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Holmes v. Pittsburg Port Auth.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Apr 24, 2023
CIVIL 2:22-CV-1342 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2023)

Opinion

CIVIL 2:22-CV-1342

04-24-2023

HENRY JAMES HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. PITTSBURG PORT AUTHORITY, et al Defendants.


Chief Judge Brann

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Factual Background

This pro se, in forma pauperis lawsuit was reassigned to Chief Judge Brann and referred to the undersigned following the recusal of the judges initially assigned to this matter. (Doc. 15). This case now comes before us for a legally mandated screening review.

Holmes' complaint is a cryptic and enigmatic pleading. In this complaint, Holmes alleges that he became embroiled in an argument with an unidentified Pittsburgh bus driver on an unknown date concerning the alleged failure to unstrap a disabled person's seat on the bus. (Doc. 1, at 4). This dispute apparently escalated into a full blown imbroglio since according to Holmes the bus driver “tried to have me arrested on false allegation of a knife.” (Id.)

In its current form Holmes' complaint is riddled with ambiguities. First, it is entirely unclear who the plaintiff is suing. The caption of the complaint names the Pittsburgh Port Authority as the defendant, but the body of the complaint purports to sue an unnamed bus driver. Second, the complaint does not state when these events took place. Third, the complaint alleges a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, but fails to recite facts setting forth an ADA violation. Finally, the complaint fails to articulate an intelligible prayer for relief beyond inviting the court to “set the damages.” (Id.)

While Holmes has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, upon our independent consideration of this pleading we conclude that this complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed.

We note that prior to the recusal of the judges initially assigned to this case a screening Report and Recommendation had been filed in this case. We have, however, conducted a separate and independent review of this complaint.

II. Discussion

A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints-Standard of Review

This Court has an on-going statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally a court need not “assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of the complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id. at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

Two years after Fowler, the Third Circuit further observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.'”
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id. Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).

In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:

(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.

Judged against these legal guideposts, for the reasons set forth below it is recommended that this complaint be dismissed.

B. The Current Complaint Fails as a Matter of Law.

In this case, Holmes' complaint runs afoul of a series of legal obstacles. At the outset, dismissal of this complaint is warranted because this pleading fails to comply with Rule 8's basic injunction that “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).

It is well-settled that: “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and that each averment be ‘concise, and direct,' Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1).” Scibelli v. Lebanon County, 219 Fed.Appx. 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, when a complaint is “illegible or incomprehensible[]” id., or when a complaint “is not only of an unwieldy length, but it is also largely unintelligible[,]” Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 Fed.Appx. 785, 787 (3d Cir. 2007), an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 is clearly appropriate. See, e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 Fed.Appx. 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v. New Jersey State Superior Court, 260 Fed.Appx. 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos v. Cohen, supra; Scibelli v. Lebanon County, supra; Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 450 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005).

Dismissal under Rule 8 is also proper when a complaint “left the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action],” Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 Fed.Appx. 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when the complaint is so “rambling and unclear” as to defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, 441 Fed.Appx. 109 (3d Cir. 2011). Similarly, dismissal is appropriate in “those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Tillio v. Spiess, 441 Fed.Appx. at 110 (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted)); Tillio v. Northland Grp. Inc., 456 Fed.Appx. 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2012). Further, a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 8 when the pleading is simply illegible and cannot be understood. See, e.g., Moss v. United States, 329 Fed.Appx. 335 (3d Cir. 2009) (dismissing illegible complaint); Radin v. Jersey City Medical Center, 375 Fed.Appx. 205 (3d Cir. 2010); Earnest v. Ling, 140 Fed.Appx. 431 (3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing complaint where “complaint fails to clearly identify which parties [the plaintiff] seeks to sue”); Oneal v. U.S. Fed. Prob., Civ. No. 05-5509, 2006 WL 758301 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2006) (dismissing complaint consisting of approximately 50 pages of mostly-illegible handwriting); Gearhart v. City of Philadelphia Police, Civ. No. 06-0130, 2006 WL 446071 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006) (dismissing illegible complaint).

These principles apply here and call for the dismissal of Holmes' complaint in its current form. Indeed, this complaint fails to clearly allege who Holmes wishes to sue, how the conduct of the unidentified defendants violated the ADA, and when this conduct is alleged to have taken place. As we have observed, Rule 8 compels the dismissal of a complaint in a case such as this:

[S]ince the . . . complaint fails to allege what conduct occurred, who engaged in that conduct, and when this conduct took place. The failure to allege these basic facts could leave “defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action].” Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 Fed.Appx. 158 (3d Cir.2011). It also impedes any efforts to determine whether this pleading was timely filed within the statute of limitations. Therefore, Rule 8 compels dismissal of the complaint, which fails to state when these events are alleged to have occurred. Collins v. Bates, No. 1:14-CV-1486, 2014 WL 4447553, at *5 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 10, 2014).
Foster v. Fink, No. 3:14-CV-1368, 2016 WL 1728723, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:14-CV-01368, 2016 WL 1718246 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2016).

Likewise, in its current form Holmes' complaint does not contain a coherent prayer for relief. This, too, is a fatal flaw since:

[T]his complaint fails to do something which all complaints must do- it fails to contain “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(3). This failure to articulate in the complaint a basis for holding these defendants accountable for some violation of the constitution, or to state a proper prayer for relief, requires dismissal of these defendants from this lawsuit. See Thomas v. Conway, No. 04-1137, 2005 WL 2030304 (M.D. Pa. July 21, 2005) (failure to name defendant in body of complaint compels dismissal). Indeed, in this case, without the inclusion of some further well-pleaded factual allegations, the assertions made here are plainly inadequate and fail to meet the threshold defined by law since they are little more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, [which as a legal matter] do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra 127 S.Ct. at 1979.
Klein v. Pike Cnty. Comm'rs, No. CIV.A. 11-278, 2011 WL 6097734, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2011).

Since Holmes' complaint, in its current form, fails as a matter of law, this complaint should be dismissed. Yet, while this screening merits analysis calls for dismissal of this action in its current form, we recommend that the plaintiff be given another, final opportunity to further litigate this matter by endeavoring to promptly file an amended complaint which names proper party-defendants. We recommend this course mindful of the fact that in civil rights cases pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend is not necessary because amendment would be futile or result in undue delay, Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).

III. Recommendation

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff is conditionally GRANTED leave to proceed in forma pauperis but IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint.

The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.


Summaries of

Holmes v. Pittsburg Port Auth.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Apr 24, 2023
CIVIL 2:22-CV-1342 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2023)
Case details for

Holmes v. Pittsburg Port Auth.

Case Details

Full title:HENRY JAMES HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. PITTSBURG PORT AUTHORITY, et al…

Court:United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

Date published: Apr 24, 2023

Citations

CIVIL 2:22-CV-1342 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2023)