[¶ 17] I would reverse and remand to a different judge. See T.F. James Co. v. Vakoch, 2001 ND 112, ¶¶ 18-19, 628 N.W.2d 298; Holzer v. Jochim, 557 N.W.2d 57, 59 (N.D. 1996). [¶ 18] Dale V. Sandstrom

[¶ 23] "A party who moves for relief under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60 has the burden of establishing sufficient grounds for disturbing the finality of the court's judgment or order." Holzer v. Jochim, 557 N.W.2d 57, 58 (N.D. 1996). Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the district court's decision.

The fundamental requirements of due process contemplate adequate notice and a fair opportunity to be heard. See Holzer v. Jochim, 557 N.W.2d 57, 59 (N.D. 1996). We conclude the trial court's failure to allow the defendants an opportunity to respond to Fodes' documentation of attorney fees was arbitrary and unreasonable.

In Schultz, 372 N.W.2d at 892, we also said an agency may even reject a hearing officer's recommendation on findings of the credibility of contradictory witnesses. Compare Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D. 1984) (under NDRCivP 63, if successor judge is not satisfied with findings, conclusions and decision of predecessor judge, successor judge is limited to granting new trial); Holzer v. Jochim, 557 N.W.2d 57, 58-59 (N.D. 1996) (successor judge abused discretion in redeciding the merits of case tried before predecessor judge without affording the parties an opportunity to retry case). As Holzer at 59 explained, a major tenet of due process anticipates that a party receive adequate notice and fair opportunity to be heard by the decision maker.

We are of the opinion that the stipulation is clear and unambiguous and authorized Judge Jorgensen to request "any additional materials necessary to do justice" in the case which would include the written transcript. But see Holzer v. Jochim, 557 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1996). In Holzer, the parties were unaware that the successor judge was going to reconsider the issue of liability.