Opinion
C.A. No. 28871
06-29-2018
WILLIAM HOMA Appellee v. NICOLE M. TRUNZO HOMA AND OCCUPANTS Appellant
APPEARANCES: GREGORY R. SAIN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. WILLIAM HOMA. pro se, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE STOW MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
CASE No. 2016CVG02275
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
TEODOSIO, Judge.
{¶1} Nicole Trunzo Homa appeals the order of the Stow Municipal Court, entered October 24, 2017, adopting the magistrate's decision and granting default judgment in favor of William Homa in the amount of $1,580.13, plus interest. We affirm.
I.
{¶2} In September 2016, William Homa filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer, with a second cause of action for unspecified damages. In October 2016, a hearing was held before the magistrate, and a magistrate's decision was issued and approved by the trial court, which indicated that a writ of restitution may be issued. Mr. Homa filed a praecipe for a writ of restitution, which was subsequently issued by the Clerk of Courts.
{¶3} As to the second cause of action, Mr. Homa filed a motion for default judgment, with the trial court setting a default hearing for September 21, 2017. Both parties were present at the hearing. On September 25, 2017, a magistrate's decision recommended default judgment in favor of Mr. Homa in the amount of $1,580.13, plus interest. No objections to the magistrate's decision were filed, and on October 24, 2017, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision and entered default judgment as recommended by the magistrate. Ms. Trunzo Homa now appeals, raising one assignment of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN, CONTRARY TO THE EXPRESS PRECLUSION IN CIVIL RULES 54(C) AND 55(C), DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR MONEY DAMAGES WAS GRANTED ON A COMPLAINT THAT MADE NO DEMAND FOR MONEY DAMAGES AND MADE NO DEMAND FOR AN AMOUNT OF MONEY DAMAGES.
{¶4} In her assignment of error, Ms. Trunzo Homa argues the trial court committed plain error when it granted default judgment for money damages. We disagree.
{¶5} Mr. Homa's second cause of action states, in its entirety: "Defendant did not allow access to the property, a few reports exist on damages. Plaintif[f] reserves the right to assert proof of additional damages to the property once defendant and occupants vacate. Proof of damages will be demonstrated at the hearing on the second cause of action." As we noted above, the trial court granted default judgment in favor of Mr. Homa on the second cause of action in the amount of $1,580.13, plus interest. Ms. Trunzo Homa acknowledges that she did not object to the magistrate's decision, which would ordinarily waive her right to raise the error on appeal, but contends she may do so here under the doctrine of plain error.
{¶6} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv), which addresses objections to a magistrate's decision, provides:
Waiver of right to assign adoption by court as error on appeal. Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii),
unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).
{¶7} The Supreme Court of Ohio has construed the concept of plain error with regard to civil cases as follows:
The plain error doctrine originated as a criminal law concept. In applying the doctrine of plain error in a civil case, reviewing courts must proceed with the utmost caution, limiting the doctrine strictly to those extremely rare cases where exceptional circumstances require its application to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice, and where the error complained of, if left uncorrected, would have a material adverse effect on the character of, and public confidence in, judicial proceedings.Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 (1997). "[T]he doctrine is sharply limited to the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where the error, left unobjected to at the trial court, rises to the level of challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself." (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 122. "The plain error doctrine should never be applied to reverse a civil judgment simply because a reviewing court disagrees with the result obtained in the trial court, or to allow litigation of issues which could easily have been raised and determined in the initial trial." Id. The Supreme Court concluded:
We therefore hold that in appeals of civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored and may be applied only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.Id. at 122-123.
{¶8} With regard to the default judgment issued by the trial court, "Civil Rule 55(A) permits a trial court to enter a default judgment against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend in compliance with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. A trial court's decision to grant a motion for default judgment is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Nat'l City Bank v. Shuman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21484, 2003-Ohio-6116, ¶ 6. "Unlike the initial decision to grant a default judgment, however, the determination of the kind and maximum amount of damages that may be awarded is not committed to the discretion of the trial court, but is subject to the mandates of Civ. R. 55(C) and Civ. R. 54(C)." Id. Civ.R. 55(C) provides, in pertinent part: "In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(C)." Civ.R. 54(C) provides, in pertinent part: "A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment."
{¶9} "The primary purpose of Civ.R. 54(C)'s limitations on default judgments is to ensure that defendants are clearly notified of the maximum potential liability to which they are exposed, so that they may make an informed, rational choice to either: (1) enable a default judgment by not responding, or (2) invest the time and expense involved in defending an action." Shuman at ¶ 11. "The plain language of Civ. R. 54(C) unequivocally requires this notification of the maximum potential liability to be communicated through a demand for judgment in the complaint." Id. "If no damages are prayed for in the demand for judgment, no damages may be awarded." Id. at ¶ 8.
{¶10} In the case before us for review, Ms. Trunzo Homa was present at the default hearing and had an opportunity to object to the magistrate's decision before it was adopted by the trial court. However, the doctrine of plain error exists to protect the exceptional outlying case where a party's own failure to object to a magistrate's decision does not preclude raising such an error on appeal. Although the trial court erred in awarding damages where none were prayed for in the demand, we cannot say this is the rare case involving exceptional circumstances where the error rises to the level of challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not commit plain error.
{¶11} Ms. Trunzo Homa's assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶12} Ms. Trunzo Homa's assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Stow Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Stow Municipal Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
/s/_________
THOMAS A. TEODOSIO
FOR THE COURT SCHAFER, P. J.
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
GREGORY R. SAIN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. WILLIAM HOMA. pro se, Appellee.