as to the council’s findings; all relevant findings were made and we apply the law to those findings. Davidon has not shown that council’s findings would have been any different had it applied the 1997 general plan rather than the 1998 general plan. To the contrary, Government Code section 66474 requires a legislative body to deny a tentative subdivision map if “the site is not physically suitable for the type of development [proposed in the map]” or “the site is not physically suitable for the proposed density of development.” (Gov. Code, § 66474, subds. (c) & (d).) Napa proceeded in a lawful manner in that it provided Davidon with notice and a fair hearing, and its findings establish that, no matter what general plan applied, Davidon’s application would have been rejected under Government Code section 66474, subdivisions (c) and (d).
Davidon also declares that “[t]he only application of the prejudice requirement that is consistent with the separation of powers doctrine is one in which courts find errors harmless only when they comprise a technical, procedural irregularity.” It claims that the legislative intent underlying Government Code section 65801 was to enact this statute as “a curative statute for the purpose of terminating recurrence of judicial decisions which had invalidated local zoning proceedings for technical procedural omissions.” (City of Sausalito v. County of Marin (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 550, 557-558, referring to former Gov. Code, § 65801 .) Davidon maintains that Government Code section 65010 applies only to trivial evidentiary and procedural irregularities, and not to substantive or significant procedural errors. In the present case, Davidon claims that council applied the wrong substantive law and therefore the error was substantive and significant. Davidon asserts that it therefore did not have a fair hearing and showed prejudice.
Government Code section 65010 derives from former Government Code section 65801.
The degree of judicial deference to administrative discretion, which is required of courts in this area of the law by the separation of powers doctrine, is statutorily expressed in subdivision (f) of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure: “The court shall enter judgment either commanding respondent to set aside the order or decision, or denying the writ. Where the judgment commands that the order or decision be set aside, it may order the reconsideration of the case in the light of the court’s opinion and judgment and may order respondent to take such further action as is specially enjoined upon it by law, but the judgment shall not limit or control in any way the discretion legally vested in the respondent.”
“More importantly, perhaps, is the public policy consideration for utilizing the mechanism of review provided under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. To allow parties to circumvent the system of review provided under [section] 1094.5 would, in effect, undermine the authority and integrity of the hearing procedures which administrative agencies are presently required to render. These agencies have been vested with quasi-judicial authority to hold hearings, take evidence, and render a decision based upon findings of fact. [Citation.] The right to a limited review of that decision by a reviewing court has also been provided. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) To allow the parties to challenge every administrative decision with another trial de novo would be a waste of both administrative and judicial resources, and the administrative hearings would be nothing more than perfunctory gestures.” (Eureka Teachers Assn. v. Board of Education (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 353, 366.)
The present case differs significantly from those cited by Davidon, where courts found no showing of prejudice because the government agency made a decision without providing notice to large groups of people. (Sounhein v. City of San Dimas (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1255 (Sounhein); Scott v. City of Indian Wells (1972) 6 Cal.3d 541 [reversed city’s grant of conditional land use permit when city failed to give notice to nonresident owners of land adjoining land in city]; Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152 [no fair hearing when city exhibited bias, council member had conflict of interest, and parties had no opportunity to be heard on two issues, which were raised for first time after hearing].) For example, in Sounhein, the court held that the failure of the city to provide the requisite notice and hearing procedures was not harmless because this failure was not a “minor technical defect[,]” “but rather the process was fundamentally flawed by the complete omission of any public notice or hearings when adopting the zoning ordinance.” (Sounhein, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1260.) The failure to provide the public with notice and an opportunity to be heard and to have their concerns considered amounted “to more than a mere technical, procedural omission” and reflected “a total deprivation of basic zoning procedural safeguards for the community.” (Id. at p. 1261.)
Here, in contrast to Sounhein, there was no complete deprivation of a hearing and Davidon had an opportunity to be heard. It is true when the defect is procedural or related to a lack of proper notice, the court will look to see whether the challenged defect was merely technical or whether it deprived the parties of their right to a fair hearing. This was not the situation in the present case. As discussed more extensively below, Davidon received a fair hearing.
The language of the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 and Government Code section 65010 does not limit the application of these statutes to procedural errors, as Davidon urges, and we will not rewrite these statutes to limit their application. (See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Cukierman (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1339.) Government Code section 65010, subdivision (b) states that no action by a public agency “shall be held invalid or set aside by any court on the ground of the improper admission or rejection of evidence or by reason of any error, irregularity, informality, neglect, or omission (hereafter, error) as to any matter pertaining to petitions, applications, notices, findings, records, hearings, reports, recommendations, appeals, or any matters of procedure subject to this title, unless the court finds that the error was prejudicial and that the party complaining or appealing suffered substantial injury from that error and that a different result would have been probable if the error had not occurred.” (Italics added.) The language of the statute is clear and there is no reason to consider extrinsic evidence. “If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (i.e., extrinsic evidence).” (City of Berkeley v. Cukierman, supra, at p. 1339,citing Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.)
Davidon has never asserted that it did not receive fair notice or that it was deprived from a fair hearing on the council’s findings that Napa Oaks “is too sensitive and constrained to develop as currently proposed by Davidon” and that Napa Oaks “had serious constraints, including landslides and seismic hazards related to a fault running through the property.” If Davidon could establish that applying the later general plan affected council’s findings or the outcome, we would agree that the error was prejudicial. However, Davidon has made no such showing. Further, as the trial court noted, council’s finding that the site was too sensitive for the development proposed by Davidon was based on the physical attributes of the property and unrelated to which general plan applied. As already stressed, the findings based on the physical attributes of the property required council to reject Davidon’s application under Government Code section 66474.
In its reply brief, Davidon contends that the analysis of prejudice requires that it be Napa’s error, and not some independent cause, that is the source of the injury, and cites Saad, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th 1206. Davidon’s argument is not entirely clear because, if we presume that council abused its discretion in applying the 1998 general plan rather than the 1997 general plan, then it was council’s error. Davidon argues that applying the wrong general plan was a substantial injury, not merely technical or procedural. However, the question is whether Davidon suffered a substantial injury by the application of the wrong plan. Here, Davidon cannot show any injury because, under the express findings of the council, the plan would still have been rejected under Government Code section 66474 no matter what plan the council applied. As stated in Saad: “If any one of the findings made by the City is supported by substantial evidence and warrants denial of the permit under the ordinance, defects in other findings by the City will not prejudice the [petitioners].” (Saad, supra, at p. 1215.) Here, the findings of the council warrant denial of Davidon’s application under Government Code section 66474. As already stressed, Davidon does not maintain that it was limited in presenting its evidence or that an evidentiary error occurred as a result of council’s application of the later general plan.
Thus, in the present case, there was an alternative, independent ground for council’s denying Davidon’s application based on findings made at the hearing and there is no need for us to infer findings (see Saad, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1214). Davidon has not argued that the application of the wrong general plan impacted its ability to present all of its evidence or affected the outcome of the findings. The evidence presented at the hearing and the findings made at the hearing required the council to deny the application under Government Code section 66474. Accordingly, we conclude that, even if we presume that council abused its discretion in applying the later general plan, its abuse of discretion was not prejudicial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Napa is awarded the costs of appeal.
We concur: Kline, P.J., Haerle, J.