Opinion
No. 2014AP293.
2014-12-9
HOLY REDEEMER CHURCH OF GOD IN CHRIST, INC., d/b/a Holy Redeemer Christian Academy, Petitioner–Appellant, v. STATE of Wisconsin DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, Respondent–Respondent.
Relying on 7 C.F.R. § 210.8(b)(4), Holy Redeemer implies that because its September 2010 through March 2012 claims were filed within 60 days following the last day of the full month covered by the claims, it was under no time limit to correct the inaccuracies in those claims. The regulation dealing with corrective action provides:See § 210.8(b)(4) (emphasis added). Holy Redeemer again ignores the plain language of the regulation, which states that state agencies, not schools, may make adjustments on claims filed within the 60–day deadline under certain circumstances if those adjustments are completed within 90 days of the last day of the claim month. Nothing in this section allows for schools to circumvent the requirement that the schools' final claims must be submitted within a 60–day deadline and that those claims must be accurate.
Appeal from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: Jeffrey A. Conen, Judge. Affirmed.
Before CURLEY, P.J., KESSLER and BRENNAN, JJ. ¶ 1 KESSLER, J.
Holy Redeemer Church of God in Christ, Inc. (Holy Redeemer) appeals a circuit court order upholding an administrative decision denying reimbursements for its school meals program for September 2010 through March 2012, and appeals an administrative decision prohibiting Holy Redeemer from relitigating meal claims prior to the 2011–12 academic year. We affirm.
¶ 17 To support its argument, Holy Redeemer contends that 7 C.F .R. § 210.19(c) permits fiscal action only if school meals fail to meet nutritional standards, not if schools submit noncompliant benefit issuance documents. Holy Redeemer ignores the plain language not only of 7 C.F.R. § 210.24, but also of the section it relies upon. Section 210.19(c), which addresses nutritional standards, states: “State agencies must take fiscal action against school food authorities for Claims of Reimbursement that are not properly payable including, if warranted, the disallowance of funds for failure to take corrective action to comply with the meal requirements in parts 210 and 220 of this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) Section 210.19(c), therefore, does not limit a state agency's ability to take fiscal action against school fund authorities based on noncompliance with nutritional requirements, but rather, includes noncompliance with nutritional standards as a basis for taking fiscal action against schools. This notion is supported by 7 C.F.R. § 210.19(a)(1), which states: “Each State agency shall ensure that school food authorities comply with the requirements to account for all revenues and expenditures of their nonprofit school food service.”
¶ 18 It follows then, that the DPI is not required to reimburse schools for all claims filed during the withholding period simply because the school's meals meet federal nutritional standards, regardless of whether those claims fully comply with other reimbursement requirements in 7 C.F.R. Part 210. To hold otherwise would allow a nutritionally compliant school to receive reimbursements even if the school filed massive overclaims. This would produce an absurd result. Inaccurate claims as to student eligibility clearly do not comply with federal regulations. Accordingly, the DPI properly denied reimbursement to Holy Redeemer for its September 2010 through March 2012 claims because those claims did not accurately establish various students' eligibility.
II. The ALJ reasonably concluded that federal regulations establish a 60–day time limit for submitting a final monthly claim for reimbursement.
¶ 19 Holy Redeemer next contends that the DPI erroneously denied reimbursement for the school's September 2010 through March 2012 claims because Holy Redeemer corrected the errors on the benefit issuance lists. The heart of Holy Redeemer's argument is that once it corrected the benefit issuance lists, it was allowed to amend the September 2010 through March 2012 claims at a later time.
¶ 20 According to the federal regulations, specifically, 7 C.F.R. § 210.8, a final claim for reimbursement must be submitted no later than 60 days following the last day of the full month covered by the monthly claim:
(b) Monthly claims. To be entitled to reimbursement under this part, each school food authority shall submit to the State agency, a monthly Claim for Reimbursement, as described in paragraph (c) of this section.
(1) Submission timeframes. A final Claim for Reimbursement shall be postmarked or submitted to the State agency not later than 60 days following the last day of the full month covered by the claim. State agencies may establish shorter deadlines at their discretion. Claims not postmarked and/or submitted within 60 days shall not be paid with Program funds unless otherwise authorized by FNS.
....
(c) Content of claim. The Claim for Reimbursement shall include data in sufficient detail to justify the reimbursement claimed and to enable the State agency to provide the Report of School Program Operations required under § 210.5(d) of this part.
Relying on 7 C.F.R. § 210.8(b)(4), Holy Redeemer implies that because its September 2010 through March 2012 claims were filed within 60 days following the last day of the full month covered by the claims, it was under no time limit to correct the inaccuracies in those claims. The regulation dealing with corrective action provides:
Corrective action. The State agency shall promptly take corrective action with respect to any Claim for Reimbursement which includes more than the number of lunches served, by type, to eligible children. In taking corrective action, State agencies may make adjustments on claims filed within the 60–day deadline if such adjustments are completed within 90 days of the last day of the claim month and are reflected in the final Report of School Program Operations (FNS–10) for the claim month required under § 210.5(d) of this part....
See § 210.8(b)(4) (emphasis added). Holy Redeemer again ignores the plain language of the regulation, which states that state agencies, not schools, may make adjustments on claims filed within the 60–day deadline under certain circumstances if those adjustments are completed within 90 days of the last day of the claim month. Nothing in this section allows for schools to circumvent the requirement that the schools' final claims must be submitted within a 60–day deadline and that those claims must be accurate.
III. Procedural Claims.
¶ 21 Holy Redeemer contends that the DPI failed to follow proper federal procedures when denying Holy Redeemer's September 2010 through March 2012 claims. The extent of Holy Redeemer's argument in its brief to this court is as follows: “Under a correct interpretation of the law, Holy Redeemer should be reimbursed for meals served from September 2010 through the end of March 2012 since it has corrected the errors on the Benefit Issuance List.” We decline to address arguments that are undeveloped or inadequately briefed. See Truttschel v. Martin, 208 Wis.2d 361, 369, 560 N.W.2d 315 (Ct.App.1997); State v. Pettit, 171 Wis.2d 627, 646–47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct.App.1992).
IV. Due Process.
¶ 22 Holy Redeemer raises a number of due process arguments, all stemming from its contention that the DPI failed to provide notice of an “accuracy standard.” Specifically, Holy Redeemer contends that: (1) the DPI failed to advise Holy Redeemer that its claim could be denied for reasons other than nutritional deficiencies; (2) the DPI was required to refund Holy Redeemer for the amounts Holy Redeemer paid in September and October of 2010, before Holy Redeemer was removed from withholding; and (3) the DPI should have denied claims on a claim-by-claim basis, rather than placing the school in withholding status.
¶ 23 Holy Redeemer did not raise constitutional due process arguments during the administrative proceedings. “It is settled law that to preserve an issue for judicial review, a party must raise it before the administrative agency.” State v. Outagamie Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, ¶ 55, 244 Wis.2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376. “Judicial review of administrative agency decisions contemplates review of the record developed before the agency.” Id. We “will not consider issues beyond those properly raised before the administrative agency, and a failure to raise an issue generally constitutes a waiver of the right to raise the issue before a reviewing court.” Id. As such, we can not consider Holy Redeemer's constitutional due process claims.
V. Holy Redeemer's arguments are barred by claim and issue preclusion.
¶ 24 Finally, Holy Redeemer contends that the ALJ erroneously found that its claims submitted prior to the 2011–12 school year (September 2010 through May 2011) were barred by claim and issue preclusion. Specifically, Holy Redeemer contends that claim preclusion was inapplicable in this case, and that issue preclusion does not bar its claims for reimbursement for September 2010 through December 2010, and January 2011 through May 2011.
¶ 25 “The doctrine of issue preclusion, formerly known as collateral estoppel, is designed to limit the relitigation of issues that have been actually litigated in a previous action.” Aldrich v. LIRC, 2012 WI 53, ¶ 88, 341 Wis.2d 36, 814 N.W.2d 433. On the other hand, claim preclusion “is designed to prevent litigation of matters that were, or could have been, litigated in a prior proceeding.” Aldrich v. LIRC, 2008 WI App 63, ¶ 14, 310 Wis.2d 796, 751 N.W.2d 866. Here, Holy Redeemer has either: (1) waived the opportunity to appeal certain claims because it either withdrew or specifically failed to challenge certain claims (September 2010 through February 2011); (2) already litigated certain issues (March 2011 through May 2011); or (3) lost the opportunity to raise claims it did not raise before the ALJ. Accordingly, Holy Redeemer's arguments are barred by both issue and claim preclusion.
To the extent Holy Redeemer argues issues not addressed by this decision, we conclude that our resolution of the issues addressed is dispositive and that the record supports the ALJ's factual and legal conclusions.
CONCLUSION
¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court.
Order affirmed.
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