Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority

184 Citing cases

  1. Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority

    425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970)   Cited 355 times
    Holding that due process requires detailed notice of the reasons for terminations of tenancies in the public housing context

    An action, especially under the Civil Rights Act, should not be dismissed at the pleadings stage unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiffs are entitled to no relief under any state of the facts, which could be proved in support of their claims. Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968); Barnes v. Merritt, 376 F.2d 8 (5 Cir. 1967); York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 453 (9 Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939, 84 S.Ct. 794, 11 L.Ed.2d 659 (1964); 2A Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 12.08, at 2271-74 (1968). Considered in this light, the challenge to the procedures of the HA is as follows.

  2. Fletcher v. Housing Authority of Louisville

    491 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1974)   Cited 19 times
    Finding a plan to relieve fiscal stress that favored admitting tenants who could afford to pay higher rent to be contrary to congressional intent

    The decision below gives this policy legal sanction. The following decisions have involved successful challenges to the actions of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development or local housing agencies: Thomas v. Housing Authority of Little Rock, 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D.Ark. 1967); Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969); Cole v. Housing Authority of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970); Shannon v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), noted in 85 Harv.L.Rev. 870 (1972); Hammond v. Housing Authority, 328 F. Supp. 586 (D.Or. 1971); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D.Ga. 1971), aff'd., 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972); Male v. Crossroads Associates, 469 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1972); Barber v. White, 351 F. Supp. 1091 (D.Conn. 1972); Davis v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 29 (E.D.Pa. 1973); Findrilakis v. Secretary of Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 357 F. Supp. 547 (N.D.Cal. 1973); and National Tenants Organization, Inc. v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 358 F. Supp. 312 (D.D.C. 1973).

  3. Andrew H. by Irene H. v. Ambach

    600 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D.N.Y. 1984)   Cited 3 times

    See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Plaintiffs allege a second due process theory based upon the Second Circuit's landmark decision in Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2nd Cir. 1968). In Holmes, low income public housing applicants contended that the Housing Authority's system for selecting among applicants for available public housing "increase[d] the likelihood of favoritism, partiality, and arbitrariness on the part of the Authority, and deprive[d] the plaintiffs of a fair opportunity to petition for admission to public housing, and to obtain review of any action taken by the Authority."

  4. Bond v. Dentzer

    362 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D.N.Y. 1973)   Cited 9 times
    In Bond, the court was concerned with abstention in a case involving a wage assignment while state litigation was pending.

    Furthermore, there is a special duty upon federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction in civil rights cases because abstention is least appropriate where federal civil rights are in jeopardy. Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265-266 (2d Cir. 1968); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1967); Owens v. Parham, 350 F. Supp. 598, 600 (N.D.Ga. 1972) (three-judge court); Musselman v. Spies, 343 F. Supp. 528, 533 (M.D.Pa. 1972) (three-judge court); Holt v. Brown, 336 F. Supp. 2, 5 (W.D.Ky. 1971) (three-judge court); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 292 (E.D.Pa. 1970). (three-judge court).

  5. Holbrook v. Pitt

    643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981)   Cited 134 times
    Holding that existing tenants — not applicants — had enforceable rights under contracts as intended third party beneficiaries

    In response to the need for insuring that government programs are not administered in an arbitrary or irrational fashion, courts have extended due process protections to a wide variety of governmentally conferred benefits. See, e. g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) (parole application); Willner v. Committee on Character Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1967) (application for bar admission); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir. 1978) (social security benefits); Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1973) (chauffeur's license application); Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) (public housing application). As court decisions have extended the notion of protected rights under the due process clause beyond traditional concepts of "liberty" and "property," however, it is often difficult to discern the boundaries of due process protection.

  6. Davis v. Ball Memorial Hospital Ass'n

    640 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1980)   Cited 31 times
    In Davis, plaintiffs seem to have asserted a claim based on the APA only indirectly or belatedly, arguing that "the differences between a private right of action under the Hill-Burton Act and the... APA are inconsequential.

    See note 7 supra. Lastly, Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968), which otherwise resembles this case, combined several of the sins of pre- Roth due process analysis. In that case, plaintiffs were among 90,000 eligible applicants for 10,000 places in public housing projects.

  7. White v. Roughton

    530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976)   Cited 74 times
    Holding that determining eligibility for general assistance program based upon unwritten standards vests "virtually unfettered discretion" in the decision makers and "is clearly violative of due process"

    See Welfare Fighters Organization v. Center Township, 2 CCH Pov.L.Rep. ¶ 18,964 (S.D.Ind. April 30, 1974), also reported at 8 Clearing-house Review 131 (June 1974); Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733, 742 (5th Cir. 1963). III.

  8. Burke v. United States Department of Justice

    968 F. Supp. 672 (M.D. Ala. 1997)

    When faced with agencies making decisions involving property rights, several courts have ruled that agencies following unwritten policies or procedures violate the due process rights of those who must come before the agency. See White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 753-54 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that determining eligibility for general assistance program based upon unwritten standards vests "virtually unfettered discretion" in the decision makers and "is clearly violative of due process"); Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2nd Cir. 1968) (stating that "due process requires that selections among applicants be made in accordance with `ascertainable standards'") (citing Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 1964)). "It hardly need be said that the existence of an absolute and uncontrolled discretion in an agency of government vested with the administration of a vast program, such as public housing, would be an intolerable invitation to abuse."

  9. Child v. Beame

    412 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)   Cited 47 times
    Holding that in the absence of anything to impugn his good faith, a self-appointed next friend of foster children could pursue litigation on their behalf even though he did not know the children until his aid was enlisted by the attorneys

    In this circumstance their standing to sue is not open to question.Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968). The movants next seek to strike the complaint for a violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

  10. Paturzo v. Home Life Ins. Co.

    382 F. Supp. 357 (D. Md. 1974)

    Section 26 additionally grants authority to the Commissioner to 'make reasonable rules and regulations necessary for or as an aid to effectuation of any provision of this article.'         Plaintiff asserts that Hatem's failure to investigate and take action with regard to Home Life's alleged wrongdoing constitutes a lack of constitutional procedural due process which has resulted in the loss of plaintiff's property, citing Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970), and Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968). To bolster that contention, plaintiff has filed an affidavit of John Coppage, Special Deputy Insurance Commissioner of Maryland, stating that no attempt has been made by the State Insurance Department to 'regulate, detect or correct abuses, misrepresentations or other unfair insurance practices with respect to post-mortem dividends or refunds of unearned premiums payable to life insurance contracts issued within the State of Maryland.'