Home Builders v. City of Maricopa

17 Citing cases

  1. State v. Payne

    223 Ariz. 555 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 61 times
    Holding county prosecution fee not statutorily authorized

    ¶ 15 Counties in Arizona are separate legal entities, whose power is derived from the Arizona Constitution and statutes. Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Maricopa, 215 Ariz. 146, ¶ 5, 158 P.3d 869, 872 (App. 2007). A county's "authority is limited to those powers expressly, or by necessary implication, delegated to [it] by the state constitution or statutes."

  2. County of Cochise v. Faria

    221 Ariz. 619 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 13 times

    ¶ 10 "'We presume the legislature is aware of existing statutes when it enacts new statutes.'" Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Maricopa, 215 Ariz. 146, ¶ 15, 158 P.3d 869, 874 (App. 2007), quoting Washburn v. Pima County, 206 Ariz. 571, ¶ 11, 81 P.3d 1030, 1035 (App. 2003). When "statutes relate to the same subject and are thus in pari materia, they should be construed together with other related statutes as though they constituted one law."

  3. Town of Florence v. Florence Copper Inc.

    493 P.3d 891 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 19 times

    We also view the facts on appeal from a bench trial in the light most favorable to upholding the judgment. Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Maricopa , 215 Ariz. 146, 148, ¶ 2, 158 P.3d 869, 871 (App. 2007). I. Binding Contract and Separation of Powers

  4. West v. Highroads Prop. Owners Ass'n

    No. 2 CA-CV 2019-0033 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jun. 8, 2020)

    A successor in interest is one who follows another in ownership or control of property and retains the same rights as the original owner. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Maricopa, 215 Ariz. 146, ¶ 18 (App. 2007). ¶35 76 Ranch was a lessee of the grazing rights to the portion of Eureka Springs to the east of Bonita-Klondyke Road pursuant to a 2005 lease and subsequent lease extension.

  5. State v. Carter

    429 P.3d 1176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 1 times

    But because § 13-1803 was enacted in 1977, see 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 142, § 72, and Kamai was decided in 1995, the legislature had reason to know, in 1998, that "intent to deprive," as provided in § 13-1802(A)(1), would be sufficient to distinguish unlawful use under § 13-1803 from the newly enacted vehicle-theft statute. Thus, to the extent the court in Garcia may suggest otherwise, see 235 Ariz. 627, n.5, 334 P.3d at 1290, n.5, this does not appear to have been the motivation for the requirement in § 13-1814(A)(1) of an intent to permanently deprive, see County of Cochise v. Faria , 221 Ariz. 619, ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 957, 960–61 (App. 2009) ("We presume the legislature is aware of existing statutes when it enacts new statutes.") (quoting Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Maricopa , 215 Ariz. 146, ¶ 15, 158 P.3d 869, 874 (App. 2007) ). ¶45 In sum, we conclude Carter’s convictions for theft, pursuant to § 13-1802, and vehicle theft pursuant to § 13-1814, as to each of two vehicles, constitute impermissible multiple punishments.

  6. Bashi v. Mercado

    No. 1 CA-CV 16-0508 (Ariz. Ct. App. May. 9, 2017)

    ¶8 Appellant appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment against him and subsequent dismissal of his complaint. We review the trial court's factual findings for an abuse of discretion, but review its legal conclusions and issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Home Builders Ass'n of Central Ariz. v. City of Maricopa, 215 Ariz. 146, 149, ¶ 6, 158 P.3d 869, 872 (App. 2007). We review de novo the trial court's grant of summary judgment, including the court's assessment of the existence of factual disputes and its application of the law.

  7. Hawkins v. Blair

    No. 1 CA-CV 15-0493 (Ariz. Ct. App. May. 10, 2016)

    ¶4 The trial court's ruling focused on whether Blair's recording violated § 33-420(A) and that issue turns on the interpretation of § 33-420. We review the trial court's statutory interpretation and conclusions of law de novo, and its factual findings for abuse of discretion. Home Builders Ass'n v. Maricopa, 215 Ariz. 146, 149, ¶ 6, 158 P.3d 869, 872 (App. 2007); see Lebaron Props., LLC v. Jeffrey S. Kaufman, Ltd., 223 Ariz. 227, 229, ¶ 6, 221 P.3d 1041, 1043 (App. 2009) (reviewing the trial court's statutory interpretation of § 33-420 de novo). We will affirm the entry of judgment if correct, even if the trial court's rationale for doing so was erroneous.

  8. Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp.

    237 Ariz. 547 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that a subsequent homebuyer cannot maintain a negligence action against a builder to recover repair costs because the builder does not owe a duty to that homebuyer

    We consider the duty question de novo. See N. Peak Constr., LLC v. Architecture Plus, Ltd., 227 Ariz. 165, 167, ¶ 13, 254 P.3d 404, 406 (App.2011) (dismissal for failure to state a claim reviewed de novo ); Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Maricopa, 215 Ariz. 146, 149, ¶ 6, 158 P.3d 869, 872 (App.2007) (questions of law and statutory interpretation reviewed de novo ). ¶ 7 At oral argument before this Court, the Sullivans disavowed any assertion that a duty exists based on common law principles of negligence.

  9. Spirlong v. Browne

    236 Ariz. 146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 8 times
    Construing A.R.S. §§ 11-1001, et seq.

    Thus, we agree with the superior court the word “keeping” as used in A.R.S. § 11–1001(10) is ambiguous. Because the interpretation of statutory language presents a question of law, we exercise de novo review. Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Maricopa, 215 Ariz. 146, 149, ¶ 6, 158 P.3d 869, 872 (App.2007). We agree with Browne's construction of the word “keeping.

  10. Ponderosa Fire Dist. v. Coconino Cnty.

    235 Ariz. 597 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 21 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding mandamus relief is appropriate only when a law specifically requires a public officer to act

    ¶ 25 In determining whether the County has discretion to call the bonds under A.R.S. § 11–821(C), we are also guided by the principle that counties, like cities, have no inherent powers; a county's authority is limited to those powers expressly or impliedly delegated to it by the state constitution or statutes. Associated Dairy Prods. Co. v. Page, 68 Ariz. 393, 395, 206 P.2d 1041, 1043 (1949); Home Builders Assoc. of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Maricopa, 215 Ariz. 146, 149, ¶ 5, 158 P.3d 869, 873 (App.2007). Thus, in performing its duties under A.R.S. § 11–821(C), the County possesses “all powers that may be fairly implied from, and are necessary for, the complete exercise of [its] express powers” under the statute.