Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-9528.
December 20, 2006.
Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Raymond M. Funk, Judge, Trial Court No. 4FA-05-1266 Civ.
Marcia E. Holland, Assistant Public Defender, Fairbanks, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Kelly J. Lawson, Assistant District Attorney, and Jeffrey A. O'Bryant, District Attorney, Fairbanks, and David W. Márquez, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: COATS, Chief Judge, and MANNHEIMER and STEWART, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In May 1998, Christopher G. Holsclaw was charged with driving while intoxicated, driving with a suspended license, and consuming alcoholic beverages as a minor. At Holsclaw's arraignment in the district court, the prosecutor proposed that, if Holsclaw pleaded no contest to the two driving charges, the prosecutor would dismiss the minor consuming charge and would recommend the statutory minimum sentences on the two driving charges. The arraigning magistrate informed Holsclaw that, because of his prior conviction for DWI, these minimum sentences would total 30 days to serve, plus fines and costs.
AS 28.35.030(a), AS 28.15.291(a), and AS 04.16.050(a), respectively.
Holslclaw decided to accept this proposal. He told the magistrate that, even though he could afford to hire an attorney, he did not wish to consult an attorney about these charges; instead, he wished to plead no contest to the two driving charges. The magistrate accepted Holsclaw's pleas and then imposed the promised minimum sentences.
In March 2005, Holsclaw filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that his 1998 convictions were illegal. Specifically, Holsclaw asserted that his purported waiver of the right to counsel was invalid.
Holslcaw conceded that he had viewed a pre-arraignment video that described the benefits of counsel and the potential dangers of proceeding without an attorney. Holsclaw further conceded that, in response to the arraigning magistrate's questions, he had declared that he did not wish to consult an attorney (even though he could afford one). However, Holsclaw argued that the magistrate committed procedural error by neglecting to have Holslclaw formally announce that he understood the benefits of being represented by counsel, and that he waived his right to counsel.
Under AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A), if a defendant has not appealed their conviction, any petition for post-conviction relief must be filed within two years after the entry of the judgement being attacked. As explained above, Holsclaw did not file his petition for post-conviction relief until approximately seven years after the entry of his 1998 convictions. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Holsclaw's petition as time-barred.
Holsclaw now appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction relief petition. He argues that a defendant's failure to knowingly waive the right to counsel is such a central defect in a criminal prosecution that he should be exempted from the time limit codified in AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A). We conclude that we need not decide that issue. Holsclaw's petition fails on another ground: the materials he submitted in support of his petition fail to present a prima facie case that his waiver of counsel was invalid.
Holsclaw's opening brief is addressed almost exclusively to the issue of whether there should be an exception to the statute of limitations for defendants who do not validly waive their right to counsel. But this is putting the cart before the horse. That legal issue is moot unless Holsclaw first demonstrates that he did not validly waive his right to counsel.
Holsclaw does argue (in a single paragraph) that he did not validly waive his right to counsel because the magistrate did not expressly ask Holsclaw to personally acknowledge that he understood the benefits of counsel and the disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, and to formally confirm that, with this understanding, he was still willing to waive his right to counsel and enter no contest pleas to the two driving charges.
A waiver of the right to counsel will not be valid unless "it [is] clear from the record that the [defendant] has been informed of the role of a defense attorney and the advantages of being represented by [an attorney] in a criminal proceeding." In addition, a defendant's waiver of counsel must be made with an understanding of the nature of the pending charges, the range of allowable punishments, possible defenses, and "all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter."
Gregory v. State, 550 P.2d 374, 379 (Alaska 1976). See also Ledbetter v. State, 581 P.2d 1129, 1130-31 (Alaska 1978); O'Dell v. Anchorage, 576 P.2d 104, 106-08 (Alaska 1978).
Gregory, 550 P.2d at 380, quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724; 68 S.Ct. 316, 323; 92 L.Ed. 309, 321 (1948).
But the appellate courts of this state have never required a waiver of counsel to comply with a ritualistic, unvarying formula. In cases where the charges are straightforward and the defendant has sufficient maturity and comprehension of the situation, only a brief inquiry will be necessary to establish an effective waiver of counsel.
Gregory, 550 P.2d at 380. See also Williams v. State, 616 P.2d 881, 883 (Alaska 1980); O'Dell v. Anchorage, 576 P.2d 104, 108 (Alaska 1978) (holding that the requisite length and detail of the inquiry hinges on the characteristics of the defendant and the relative complexity or non-complexity of the charges).
Holsclaw relies on the supreme court's decision in Gregory v. State, 550 P.2d 374 (Alaska 1976), to support his assertion that his waiver of counsel at his arraignment was ineffective.
The defendant in Gregory pleaded guilty to DWI at his arraignment. Within a month of sentencing, Gregory sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The supreme court agreed.
Gregory, 550 P.2d at 377.
Id.
The supreme court noted that, although the arraigning magistrate told Gregory that he had the right to counsel, the magistrate never asked Gregory if he understood the benefits of having an attorney. Moreover, the record of Gregory's arraignment revealed that he had difficulty understanding basic English, and that he was confused by the legal terminology used by the magistrate — including such basic terms as "lawyer", "attorney", and "public defender." The supreme court concluded that the record was "devoid of any indication that Gregory understood a lawyer's function and the advantages of legal representation in a criminal proceeding."
Id. at 379 n. 4.
Id. at 377, 379.
Id. at 379.
The circumstances of Holsclaw's case are readily distinguishable from the facts of Gregory. There is nothing in the record of Holsclaw's arraignment to suggest that he had difficulty with English, nor is there any indication that he was confused by the content of the pre-arraignment video or by the magistrate's subsequent questions about whether he wished to consult an attorney.
The record of the arraignment shows that Holsclaw told the magistrate that he had read the charges against him, and that he understood those charges. He was told that the maximum term of imprisonment for his most serious offense, driving while intoxicated, was 1 year, and that he faced a potential 3 months more for driving with a suspended license. As explained above, the magistrate also informed Holslclaw of the mandatory minimum penalties for these two driving offenses. And, in Holsclaw's presence, the prosecutor promised that if Holsclaw would plead no contest to the two driving charges, the State would dismiss the minor consuming charge and would recommend that Holsclaw receive the minimum sentences for the driving offenses.
Against this backdrop, the magistrate asked Holsclaw if he wanted to talk to an attorney; Holsclaw answered, "No, sir. I'd like to plea[d] no contest." The magistrate then inquired if Holsclaw could afford an attorney. Holsclaw answered that he could afford an attorney, but he reiterated that he wished to plead no contest without consulting an attorney. The magistrate cautioned Holsclaw that, by entering these no contest pleas, he was giving up his right to a jury trial. The magistrate went on to explain the elements of Holsclaw's offenses, and reminded Holsclaw that it was the State's burden to prove that he had committed these offenses.
As a petitioner for post-conviction relief, it was Holsclaw's burden to present a prima facie case that his waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent. Holsclaw has never asserted, nor does the record contain any suggestion, that Holsclaw was confused concerning his situation, or that he failed to understand the explanations of his rights contained in the pre-arraignment video and the magistrate's ensuing remarks to Holsclaw personally.
See Brodigan v. State, 95 P.3d 940, 944 (Alaska App. 2004), citing Jerrel v. State, 851 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Alaska App. 1993).
It is true that the magistrate never expressly asked Holsclaw to declare that he understood the benefits of having an attorney. But Holsclaw had just watched a pre-arraignment video that contained a detailed explanation of the benefits of counsel. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Holsclaw — because of his mental condition, age, education, or experience — was incapable of understanding that explanation. Nor did Holsclaw submit an affidavit in support of his petition for post-conviction relief asserting that he was in fact confused by the video or by the magistrate's inquiries.
The question of whether a petition for post-conviction relief presents one or more triable issues of fact is, itself, a question of law. Thus, an appellate court uses its independent judgment when assessing whether the petition and its supporting materials present a prima facie case for post-conviction relief.
See Brannon v. Continental Casualty Co., 137 P.3d 280, 284 (Alaska 2006); Makarka ex rel. Makarka v. Great American Insurance Co., 14 P.3d 964, 966 (Alaska 2000) (prescribing a de novo standard of review when an appellate court is asked to review a trial court's ruling that a party is entitled to summary judgement — i.e., a ruling that the other party has failed to present genuine issues of material fact and that, given the facts, the party who seeks summary judgement is entitled to prevail as a matter of law).
See Osborne v. State, 110 P.3d 986, 991 (Alaska App. 2005); DeJesus v. State, 897 P.2d 608, 619 (Alaska App. 1995).
Moreover, when reviewing a lower court's grant of summary judgement, an appellate court "is not bound by the reasoning articulated by the trial court and can affirm a grant of summary judgement on alternative grounds." That is, even though the district court dismissed Holsclaw's petition as untimely under AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A), this Court is authorized to uphold the district court's action if we are convinced that Holsclaw's petition fails to present a prima facie case for relief.
Wright v. State, 824 P.2d 718, 720 (Alaska 1992), citing Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 21 (Alaska 1976).
Having independently examined Holsclaw's petition and his sole supporting documentation (the transcript of his arraignment), we conclude that Holsclaw failed to present the district court with a prima facie case that his waiver of counsel was invalid. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision to dismiss Holsclaw's petition for post-conviction relief.
The judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED.