Opinion
No. 05-08-00134-CR
Opinion issued February 10, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 6, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. MB06-68613G.
Before Justices WRIGHT, O'NEILL, and LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kevin Bernard Holt appeals his conviction for interference with public duties. The trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at ten days' confinement. In four points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. We overrule appellant's points of error and affirm the trial court's judgment. Officer Paul Bescherer, a Dallas police officer, testified he came into contact with appellant in a neighborhood known as Arlington Park. According to Bescherer, Arlington Park is a "very dangerous drug neighborhood, and [he and his partner] were doing a drug arrest on a traffic stop from a very active drug house." As they were arresting Teresa Miles, appellant "came up behind us and started yelling at us, and he came real close. And we had prior knowledge of him, and he came so close that it became a real dangerous situation for us, and his manner was really irate and dangerous." Bescherer described appellant's behavior as "really, really super agitated. I would say probably almost psychotic." Steve Fuentes testified he is Bescherer's partner, and was helping arrest Miles when appellant approached them. Appellant was standing ten or 15 feet away with a camera. He was yelling obscenities and distracting the officers as they attempted to arrest Miles. Fuentes was concerned and "weary" about appellant being behind them and had to "constantly" turn and watch appellant as the officers were trying to arrest "this very emotional and distressed young female." When Fuentes walked away from Mile's vehicle, Fuentes heard appellant "getting louder and he was approaching closer." Fuentes told him to "back up and get away. Walk back away." Fuentes thought appellant approached as "close as five or six feet at one point." After telling appellant several times to back off and not interfere, Fuentes arrested appellant for interference. Appellant testified that he was "trying to document the officer's corruption in [the] neighborhood" and he felt he should take pictures as the officers arrested Miles. Appellant explained that he was standing in his friend's grandmother's yard with his camera taking pictures of the scene. Appellant was just letting Fuentes know that somebody was watching. Appellant admitted that he was "yelling and mouthing off" but claimed he did not do so until after Fuentes arrested him. According to appellant, he was 20 or 30 feet away from the officers with his camera and Miles was already secured in the car when he arrived. Appellant then offered and identified five pictures he took that day. The pictures show appellant was standing in the yard when they were taken. After hearing this and other evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty. This appeal followed. We apply well-known standards when reviewing challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191-92 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). We view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 191-92 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). In contrast, when reviewing a factual sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light and ask whether the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 282 (2007). Evidence is factually insufficient when the evidence supporting the conviction is so weak that the verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or when the evidence supporting the conviction is outweighed by the great weight and preponderance of the contrary evidence so as to render the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Id. A person commits the offense of interference with public duties if, with criminal negligence, he interrupts, disrupts, impedes, or otherwise interferes with a peace officer while the peace officer is performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted by law. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.15(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2008). It is a defense to prosecution that the interruption, disruption, impediment, or interference alleged consisted of speech only. Id. at § 38.15(d). Section 6.03 of the penal code provides:
A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(d) (Vernon 2003). The record shows that as Bescherer and Fuentes attempted to make an arrest in a dangerous neighborhood, appellant was behind them and was "really super agitated . . . almost psychotic." He was using profanity and yelling at the officers. Appellant became louder and approached within five or six feet, despite being warned to back away and get out of the street. His actions were distracting, caused the officers to be concerned for their safety, and caused Miles to become more nervous and upset. According to the officers they had to stop what they were doing, place Miles in the car and deal with appellant. They were unable to finalize the arrest and search the car because of appellant's behavior. As Miles became more upset and emotional, the officers warned appellant to stay away. He did not comply but continued to yell profanities. Under these circumstances, the trial court could rationally conclude appellant ought to have been aware that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk of inciting the circumstances to a degree that the officers were at risk, and that his failure to perceive that risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care an ordinary person would have exercised under like circumstances. Additionally, the trial court could rationally conclude appellant interfered with public duties, and that his interference consisted of more than just speech. Although appellant claimed he did not approach the officers and "yelled and mouthed off" only after he was arrested, the trial court was free to believe the officer's version of events and disbelieve appellant's version. Similarly, the trial court was free to reject appellant's suggestion that Fuentes arrested him in retaliation for a complaint appellant had filed against him a short time before the incident in question. And, finally, the trial court could have rejected appellant's claim that Miles had already been arrested and placed in the car when appellant arrived. We overrule appellant's first through fourth points of error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.