Opinion
6:21-CV-239 (DNH/TWD)
04-09-2021
GARY ARTHUR HOLYOKE, Plaintiff, v. MARIA HOLYOKE, et al., Defendants.
APPEARANCES: GARY ARTHUR HOLYOKE Plaintiff, pro se 811 Court Street # 320 Utica, New York 13502
APPEARANCES: GARY ARTHUR HOLYOKE
Plaintiff, pro se
811 Court Street # 320
Utica, New York 13502 THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
Gary Arthur Holyoke ("Plaintiff") filed an action against his mother Maria Holyoke and twenty-six other individuals (collectively, "Defendants"). (Dkt. No. 1.) Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP Application"). (Dkt. No. 2.) A court may grant in forma pauperis status if a party "is unable to pay" the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2), the Court finds Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, his IFP Application is granted.
Plaintiff should note that, although his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted, he will still be required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that when a person proceeds in forma pauperis, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is "plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the general rules of pleading, "does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation." Id. In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, "the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.
A pro se litigant's pleadings are held to a less strict standard than attorney drafted pleadings. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) ("Even in the formal litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties."). Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her pleadings "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, this "does not exempt a [pro se litigant] from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). Moreover, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint "without giving leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where "the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive" such that "better pleading will not cure it." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
Generally, Plaintiff claims his family and several other social acquaintances—including his ex-girlfriend—mistreated him throughout the last twenty-six years of his life. (Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 7-11; Dkt. No. 6 at 2.) Plaintiff also contends that various doctors have mis-diagnosed him with schizophrenia and have attempted to force him to comply with various treatment programs against his will. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 7; Dkt. No. 6 at 1.) Plaintiff asserts he is entitled to relief based on New York Civil Rights Law. Id. at 9-11.
Here, the collection of allegations in Plaintiff's complaint do not provide any indication of the causes of action Plaintiff intends to assert or whether this Court has jurisdiction over the action. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . . ;Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Rule 8's purpose "is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer [and] prepare an adequate defense." Hudson v. Artuz, 1998 WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998) (quoting Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)). Moreover, Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part:
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. . . .Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Rule 10's purpose is to "provide an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]" Sandler v. Capanna, 1992 WL 392597, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 1992) (citation omitted).
A complaint that does not comply with these Rules "presents far too heavy a burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff's] claims," and may properly be dismissed by the court. Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). "Dismissal, however, is usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised." Artuz, 1998 WL 832708, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Court recommends the complaint be dismissed because it is not acceptable under Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Plaintiff's claims are entirely unclear. However, considering his pro se status, the Court further recommends Plaintiff be given an opportunity to amend the complaint to comply with the basic pleading requirements set forth above. See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1995).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED solely for purposes of initial review; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation along with a copy of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6(a). Dated: April 9, 2021
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).
Syracuse, New York
/s/_________
Thérèse Wiley Dancks
United States Magistrate Judge