Opinion
Civ. Nos. 04-4294 (RHK/JSM), 05-125 (RHK/JSM).
March 14, 2005
Jerry Lee Holstad, Minnesota, Pro se.
Jason M. Hiveley and Jon K. Iverson, Iverson Reuvers, LLC, Bloomington, Minnesota, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jerry Lee Holstad has two actions currently pending before the undersigned in which he has sued three Minnesota police officers, Michael L. Sheady, Shaun M. Anselment, and Jennifer Knutson, individually and in their official capacities ("Defendants"). His claims arise from arrests made by the defendant officers and the resulting state court proceedings. Officers Sheady and Anselment have now moved for dismissal and/or summary judgment. The Court will treat the instant Motion as one for summary judgment and, for the reasons that follow, will grant the Motion.
BACKGROUND
On February 17, 2004, Officer Sheady and other Lakeville, Minnesota officers arrested Holstad based on a Goodhue County warrant that had been issued for Holstad's failure to appear in court on September 2003 charges of traffic violations. Holstad was also cited for additional traffic violations at the time of his arrest. In late 2004, Holstad was found guilty of the 2003 charges and he pled guilty to the traffic violations arising from the February 2004 stop. On October 26, 2004, Holstad was arrested again, this time by Officer Anselment, pursuant to a warrant issued by Dakota County for gross misdemeanor tax evasion. The tax evasion charges are pending.
Holstad filed suit against Officers Sheady and Anselment in September 2004, alleging that their actions in arresting him were unlawful. On January 24, 2005, he filed another, nearly identical complaint against Officers Sheady and Anselment; in the second action, however, he added Officer Knutson as a defendant. Defendants have answered the Complaints in both actions, and Officers Sheady and Anselment now move for dismissal or, in the alternative, for summary judgment in the first action. Holstad has failed to respond to Defendants' Motion and has not accepted service of any of Defendants' filings. Because Holstad did not raise new factual allegations or substantive claims in the second action, both cases will be disposed of pursuant to the instant Motion.
In fact, Holstad has filed numerous "affidavits" with the Court claiming that none of the individual defendants has responded to his Complaints. The affidavits further state that each defendant "shall be entered with a Default Judgment" in the instant case. Such claims by Holstad, which he purports to make "under penalty of perjury," where Defendants have clearly responded to his Complaints and he has rejected service of all papers from Defendants, have prompted Defendants to file a Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions (case number 04-4294, Doc. No. 29). Although the Court defers resolution of the sanctions issue, it does caution Holstad to carefully consider any further pleadings in relation to this or any other matter; sanctions are appropriate and will be imposed for pleadings which are not well-grounded in fact, nor supported by law, filed for an improper purpose, or otherwise frivolous. The Court retains jurisdiction over this matter solely to consider Defendants' Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions.
The Court, in referring to the record, will refer to the original Complaint and Amended Complaint filed in September and November 2004 in case number 04-4294. The main difference between the original and Amended Complaints in case number 04-4294, and the Complaint in case number 05-125, is the addition of Officer Jennifer Knutson as a defendant in the 05-125 action.
Holstad is no stranger to the federal courts: he has four actions currently pending against various plaintiffs, all involving substantially identical complaints. Because the Court (as it has stated before with regard to this plaintiff) "will not indulge [Holstad's] frivolous waste of [its] resources any longer," Holstad's actions before the undersigned will be dismissed. Holstad v. Snow, Civ. No. 04-1117 (RHK/RLE), slip op. at 3 (D. Minn. May 29, 2004) (Erickson, Mag. J.).
In addition to the two cases before the undersigned, Holstad has filed the following cases: 05-182 (ADM/AJB) and 04-4281 (JNE/SRN).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper if, drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the material facts in the case are undisputed. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dep't of Fire Safety Servs., 224 F.3d 735, 738 (8th Cir. 2000). The court must view the evidence, and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Graves v. Arkansas Dep't of Fin. Admin., 229 F.3d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 2000);Calvit v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 122 F.3d 1112, 1116 (8th Cir. 1997). The nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must show through the presentation of admissible evidence that specific facts exist creating a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995).
ANALYSIS
Although the Court is mindful that pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, they "still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced." Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). In the actions now before the undersigned, Holstad appears to allege three general claims: (1) he is a sovereign, "stateless man," and therefore the arrests at issue were unlawful; (2) Defendants have violated his constitutional rights; and (3) Defendants have committed torts against him. Through his various claims, Holstad also generally seeks review of his state court convictions. Even reading his Complaints liberally, Holstad has not met his burden to come forward with facts and law demonstrating a claim upon which relief can be granted. See id.; Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989) (regarding a pro se plaintiff, "we will not supply additional facts, nor will we construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded" (citation omitted)).
One of the arguments underlying Holstad's claims is that he is not subject to the laws of Minnesota or the United States because he is not a citizen of either. (Compl. at 2.) For example, Holstad contends that he is an "Internationally protected man" under 18 U.S.C. § 112 and that he "is neither a resident, nor [c]itizen, of the State of Minnesota, nor the United States." (Id.) The Court concludes that the alleged violations of Holstad's "sovereignty" do not translate into cognizable claims; such claims are consistently rejected by the courts as meritless (often in the context of federal tax disputes), and will likewise be rejected in the instant case. See, e.g., U.S. v. Gerads, 999 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting "appellants' contention that they are not citizens of the United States, but rather `Free Citizens of the Republic of Minnesota' and, consequently, not subject to taxation" (citation omitted));United States v. Thomas, No. 93-1236, 1993 WL 525726, at *2, *3 n. 3 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 1993) (rejecting as "patently frivolous" and as "having no basis in law, logic, history, or fact" the defendant's "argument that he is not a `citizen' subject to tax"); Campbell v. IRS, No. 1:01CV588, 2001 WL 1840761, at *2 (N.D. Ohio March 31, 2001) (rejecting similar argument as "patently frivolous" and noting that the plaintiff had "not alleged any factual or legal basis for the conclusion that she is not a lawful citizen of the United States").
Holstad's constitutional allegations are similarly meritless. He states that his case "is a federal question — a Constitutional matter involving a man on the land complaining about theft and kidnap." (Compl. at 2.) While Holstad does not cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court concludes that his constitutional claims fall under the statute. See Hendricks v. Rasmussen, Civ. No. 01-783 (DSD/JMM), 2001 WL 1631325, at *2 (D. Minn. July 27, 2001) (plaintiff stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 despite "no specific reference to constitutional rights or to a potential claim under" the statute); see also Goss v. City of Little Rock, Ark., 151 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that "§ 1983 establishes a means by which people can enforce the Constitution"). Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, or any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Holstad asserts constitutional claims against each of the individual defendants in both their individual and official capacities, and his claims fail on both fronts. First, "[t]o the extent that the individual defendants were sued in their official capacities . . . the defendants are not `persons' within the meaning of § 1983." Zar v. South Dakota Bd. of Exam'rs of Psychologists, 976 F.2d 459, 464 (8th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
Second, to the extent that Defendants were sued in their individual capacities, qualified immunity "shields government officials from suit unless their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known." Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 711 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). "The qualified immunity inquiry is a two-step process. [T]he Court must [first] ask, [t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d 590, 601 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). Only if a violation can be made out, does the Court progress to the next step, which is "to ask whether the constitutional right was clearly established in light of the specific context of the case." Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Holstad has not shown that they violated any of his constitutional rights. If Holstad is alleging an excessive force claim in connection with his arrests (his original Complaint refers to a "fraudulent assault" and "battery" (Compl. at 2.)), he has provided no factual support for such a claim. If he is alleging some sort of false arrest claim (his original Complaint refers to "illegal detention" and to Officer Sheady "illegally imitating an emergency when in fact there was no emergency (the State of Emergency was abolished by the United States Congress in 1976)" (Id. at 2.)), again he has provided no factual support.
Holstad's Amended Complaint also references "theft and kidnap" and in his original Complaint he refers to "invasion of privacy, [w]arranty, battery, and treason." The Court construes these allegations as asserting state tort claims and determines that Defendants are protected under the doctrine of official immunity.
"Minnesota's official immunity doctrine provides that a public official charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of his judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for damages unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong." Kuha, 365 F.3d at 607 (internal quotations omitted). Thus, "[t]here are two exceptions to the general rule precluding liability: where the duty performed is ministerial not discretionary, or where the official acts with malice." Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 598 N.W.2d 657, 664 (Minn. 1999) (citation omitted). "The doctrine is intended to insure that the threat of potential liability does not unduly inhibit the exercise of discretion required of public officers in the discharge of their duties." Kuha, 365 F.3d at 607-08 (internal quotation omitted).
Defendants are entitled to official immunity. Their actions in arresting Holstad were discretionary as a matter of law; "the conduct of police officers in responding to a dispatch or making an arrest involves precisely the type of discretionary decisions, often split-second and on meager information, that [the Minnesota courts] intended to protect from judicial second-guessing through the doctrine of official immunity." Kelly, 598 N.W.2d at 665. Holstad does not present any facts to the contrary. Nor does he make any allegations "of a willful or malicious wrong" that would defeat Defendants' official immunity. See Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988). Accordingly, any state common law claims raised by Holstad will be dismissed under the doctrine of official immunity.
Finally, to the extent that Holstad's remaining allegations do not fall under the theories discussed above, the Court determines that they are a transparent attempt to challenge his state court convictions in a federal forum. The Court may not entertain such claims, and will dismiss them as well. See Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 492-93 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that "[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine forecloses not only straightforward appeals but also more indirect attempts by federal plaintiffs to undermine state court decisions" and that "a corollary to the basic rule against reviewing judgments prohibits federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction over general constitutional claims that are `inextricably intertwined' with specific claims already adjudicated in state court" (citations omitted)); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) ("We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by [an authorized] state tribunal . . . or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.").
"Summary judgment should be granted . . . when the nonmoving party fails to meet its burden to come forward with facts and law demonstrating a basis for recovery that would support a jury verdict." Beattie v. Madison County Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 600 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). Indeed, "[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment. . . . Rather, the onus is upon the parties to formulate arguments." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). Holstad's claims cannot survive summary judgment, and accordingly, the Complaints in both actions before the undersigned will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. In case number 04-4294, Defendants' Motion for Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 15) is GRANTED and Plaintiff Jerry Lee Holstad's Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 5) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. In case number 05-125, Plaintiff Jerry Lee Holstad's Complaint (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3. The Court will retain jurisdiction over case number 04-4294 for the sole purpose of considering Defendants' Amended Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions (Doc. No. 29).