Opinion
CIVIL 2:22-CV-1612
11-02-2023
HENRY JAMES HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM MCCAIN, et al., Defendants.
Brann Chief Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
Henry James Holmes is undeniably an angry man with a penchant for altercations with others. These qualities were alluded to in one of Holmes' prior federal lawsuits, Holmes v. Wagner, Civil No. 2:22-CV-490, where Holmes acknowledged previously being convicted of what he described as “false Calif. Sex charges.” (Doc. 1, at 4). These qualities also may account for the fact that Holmes, a Pittsburgh resident, finds a number of the cases which he had filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reassigned to this Court. This pro se, in forma pauperis lawsuit was reassigned to Chief Judge Brann and referred to the undersigned following the recusal of the judges initially assigned to this matter. (Doc. 15). Those judges recused themselves from Holmes' cases after Holmes was charged with threatening to kill or injure one district court judge and two magistrate judges in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. United States v. Holmes, Criminal No. 2:23-CR-80.
While Holmes has insisted upon calling these allegations false, court records indicate that he was convicted in California of a sex offense and has been arrested in Pennsylvania for failure to register as a sex offender. Holmes v. Forman, No. EDCV2201102DOCDFM, 2023 WL 319918, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2023); Holmes v. Veith, No. 2:22-CV-00580, 2022 WL 4539029, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-CV-00580, 2022 WL 4536255 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2022). Thus, there appears to be nothing “false” about Holmes' sex offense conviction beyond the plaintiff's subjective sense of unfairness at having been convicted.
In the instant case, Holmes has filed a complaint which brings a host of civil rights claims against multiple defendants, arising against a backdrop marked by alleged anger and threatened violence on Holmes' part. Holmes' complaint is largely unintelligible, but it appears that the plaintiff is alleging that he was denied public housing and falsely arrested following a June 2022 incident in which it appears that Holmes was charged with threatening housing officials. (Doc. 1-1). While this much can be discerned from the pleading, the body of the complaint is utterly deficient. It contains no coherent narrative of well-pleaded facts that provide for a plausible claim for relief against the fourteen defendants named in this document. (Id.)
When this case was initially filed by Holmes in the Western District of Pennsylvania, that court granted the plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and ordered his complaint served upon the defendants. (Docs. 3 and 4). Following service of the complaint between March 21 and April 3, 2023, the defendants filed four motions to dismiss Holmes' complaint, citing numerous deficiencies in this pleading. (Docs. 33, 36, 38, 41).
Holmes never responded to these motions. Instead, it appears that in April of 2023, he was allegedly communicating threats to kill or injure three judicial officers in the Western District of Pennsylvania, actions which led to Holmes' pending federal indictment, the recusal of that court from his civil cases, (Doc. 46), and the referral of this case to the undersigned. (Doc. 47).
At the time that Holmes' case was first referred to us, we recognized that the plaintiff had never responded to these motions to dismiss. Accordingly, on April 20, 2023, we entered an order which instructed Holmes as follows:
We note that there are four motions to dismiss the case which have been briefed by the defendants and are pending before the court. (Docs. 33, 36, 38, 41). Accordingly, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff is directed to respond to these motions on or before May 8, 2023. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.7 the movants may then file reply briefs on or before May 22, 2023 . All briefs must conform to the requirements prescribed by Local Rule 7.8. No further extensions shall be granted, absent compelling circumstances.
The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, is advised that Local Rule 7.6 of the Rules of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions, and provides that:
Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant's brief.Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added).
It is now well-settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a motion to dismiss without analysis of the complaint's sufficiency ‘if a party fails to comply with the [R]ule after a specific direction to comply from the court.'” Williams v. Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., No. 091704, 2010 WL 3703808, *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2010) (quoting Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (1991)). Therefore, a failure to comply with this direction may result in the motions being deemed unopposed and granted.(Doc. 47).
Holmes has failed to comply with these clear directives, has neglected to respond to these motions, and the time for compliance with our order directing him to respond has now long since passed. On these facts, the motions to dismiss will be deemed ripe and, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Under The Rules of This Court This Partial Motion to Dismiss Should Be Deemed Unopposed and Granted .
At the outset, under the Local Rules of this Court the plaintiff should be deemed to concur in these motions, since the plaintiff has failed to timely oppose the motions or otherwise litigate this case. This procedural default completely frustrates and impedes efforts to resolve this matter in a timely and fair fashion, and under the rules of this Court warrants dismissal of the action, since Local Rule 7.6 of the Rules of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions and provides that:
Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant's brief. Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added).
It is now well settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a motion to dismiss without analysis of the complaint's sufficiency ‘if a party fails to comply with the [R]ule after a specific direction to comply from the court.'” Williams v. Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., No. 09-1704, 2010 WL 3703808, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2010) (quoting Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991)). In this case, the plaintiff has not complied with the local rules, or this Court's order, by filing a timely response to this motion. Therefore, these procedural defaults by the plaintiff compel the court to consider:
[A] basic truth: we must remain mindful of the fact that Athe Federal Rules are meant to be applied in such a way as to promote justice. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Often that will mean that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible. However, justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion ....” McCurdy v. American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir.1998).Lease v. Fishel, 712 F.Supp.2d 359, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
With this basic truth in mind, we acknowledge a fundamental guiding tenet of our legal system. A failure on our part to enforce compliance with the rules, and impose the sanctions mandated by the rules when such rules are repeatedly breached, “would actually violate the dual mandate which guides this Court and motivates our system of justice: ‘that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible [but that] justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion.'” Id. Therefore, we are obliged to ensure that one party's refusal to comply with the rules does not lead to an unjustified prejudice to those parties who follow the rules.
These basic tenets of fairness apply here. In this case, the plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 7.6 by filing a timely response to these motions to dismiss. This failure now compels us to apply the sanction called for under Rule 7.6 and deem the motions unopposed.
B. Dismissal of this Case Is Warranted Under Rule 41.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also authorizes a court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute, stating that: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of the Court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). That discretion, however, while broad, is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as Poulis factors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion [in dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its balancing of the following factors: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure
to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984).Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.
In exercising this discretion, “there is no ‘magic formula' that we apply to determine whether a District Court has abused its discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008)). Therefore, “[i]n balancing the Poulis factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation' to determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff's case.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)). Consistent with this view, it is well settled that “‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,' [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.'” Id. (quoting Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Moreover, recognizing the broad discretion conferred upon the district court in making judgments weighing these six factors, the Court of Appeals has frequently sustained such dismissal orders where there has been a pattern of dilatory conduct by a pro se litigant who is not amenable to any lesser sanction. See, e.g., Emerson, 296 F.3d 184; Tillio v. Mendelsohn, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (3d Cir. 2007); Reshard v. Lankenau Hospital, 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (3d Cir. 2007); Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (3d Cir. 2007).
In this case, a dispassionate assessment of the Poulis factors weighs heavily in favor of dismissing this action. At the outset, a consideration of the initial Poulis factor, the extent of the party's personal responsibility, shows first that Holmes has failed to obey court orders or respond to defense motions. Thus, Holmes is in dereliction of his personal responsibilities as a litigant.
Similarly, the second Poulis factor- the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to abide by court orders-also calls for dismissal of this action. Indeed, this factor-the prejudice suffered by the party seeking sanctions-is entitled to great weight and careful consideration. As the Third Circuit has observed:
“Evidence of prejudice to an adversary would bear substantial weight in support of a dismissal or default judgment.” Adams v. Trustees of N.J. Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, prejudice includes “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) .... However, prejudice is not limited to “irremediable” or “irreparable” harm. Id.; see also Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 693-94 (3d Cir. 1988). It also includes “the burden imposed by
impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222.Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259-60. In this case, the plaintiff's failure to litigate this claim, or to comply with court orders, now wholly frustrates and delays the resolution of this action. In such instances, the defendant is plainly prejudiced by the plaintiff's continuing inaction and dismissal of the case clearly rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Tillio, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (failure to timely serve pleadings compels dismissal); Reshard, 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (failure to comply with discovery compels dismissal); Azubuko, 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (failure to file amended complaint prejudices defense and compels dismissal).
When one considers the third Poulis factor-the history of dilatoriness on the plaintiff's part-it becomes clear that dismissal of this action is now appropriate. In this regard, it is clear that “‘[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . ., or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.'” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260-61 (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 874) (some citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff has failed to comply with court orders, and respond to defense motions. Thus, the plaintiff's conduct displays “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency [and conduct which] constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . ., or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874.
The fourth Poulis factor-whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith-also cuts against the plaintiff in this case. In this setting, we must assess whether this conduct reflects mere inadvertence or willful conduct, in that it involved “strategic,” “intentional or self-serving behavior,” and not mere negligence. Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. At this juncture, when the plaintiff has repeatedly failed to comply with instructions of the Court, or respond to multiple defense motions, the Court is compelled to conclude that the plaintiff's actions are not isolated, accidental, or inadvertent but instead reflect an ongoing disregard for this case and the Court's instructions.
While Poulis also enjoins us to consider a fifth factor, the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, cases construing Poulis agree that in a situation such as this case, where we are confronted by a pro se litigant who will not comply with the rules or court orders, lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative. See, e.g., Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262-63; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. This case presents such a situation where the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability of the court to utilize other lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion. In any event, by entering our prior orders and counseling the plaintiff on his obligations in this case, we have endeavored to use lesser sanctions, but to no avail. The plaintiff still ignores his responsibilities as a litigant.
Moreover, we note that we are not alone in confronting the obdurate refusal by Holmes to comply with Court instructions. Indeed, it appears that when Holmes was presented with instructions from the federal court in the Western District of Pennsylvania, his response to those instructions led to the plaintiff being indicted for threatening to kill or injure three judges. Thus, it is clear beyond peradventure that lesser sanctions have been tried and have failed. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more troubling refusal to follow court instructions than the conduct allegedly engaged in by Holmes which has led to his pending federal indictment. Accordingly, only the sanction of dismissal remains available to the Court.
Finally, under Poulis, we are cautioned to consider one other factor, the meritoriousness of the plaintiff's claims. In our view, however, consideration of this factor cannot save this particular plaintiff's claims since the plaintiff is now wholly non-compliant with the court's instructions. The plaintiff cannot refuse to comply with court orders which are necessary to allow resolution of the merits of his claims, and then assert the untested merits of these claims as grounds for declining to dismiss the case. Furthermore, it is well settled that “‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,' [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.'” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Therefore, the untested merits of the non-compliant plaintiff's claims, standing alone, cannot prevent dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute.
In any event, Holmes' complaint runs afoul of at least one significant legal obstacle which the plaintiff has refused to clarify or correct despite being instructed to do so. Holmes' pleading fails to comply with Rule 8's basic injunction that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). It is well-settled that: “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and that each averment be ‘concise, and direct,' Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1).” Scibelli v. Lebanon County, 219 Fed.Appx. 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, when a complaint is “illegible or incomprehensible[,]” id., or when a complaint “is not only of an unwieldy length, but it is also largely unintelligible[,]” Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 Fed.Appx. 785, 787 (3d Cir. 2007), an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 is clearly appropriate. See, e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 Fed.Appx. 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v. New Jersey State Superior Court, 260 Fed.Appx. 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos 236 Fed.Appx. 785 at 787 ; Scibelli 219 Fed.Appx. 221 at 222 ; Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 450 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005). Dismissal under Rule 8 is also proper when a complaint “left the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action],” Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 Fed.Appx. 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when the complaint is so “rambling and unclear” as to defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, 441 Fed.Appx. 109 (3d Cir. 2011).
These principles apply here and call for the dismissal of Holmes' complaint in its current form since the complaint leaves the defendants having to guess what of the many things alleged constitutes a cause of action. In short, at this juncture Holmes has failed to comply with court orders and neglected to respond to defense motions. He has also compelled the recusal of numerous judges through conduct which has led to his indictment on federal threats charges. Given this striking constellation of circumstances, it is submitted that all of the Poulis factors now favor dismissal of this complaint.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff is conditionally GRANTED leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but IT IS RECOMMENDED that the motions to dismiss (Docs. 33, 36, 38, and 41), be GRANTED and the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.