State v. Mikusch (1990), 138 Ill.2d 242, 247, 562 N.E.2d 168, 170. The principal object to be effectuated by the creation of the homestead estate is to protect the homesteader in the enjoyment of a home and to secure to him a shelter beyond the reach of his improvidence or financial misfortune. ( Holterman v. Poynter (1935), 361 Ill. 617, 625-26, 198 N.E. 723, 727.) Statutes relating to the homestead exemption have been construed liberally by our courts.
On these facts we find no intention to abandon the homestead premises. ( Holterman v. Poynter, 361 Ill. 617, 198 N.E. 723.) At all relevant times Roy Moller, as householder and owner in joint tenancy, had a statutory homestead estate in the property in question. At the time of the execution sale, section 1 of "An Act to exempt the homestead from forced sale * * *" provided Roy Moller with a homestead estate of $5,000.
This interpretation fosters the punitive purpose of the statute and comports with the legislature's delineation of exemptions it determined ought to apply to this type of proceeding. Holterman v. Poynter (1935), 361 Ill. 617, on which 1403 East Parham relied, is inapposite because the exemption in that case was sought in a forcible entry and detainer action; it was not a forfeiture case. The reliance on the statement that " '[n]either fraud, nor even the commission of a criminal offense, can work a release or forfeiture of the right of homestead' " ( Holterman, 361 Ill. at 625, quoting Leupold v. Krause (1880), 95 Ill. 440, 445) is misplaced.
In re Tolson, 338 B.R. 359, 368 (Bkrtcy.C.D.Ill.2005). See People v. One Residence Located at 1403 East Parham Street, 251 Ill.App.3d 198, 190 Ill.Dec. 573, 621 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (1993) ("[T]he purpose of the homestead exemption is to secure to the homesteader a shelter beyond the reach of his improvidence.") (citing Holterman v. Poynter (1935), 361 Ill. 617, 198 N.E.723, 725 (Ill. 1935)). In light of the nature and characteristics of ownership in a cooperative apartment, including the proprietary lease, the fact that such ownership may be held in tenancy by the entirety under the Illinois Tenancy Act, and the purposes of the Illinois homestead and tenancy by the entirety exclusion from judgment statutes, we conclude that the Mahers' ownership interest in the Corporation constitutes real property for the purposes of 735 ILCS 5/12-112 and is therefore excluded from satisfaction of Jerome Maher's judgment.
In the case before us there is no indication whatsoever of any violation or breach of duty or confidence, nor has any damage been demonstrated. Insurance Co. v. Mowry, 1877, 96 U.S. 544, 24 L.Ed. 674; Holterman v. Poynter, 1935, 361 Ill. 617, 198 N.E. 723, 101 A.L.R. 842; McLearn v. Hill, 1931, 276 Mass. 519, 177 N.E. 617, 77 A.L.R. 1039; Wheaton v. North British Mercantile Ins. Co., 1888, 76 Cal. 415, 18 P. 758. Dickerson v. Colgrove, 1879, 100 U.S. 578, 25 L.Ed. 618.
Illinois courts, like those of Texas, are similarly protective of homestead rights and have long held that an estate of homestead can be waived or extinguished only by one of the methods prescribed by statute. Imhoff v. Lipe, 162 Ill. 282, 44 N.E. 493 (1896); Holterman v. Poynter, 361 Ill. 617, 198 N.E. 723 (1935); Leonard v. Crane, 147 Ill. 52, 35 N.E. 474 (1893). Moreover the doctrines of estoppel and laches have been held inapplicable to homestead claims.
The defendant, who had not waived or extinguished his homestead right by one of the modes provided by statute, still retained it. ( Holterman v. Poynter, 361 Ill. 617; I.L.P., vol. 20, p. 688.) He was therefore entitled to have a homestead of $2,500 set off to him.
) The law does not require a judgment debtor to perform any act, or manifest any intention in order to avail himself of his homestead exemption. Holterman v. Poynter, 361 Ill. 617. In this case the court made a finding that the homestead of Fisher A. Rice and his wife was sold for the sum of $750, (contrary to the provisions of the Homestead Exemption Act,) and that the levy of the execution, the sale had thereunder, the certificate of purchase issued at said sale, and the deed issued in pursuance of the sheriff's certificate of sale, were absolutely and wholly null and void.
The principal objective in creating the homestead estate was to protect the homesteader in the enjoyment of a home and to secure the homesteader a shelter beyond the reach of his improvidence or financial misfortune. Holterman v. Poynter, 361 Ill. 617, 625-26 (1935). Illinois courts have construed the homestead estate liberally because the statutory exemption of property from enforcement is a matter affecting the remedy available to a judgment creditor for the collection of a debt. Bank of Illmo v. Simmons, 142 Ill. App.3d 741, 744 (1986).
However, the case definitely established the power of a court of equity to override the statutory language. Sellers cite Holterman v. Poynter, 361 Ill. 617, 198 N.E. 723, which holds that a direction by an execution debtor to the sheriff to levy on land first is not in itself a waiver of homestead. Sellers also cite Redfern v. Redfern, 38 Ill. 509, 512; Best v. Gholson, 89 Ill. 465, 468, and Stodalka v. Novotny, 144 Ill. 125, 130, 131, 33 N.E. 534, which unquestionably support sellers' position.