Summary
dismissing state landlord-tenant claims, raised as § 1983 conspiracy claims against two New York Civil Court judges and court administration officers, under Rooker-Feldman doctrine
Summary of this case from Salem v. ParoliOpinion
00 Civ. 7871 (LAP)(AJP).
January 2, 2001.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Dorrel Holmes has brought this suit against the State of New York Office of Court Administration, two Civil Court Judges, and others, alleging a "RICO" conspiracy in connection with the decision of a Queens Civil Court landlord-tenant matter.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court should dismiss the action for failure to prosecute and failure to obey court orders, and pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
ANALYSIS
I. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO OBEY COURT ORDERS AND FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
By Orders dated November 13, 2000 and November 27, 2000, Judge Preska directed plaintiff Holmes to show cause by dates certain why the complaint should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Dkt. Nos. 2 3:11/13/00 11/27/00 Orders.) Plaintiff Holmes did not respond. When the case was referred to me, I was not sure that Judge Preska's Orders had been received by plaintiff Holmes, although mailed to the address he had provided the Court. Accordingly, on December 12, 2000, I ordered plaintiff Holmes to respond to Judge Preska's prior orders "by December 29, 2000 or the complaint will be dismissed.") (Dkt. No. 4:12/12/00 Order.) I mailed my order both to plaintiff's street address and to a P.O. Box address contained in plaintiff's submissions.
Plaintiff Holmes has not responded to any of Judge Preska's or my orders.
If the Court no longer has a valid address for plaintiff Holmes, it was his responsibility to keep the Court informed of any change of his address. See, e.g., Cardona v. Forster, No. 95-CV-1839, 1997 WL 599348 at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, D.J.) ("Every plaintiff in federal court has a responsibility to prosecute his action diligently, and inform the Court of any address changes."); Handlin v. Garvey, 91 Civ. 6777, 1996 WL 673823 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1996) (duty to inform defendants and court of current address is "an obligation that rests with all pro se plaintiffs"); Pierce v. Ross, 94 CV 218, 1995 WL 129176 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. March 17, 1995) ("it is plaintiff's responsibility to notify the court of any change in address").
The Court should dismiss this action for plaintiff Holmes' failure to respond to Court orders and failure to prosecute this action (he has done nothing since filing the complaint). See, e.g., Katz v. Morgenthau, 86 Civ. 0067, 1998 WL 156672 at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1998) (Lowe, D.J. Peck, M.J.); Lediju v. New York City Dep't of Sanitation, 173 F.R.D. 105, 110-13 (S.D.N Y 1997) (Leisure, D.J. Peck, M.J.); Woo v. City of New York, 93 Civ. 707, 1997 WL 277368 at *5-8 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1997) (Peck, M.J.).
II. THE CASE ALSO SHOULD BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
Although dressed up with vague assertions of "conspiracy" and "racketeering" devoid of any evidentiary support, the basis of plaintiff's complaint concerns decisions of the Queens County Civil Court in a landlord-tenant dispute. This Court lacks jurisdiction of such a claim pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from reviewing final state court decisions arising out of judicial proceedings absent a federal statute (such as 28 U.S.C. § 2254 governing habeas corpus) specifically authorizing such review. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1317 (1983) (federal district courts lack jurisdiction "over challenges to state court decisions . . . arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional");Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150 (1923); see, e.g., Cobian v. New York City, 99 Civ. 10533, 2000 WL 1782744 at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2000) (Peck, M.J.); Saint-Fleur v. City of New York, 99 Civ. 10433, 2000 WL 280328 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. March 14, 2000) (Peck, M.J.) (citing cases).
As the Second Circuit has explained: "The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . bars federal courts from considering claims that are 'inextricably intertwined' with a prior state court determination." Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1999); see, e.g., Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1364-70 (7th Cir. 1996) (district court lacked jurisdiction over claim that defendants' condemnation action was act of political retaliation because claim was "inextricably intertwined" with state court judgment); Cobian v. New York City, 2000 WL 1782744 at *10 (court lacks jurisdiction over discrimination/retaliation claims regarding niece's custody, which had been determined by Family Court);Saint-Fleur v. City of New York, 2000 WL 280328 at *4 (dismissing challenge to Family Court termination of plaintiff's custody of his children).
Kya-Hill v. Case, No. 98-6158, 182 F.3d 900 (table), 1999 WL 459780 at *1 (2d Cir. June 22, 1999) (court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, under Rooker-Feldman doctrine, to consider plaintiff's retaliatory eviction claim); Beckford v. Citibank N.A., 00 Civ. 205, 2000 WL 1585684 at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2000) (plaintiff's claim that defendants violated federal and state law during foreclosure proceedings in Bronx County Supreme Court barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Bal v. New York City Loft Board, 00 Civ. 1112, 2000 WL 890199 at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2000) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibited district court from considering plaintiff's § 1983 claim that his constitutional rights were violated during New York City Loft Board proceedings); McAllan v. Malatzky, 97 Civ. 8291, 1998 WL 24369 at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1998) (no subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff attempted to recast his complaint about state Housing Court procedure as a § 1983 claim), aff'd, No. 98-7218, 173 F.3d 845 (table), 1999 WL 146300 at *1 (2d Cir. March 15, 1999) ("To the extent [plaintiff] is asking the federal court to review the state court's decisions concerning his landlord-tenant dispute, the district court properly found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do so."); Delgado v. Chan, 97 Civ. 2251, 1997 WL 527876 at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1997); Humpherys v. Nager, 962 F. Supp. 347, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Chiana v. Broadmoor Assoc., 94 Civ. 0613, 1994 WL 30412 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1994) ("Plaintiff's complaint arises out of a long and acrimonious landlord/tenant dispute. . . . [Plaintiff's] requests merely attest to plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the course her litigation has taken in the state courts. 'Where, as here, the complaint's constitutional claim appears to be nothing more than the plaintiff's state court claims "recloaked in constitutional garb," the "constitutional" claim is insufficient to confer jurisdiction.'").
Because Holmes' claims are "inextricably intertwined" with the Queens County Civil Court's decision in the landlord-tenant case, Holmes' claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and should be dismissed.
As the Second Circuit has explained: "The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . bars federal courts from considering claims that are 'inextricably intertwined' with a prior state court determination." Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1999); see, e.g., Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1364-70 (7th Cir. 1996) (district court lacked jurisdiction over claim that defendants' condemnation action was act of political retaliation because claim was "inextricably intertwined" with state court judgment); Cobian v. New York City, 2000 WL 1782744 at *10 (court lacks jurisdiction over discrimination/retaliation claims regarding niece's custody, which had been determined by Family Court); Saint-Fleur v. City of New York, 2000 WL 280328 at *4 (dismissing challenge to Family Court termination of plaintiff's custody of his children).
Kya-Hill v. Case, No. 98-6158, 182 F.3d 900 (table), 1999 WL 459780 at *1 (2d Cir. June 22, 1999) (court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, under Rooker-Feldman doctrine, to consider plaintiff's retaliatory eviction claim); Beckford v. Citibank N.A., 00 Civ. 205, 2000 WL 1585684 at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2000) (plaintiff's claim that defendants violated federal and state law during foreclosure proceedings in Bronx County Supreme Court barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Bal v. New York City Loft Board, 00 Civ. 1112, 2000 WL 890199 at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2000) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibited district court from considering plaintiff's § 1983 claim that his constitutional rights were violated during New York City Loft Board proceedings); McAllan v. Malatzky, 97 Civ. 8291, 1998 WL 24369 at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1998) (no subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff attempted to recast his complaint about state Housing Court procedure as a § 1983 claim), aff'd, No. 98-7218, 173 F.3d 845 (table), 1999 WL 146300 at *1 (2d Cir. March 15, 1999) ("To the extent [plaintiff] is asking the federal court to review the state court's decisions concerning his landlord-tenant dispute, the district court properly found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do so."); Delgado v. Chan, 97 Civ. 2251, 1997 WL 527876 at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1997); Humpherys v. Nager, 962 F. Supp. 347, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Chiana v. Broadmoor Assoc., 94 Civ. 0613, 1994 WL 30412 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1994) ("Plaintiff's complaint arises out of a long and acrimonious landlord/tenant dispute. . . . [Plaintiff's] requests merely attest to plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the course her litigation has taken in state courts. 'Where, as here, the complaint's constitutional claim appears to be nothing more than the plaintiff's state court claims "recloaked in constitutional garb," the "constitutional" claim is insufficient to confer jurisdiction.'").
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should dismiss plaintiff Holmes' claims.FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from service of this Report to file written objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Such objections (and any responses to objections) shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Loretta A. Preska, 500 Pearl Street, Room 1320, and to my chambers, 500 Pearl Street, Room 1370. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Preska. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466 (1985); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 822, 115 S.Ct. 86 (1994); Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993); Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1038, 113 S.Ct. 825 (1992); Small v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989); Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 57-59 (2d Cir. 1988); McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1983); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a), 6(e).