Opinion
08-12-1898
HOLMES v. TRUSTEES OF WESLEY METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF BELLEVILLE.
C. G. Parker, for complainant. George Blller, for defendants.
Bill by Hugh Holmes against the trustees of the Wesley Methodist Episcopal Church of Belleville to enjoin the trustees from selling land used as a church and burial ground. Application for preliminary injunction. Heard on bill, affidavit, and affidavits in reply. Denied.
C. G. Parker, for complainant.
George Blller, for defendants.
EMERY, V. C. This is a bill by a member of a religious society whose trustees are incorporated under the general act to incorporate the trustees of religious societies; and it is filed for the purpose of enjoining the trustees from selling lands now used by the society as a church and burial grouud. The present application is for a preliminary injunction. The section of the act which defines the power of the trustees, relating to the acquisition and sale of lands, provides (section 3, p. 2735, 3 Gen. St.) that they "shall be able and capable to acquire, purchase, receive, have and hold any lands," etc., "in trust for the use of said society or congregation, to an amount in value not exceeding $2,000 a year, and the same or any part thereof to sell, grant, demise, alien and dispose of." Under this act, the trustees and their successors, and not the society itself, are the incorporated body, and the title this incorporated body holds under the statute is a title in simple trust for the benefit of the society; and, as to lands held by the trustees in trust under the statute only, the society itself has the ultimate right of directing the disposition or control of the church property by the trustees, which right of the society is exercised in the manner and subject to the regulations imposed either by statute or the regulations of the religious association to which the society belongs. Morgan v. Rose (Err. & App. 1871) 22 N. J. Eq. 583, 587. The society of which defendants are the trustees is a Methodist Episcopal society, and a general statute in relation to these societies (Act March 28, 1895; P. L. p. 707; 3 Gen. St. p. 2769, par. 173) authorizes the trustees to sell and convey in fee simple all church and parsonage property whenever a majority of the members of the society so direct at a meeting called in a manner directed by the statute. The sale proposed to be made by defendants in the present case has been duly authorjzed under this act by a majority vote (54 to 10) at a proper meeting of the society, and the regulations prescribed by the General Book of Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church, relating to the sale of church property, have also been complied with by the defendants. If, therefore, the property in question is held by the defendants as trustees solely under the trusts and provisions of the act, the sale cannot be enjoined. Complainant's claim of a right on his part to prevent a sale of the property, under the powers conferred by the act, is based upon the contention that the trusts upon which the property is held are fixed, not by the act, but by the deed conveying the property to the trustees in 1845, and that the execution of these trusts prevents any sale of the property at any time. The deed, for an expressed consideration of $565, conveys the premises to the trustees, by their corporatename, and to their successors in office, forever, "as a church lot and burying ground in trust that they shall keep and maintain or cause to be kept and maintained thereon a house or place of worship for the use of the society associating therein as members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, the said property under no circumstances to be mortgaged for any purpose whatsoever, and in further trust and confidence that they shall at all times forever permit such members and preachers, belonging to the said church, as shall from time to time be duly authorized by the General Conference of the ministers and preachers of the said Methodist Episcopal Church, or by the Annual Conference authorized by the said General Conference, to preach and expound God's Holy Word therein." Complainant claims that this provision of the deed creates a trust in favor of each member of the society, and gives him, as a member of this society, a standing as such cestui que trust under the deed, to compel the execution of the trust, and to prevent any sale or disposition of the church property under the statute or regulations of the church. But inasmuch as this conveyance to the trustees shows upon its face that it was a purchase upon a substantial consideration received by the grantor, and not a donation by him, the trusts declared in the deed will be considered as inserted by the trustees at their own instance and for their benefit and protection, and not in the nature of charitable trusts. Trusts of this character, which give a right to impose those restrictions upon alienation, which a charitable donor has a right to create, arise only upon gifts and devises, and not upon sales of lands. Magie v. Church (Green, Ch., 1860) 13 N. J. Eq. 77, 79, affirmed, on appeal, 15 N. J. Eq. 500; Mills v. Davidson (Err. & App. 1896) 54 N. J. Eq. 659, 663, 35 Atl. 1072. And the fact that the trust clause in the deed, as to the use of the church by the ministers of the church, substantially conforms to the requirements of the Book of Discipline of the church then in force, is a further indication as to the intention of the declarations of trust. A church lot for the erection of a house of worship and a burying ground are proper "uses and purposes" of a religious society, and therefore are lands which the trustees are authorized to hold under the statute; but the statute has not given power to the trustees to validate, by their acceptance of a deed or otherwise, conditions or trusts made by the vendor of lands which are in violation of the general rules of law against alienation or the creation of perpetuities. This designation of the special purposes for which the lot was conveyed, or the further declaration that it was conveyed in trust for these purposes made by the vendor in the deed, cannot have the effect, therefore, of changing the character of the title to the lands held for the use of the society, which the trustees have under the express terms of the statute, or impose upon these trustees other restrictions against alienation than those imposed by the statute or by the regulations governing the society for which the trustees hold. If this designation is construed to have this effect, then, under the doctrine of the Magie and Mills Cases, above cited, the conditions or trusts are void. Complainant's status and property rights in this case against the trustees, so far as relates to the property held for a church or house of worship, as distinct from the burial ground, are only those which belong to him as a member of the society whose trustees are organized under the statute; and so long as the trustees, in disposing of the property, which is held under the trusts of the statute, and under those trusts only, follow the provisions of the statute and the regulations of the society, no property rights of complainant are infringed, and there is no basis for an injunction, so far as a sale of the church lot is concerned.
Complainant further claims that part of the property which the trustees intend to sell includes a portion of the burial ground. The trustees were authorized by the society, at its meeting, to sell so much of the tract "as has not been heretofore used as a burying ground." They have had surveyed and mapped the tract proposed to be sold, and the western line of this tract is about 25 feet from the westerly line of the church, except for about 6 feet on the southerly end of the line, and this portion is about 8 or 10 feet west of the westerly line of the church. No burials have taken place anywhere in the grounds since 1885; and, according to defendants' affidavits, there are no surface indications of graves on the portion proposed to be sold. Complainant's affidavit on this point (this being the only affidavit annexed to the bill) is that the tract as advertised for sale "includes part of the premises devoted to a burying ground where bodies have been actually interred"; but he fails to specify where this portion actually used for burial is located. It is not claimed that it includes the burial plot of his family and relatives, and by defendants' affidavit this plot is shown not to be included in the tract to De sold. As to the actual location of the old graves on the tract proposed to be sold, defendants' affidavits go no further than to show that there were no graves or signs of interment "near the rear wall of the building" at the time of its erection, in 1845. The affidavits thus show that the actual location of the graves on any portion of the property proposed to be sold presents a disputed question of fact, and such a disputed question of fact as cannot be disposed of on the affidavits now before the court. The complainant's property interests in this question are not such as require protection by preliminary injunction, and in the absence of proof showing definitely the location, no order for injunction should be made before final hearing. But the trustees, in making the sale of thelot proposed as surveyed, will, as it now seems to me, do so subject to the risk that complainant, upon the final hearing, may show that a portion of the lot sold has been heretofore in fact used as a burying ground, and to a claim that, by reason thereof, he is entitled to have the sale, if made pending suit, declared void as to such portion. The application for preliminary injunction is denied.