Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2859.
January 4, 2001
ORDER
This cause came for hearing on November 22, 2000, upon the Motion of the Defendant, Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Co. ("Travelers"), for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Having studied the legal memoranda and exhibits submitted by the parties, the record, and the applicable law, the Court is filly advised in the premises and ready to rule.
I. Background
On September 26, 1998, the Defendant, Randy J. Parker ("Parker"), attacked the Plaintiff, Louis M. Holmes ("Holmes"), at a camp located in Manchac, Louisiana. The attack occurred when, without provocation, Parker trespassed into the camp that Holmes was visiting and struck Holmes on the back of the head with an iron skillet. Holmes fell to the floor, and Parker then proceeded to repeatedly strike Holmes about the face and head with his fists. Holmes was able to free himself from Parker's blows, and Parker subsequently left the camp. As friends were escorting Holmes to a vehicle parked near the camp in an attempt to obtain medical assistance, Parker returned and again attacked Holmes. Specifically, Parker threw Holmes into a body of water and attempted to drown him. This second attack was, like the first, entirely unprovoked. The Plaintiffs brought this action against Parker and also named Travelers, Parker's insurer, as a Defendant. In addition, the Plaintiffs named Parker's wife, Louanne Matherne Parker, as a Defendant, seeking to hold her liable for her alleged negligent acts: failure to warn others of Parker's violent propensities and failure to telephone law enforcement personnel during the attack. (Complaint, ¶ VI).
Travelers filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that no coverage is provided under its policy for Parker's intentional acts. Specifically, Travelers argues that coverage under its policy extends only to damages for bodily injury resulting from "occurrences" during the policy period. As defined in the policy, an occurrence is "an accident" resulting in bodily injury. Travelers claims that the attacks by Parker on Holmes do not fall within the definition of "occurrence" because they were not accidental. Therefore, Travelers claims that under its policy, it is not liable in the instant action.
In addition, Travelers argues that coverage is further precluded under its policy because the policy specifically excludes coverage for "bodily injury or property damage which is expected or intended by any insured." (Defendant's Exhibit B, Section II-Exclusions, paragraph (1)(a)). Travelers claims that Parker's actions described above certainly falls within the intentional act exclusion for several reasons. First, Parker plead guilty to second degree battery, a specific intent crime. Travelers argues that by doing so, Parker admitted that he intended to inflict great bodily harm upon Holmes. Second, Travelers argues that the prolonged and vicious nature of the attacks at issue evidences an intent to harm. Finally, Travelers argues that not only is the intent to harm obvious from the nature of the attack, but the type of injuries Holmes sustained are reasonably foreseeable. Thus, Travelers contends that the intentional injury exclusion is triggered in the instant action, barring coverage to Parker.
The Plaintiffs oppose Travelers' Motion for Summary Judgment for several reasons. First, the Plaintiffs argue that the Travelers policy is ambiguous because it uses the words "occurrence" and "accident" interchangeably without providing definitive definitions of either word; therefore, such ambiguity must be resolved against the insurer. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs argue that the "occurrence" must be viewed from the standpoint of the damaged party. If such is done in the instant action, then the incident in question will clearly be viewed as unexpected and accidental and will then be covered by the Travelers policy. In addition, the Plaintiffs argue that the intentional act exclusion is not triggered in this case because Parker did not have the mental capacity to appreciate the consequences of his actions or to form the specific intent required under the intentional act exclusion. The Plaintiffs assert that for these reasons, Travelers has failed to carry its burden entitling it to summary judgment.
II. Legal Analysis
A. Law on Summary Judgment
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Applying the relevant state law, "[s]ummary judgment declaring that there is no coverage under an insurance policy may not be rendered unless there is no reasonable interpretation of the policy that, when applied to undisputed facts shown by the evidence supporting the motion, would afford coverage." Deselle v. St. Paul Insurance Company 688 So.2d 1080, 1081 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1996).
B. Law on Interpreting Insurance Contracts
An insurance contract is the law between the parties, but any ambiguity should be construed to effect coverage. See Yount v. Maisano 627 So.2d 148 (La. 1994); Breland v. Schilling, 550 So.2d 609 (La. 1989). Likewise, an insurer bears the burden of showing that an intentional injury exclusion in a policy applies to deny coverage, and any ambiguity in the exclusion should be narrowly construed in favor of coverage. See id. An "expected or intended" injury exclusion has the purpose of preventing the "insured from acting wrongfully with the security of knowing that his insurance company will `pay the piper' for the damages." Yount, 627 So.2d at 151 (quoting Breland). Thus, a Court analyzing an intentional injury exclusion must determine whether the insured subjectively intended or reasonably expected the results of his actions to the extent that they did occur, and it must make this determination from all the facts and circumstances bearing on such intent or expectation. See id. However, one must be capable of discernment to intend the natural consequences of his acts. See von Dameck v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., 361 So.2d 283 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1978). Moreover, a person's insanity, or want of reason, which prevents him from comprehending the nature and consequences of his acts, may prevent him from having the requisite intent to inflict injury so that his act is not intentional within the meaning of a liability policy exclusion. See id. at 288.
In this case the policy covers any "occurrence," which "means an accident, . . . which results . . . in bodily injury;" but the policy specifically excludes coverage for personal liability due to "bodily injury . . . which is expected or intended by any insured." (Defendant's Exhibit B: Definitions, p. 1, ¶ 6; Section II-Exclusions, p. 11, ¶ (1)(a)). Therefore, like Yount and Breland, this Court must address whether Parker subjectively intended or reasonably expected the injuries suffered by Holmes to result from the violent attack. Clearly, it would be unreasonable for Parker to expect anything other than serious injuries to result when he snuck up behind Holmes and hit him in the back of the head with an iron skillet. Moreover, the only possible inference to be drawn from the factual circumstances: hitting Holmes with the skillet, Parker's pummeling the victim about the head with his fists after he fell to the floor and then retreating only to again attack and attempt to drown Holmes, is that Parker subjectively intended to severely harm or even kill Holmes. Thus, this Court determines that Parker intended and must have expected Holmes' injuries to result, that this occurrence was not an accident, that Parker should not benefit from the security of insurance coverage for this violent attack, and that Travelers' intentional act exclusion applies to deny coverage.
Holmes argues that Parker lacked the mental capacity required to commit an intentional act. As evidence of this alleged want of reason, the Plaintiff offers an answer to the State's discovery in the related criminal proceeding in which Parker lists medical professionals from whom he received psychiatric care and in which Parker evidences his intent to defend criminal charges by insanity. However, no verifiable medical documentation of this alleged insanity is available in the record. Moreover, Parker was finally convicted of battery, which is a specific intent crime where the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury. Accordingly, the Court finds this purported evidence of alleged insanity unpersuasive.
Continuing, the Plaintiff also offers an incomplete "Receipt and Release" signed by Holmes and Parker and notarized in which, for some payment (that portion of the document has been deleted from the exhibit), Holmes agrees to not object to Parker receiving probation for his criminal sentence. The release states that at the time of the incident Parker "did not have the mental capacity to understand his acts" and that "he did not intend or expect any injury to occur." (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit C). This incomplete document does not provide the Court with any objective basis on which to infer a lack of mental capacity. Were there any evidence other than this naked statement in an incomplete and non-adversarial document, such as actual medical documentation or public reputation of insanity, then that might be more than a mere metaphysical doubt as to Parker's mental capacity. However, this Court is of the opinion that a rational factfinder could not infer from the evidence in the record that Parker did not or could not form the intent to inflict the injuries upon Holmes or expect those injuries to result from his attack. Consequently, there is no genuine issue of material fact for the jury to determine, no reasonable interpretation of the policy as applied to the facts of this case would allow coverage, and Travelers is entitled to Summary Judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' claims for insurance coverage of damages from Parker's intentional acts.
This Court seriously doubts that this "Release" is a bona fide transaction negotiated at arm's length to accomplish any goal other than to thwart the applicability of the policy exclusion. However, as this is a Motion for Summary Judgment, credibility assessments do not factor into this decision.
Travelers is not dismissed from coverage for alleged negligent acts of Louanne Matherne Parker arising from this same incident.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Co.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.31) be, and the same hereby is GRANTED.