Opinion
14-22-00007-CR
08-01-2023
DARRELL WAYNE HOLMES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do Not Publish - Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 434th Judicial District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 18-DCR-082773
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Jewell and Spain. (Spain, J., concurring).
MEMORANDUM MAJORITY OPINION
TRACY CHRISTOPHER, CHIEF JUSTICE
Appellant challenges his conviction for murder, arguing in two issues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction, and that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain opinion testimony regarding his claim of self-defense. For the reasons given below, we overrule both issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
We begin with appellant's sufficiency challenge, even though it was presented second in his brief, because if meritorious, it would afford him the greatest amount of relief. See Roberson v. State, 810 S.W.2d 224, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (per curiam) (indicating that rendition points should be addressed before remand points).
Appellant was charged with murdering the complainant, Terrance Hamilton. Appellant pleaded not guilty to that charge, and his case proceeded to a trial by jury. Appellant did not testify during his trial, but the prosecution published to the jury portions of his custodial interview, in which he claimed to have shot Hamilton in self-defense. This claim of self-defense was the primary focus of the trial, and to defeat that claim, the prosecution produced evidence that appellant had provoked the difficulty, which meant that his use of deadly force was not justified.
The prosecution established that appellant and Hamilton were caught in a love triangle with the same woman. The relationship between Hamilton and the woman was toxic, and on the day of the murder, Hamilton aggressively confronted the woman and threatened to kill her. The confrontation ended with Hamilton throwing rocks at the woman's car. After the confrontation, the woman contacted appellant, her other paramour. The woman also sent appellant a picture of Hamilton, because the two men had never met each other before. Appellant then drove to Hamilton's neighborhood, where the two men spoke in the middle of the street. During their conversation, Hamilton was on foot, and appellant remained in his truck. At the end of the conversation, appellant fatally shot Hamilton a single time in the face. Appellant then fled the scene, but he was tracked down by police after receiving information from the woman.
The defense's version of events was similar, but it emphasized other facts in an effort to show that appellant's use of deadly force was justified. According to the defense, appellant did not go to Hamilton's neighborhood for the purpose of murdering Hamilton or causing him serious bodily injury. Rather, appellant went there for the purpose of finding their mutual love interest. Appellant did not find the woman, but when he saw Hamilton walking down the street, appellant made a U-turn to approach Hamilton and discuss the threats that Hamilton had made against the woman. Upon making that U-turn, appellant saw Hamilton reach into his pocket. Fearing that Hamilton might have a weapon, appellant pulled his own gun out and placed it near his lap. During the men's conversation, appellant sensed that Hamilton was pulling his hand out of his pocket. Appellant responded by raising his gun, without intending to use it. Hamilton-still outside the truck-then reached for the gun, and a struggle ensued, with appellant remaining in the truck. Appellant shot Hamilton during the struggle. Hamilton did not have a gun of his own, but he did have a knife. When Hamilton's body was discovered, the knife was found under his person, outside of his pocket.
After the prosecution rested, the defense moved for a directed verdict and argued that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction. The defense focused specifically on the essential element of a decedent. Although the defense acknowledged the existence of a decedent-and even referred to autopsy evidence discussed by the medical examiner-the defense argued that the prosecution had failed to produce any evidence that this particular decedent was Hamilton, as had been alleged in the indictment. The trial court overruled the defense's motion. Appellant now argues the same point on appeal in his sufficiency challenge.
In a sufficiency challenge, a reviewing court must determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The offense here was murder, and appellant was charged under two separate theories of murder, which meant that the prosecution had the burden of proving at least one of the following sets of essential elements: (1) that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Hamilton, or (2) that appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of Hamilton. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b).
Appellant challenges only whether the prosecution satisfied its burden of proving that Hamilton was the identity of the decedent, which was necessary under either theory of murder. We limit our review to just this essential element. See Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (solely addressing the element of the offense that was challenged on appeal). And in assessing whether the evidence was sufficient as to that element, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
The medical examiner in this case directly testified that he performed an autopsy on an individual named Terrance Hamilton. That testimony alone is sufficient to establish the identity of the decedent.
Nonetheless, appellant suggests that the evidence is insufficient because there was no testimony from a friend or relative who said that the person photographed by the medical examiner was the same Terrance Hamilton who was named in the indictment. But no such testimony was required. Besides, Hamilton's brother testified that he found Hamilton's body in the street outside of the house where they both lived. That testimony was also sufficient to establish the identity of the decedent.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hamilton was the identity of the decedent in this case.
OPINION TESTIMONY
Appellant asserted his claim of self-defense in a custodial interview conducted by a police sergeant. During the trial, the prosecution asked the sergeant if he believed that appellant was justified in using deadly force against Hamilton, based on the version of events as they were told by appellant in his interview. The defense objected to this line of questioning as calling for a legal conclusion, but the trial court overruled the objection, and the sergeant responded, "No, I didn't think that his actions were justified under the law." Appellant now challenges the trial court's ruling and the admission of the sergeant's opinion testimony.
For the sake of argument only, we will assume without deciding that the trial court's ruling was erroneous. The question then becomes whether the admission of the opinion testimony resulted in harm under the standard for nonconstitutional error. See Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (considering whether the erroneous admission of opinion testimony was harmful under the standard for nonconstitutional error).
Nonconstitutional error must be disregarded unless it affects a defendant's substantial rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). An error affects a defendant's substantial rights when the error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict. See King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). If we have a fair assurance from an examination of the record as a whole that the error did not influence the verdict, or had only a slight effect, then we must conclude that the error is harmless. See Stredic v. State, 663 S.W.3d 646, 655-56(Tex. Crim. App. 2022).
When making our assessment of harm, we consider various factors, including the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating guilt, and whether the prosecution emphasized the complained-of error. See Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
In this case, the sergeant did not purport to be an expert on the exercise of self-defense. The sergeant was just a lay witness, and he based his opinion of appellant's use of deadly force on the version of events as told by appellant during his custodial interview. Because a recording of that interview was published during the trial, the jury had access to the same set of facts that formed the basis of the sergeant's opinion. Accordingly, the jury was in an equal position to form its own opinion as to whether appellant's use of deadly force was justified. Under these circumstances, we can have a fair assurance that the sergeant's opinion had no influence on the jury's verdict, or at most just a slight effect. See Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 365 (concluding that any error in the admission of opinion testimony was harmless where the witness was not an expert and the jury had already heard all of the facts upon which the witness's opinion was based).
There was also other evidence of guilt that cast doubt on appellant's claim of self-defense. For example, there was evidence that, on the same day as Hamilton's murder, appellant received a picture of Hamilton from the woman at the center of this love triangle. The jury could have reasonably inferred from that evidence that appellant murdered Hamilton in order to promote his own romantic interests. That inference could also be made from the evidence that appellant decided to confront Hamilton in Hamilton's own neighborhood, rather than continuing to search for the woman, which had been his claimed purpose for going to the neighborhood in the first place. All of this evidence supports a conclusion that appellant was the provocateur, and that his use of deadly force was unjustified.
Also, even though there was evidence that Hamilton had a knife, there was no evidence that appellant suffered any defensive wounds from the attempted use of that knife. The knife was found under Hamilton's body, not inside appellant's truck, where the two men allegedly struggled over the gun. Appellant also admitted during his custodial interview that he did not know if Hamilton had a knife or some other sort of weapon.
Other circumstances of guilt included appellant's flight from the scene. He did not notify authorities of his use of deadly force, or of Hamilton's need for medical assistance. Rather, he asked his sister to hold on to the gun, and then he went into hiding at a motel. And when he was eventually confronted by authorities, he initially denied any sort of involvement with Hamilton.
Finally, the prosecution did not emphasize-or even mention-the sergeant's opinion during closing statements.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that any erroneous admission of the sergeant's opinion was harmless because it did not influence the jury's verdict, or at most had just a slight effect.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
MEMORANDUM CONCURRING OPINION
Charles A. Spain Justice
On appeal, the State argues appellant did not preserve a complaint for appellate review regarding the sergeant's response, "No, I didn't think that his actions were justified under the law." Appellant's issue on appeal is the trial court erred by admitting impermissible lay-witness opinion testimony under Texas Rule of Evidence 701(a). Tex. R. Evid. 701(a). At trial, appellant's objection was that the sergeant's response was a legal conclusion.
I agree that the complaint on appeal was not preserved. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a). While I concur in the judgment, I do not join in the court's opinion on harm in issue one.