Opinion
A165242
06-28-2023
GILBERT MICHAEL HOLMES, Petitioner and Respondent, v. ANGUS MAC LIR, et al., Objectors and Appellants.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SPR-094593)
Richman, J.
In 1998, Richard L. Holmes (Richard) and Jacqueline B. Holmes (Jackie) established a trust that holds title to real property in San Francisco and named their four children, including respondent Gilbert Michael Holmes (Mike), as beneficiaries. In 2016, Richard and Jackie executed a restatement of the trust providing that the real property be sold for Mike's exclusive benefit. After Richard died and Jackie was found to be incapacitated, Mike petitioned the probate court to transfer title of the property to him based on a 1986 written agreement between him and his parents providing that he was to receive 2% ownership of the property for each year during which he lived at and managed it. Mike's three siblings (when referred to collectively, appellants or objectors) filed objections to the petition, arguing that the parties to the 1986 agreement had rescinded it soon after it was entered into. Mike moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that his siblings lacked standing to object to the petition. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Mike's siblings lacked standing to argue that the agreement had been rescinded because they were not parties to it. Appellants filed a petition for supersedeas, which we granted, and we now reverse, concluding that the court erred in its application of the law of judgment on the pleadings.
Consistent with the parties' filings below, and "[b]ecause some of the persons referred to in this opinion have the same last name, we use first names for clarity and by doing so intend no disrespect." (Estate of Franco (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1274, fn. 1.)
BACKGROUND
The Parties and the General Setting
Richard and Jackie were married and had four children: Angus mac Lir, Gilbert Michael "Mike" Holmes, Patrick Laurence Holmes, and Maureen Holmes Durnell. Angus, Patrick, and Maureen are the appellants. As noted, Mike is the respondent.
On or about October 10, 1986, Mike, Richard, and Jackie acquired real property located at 2157, 2159, and 2161 Hayes Street in San Francisco (the property), with Richard and Jackie owning 90% and Mike owning 10%.
On May 21, 1998, Richard and Jackie established the Richard L. Holmes and Jacqueline B. Holmes 1998 Trust ("1998 Trust"). The 1998 Trust provides that upon the death of the surviving spouse, the assets of the 1998 Trust are to be divided equally among their four children. The 1998 Trust also provides that the trustee is "specifically instructed by the settlors that any interest held in the real property commonly known as 2157, 2159 &2161 Hayes St., San Francisco, California, that is a part of the trust estate of any trust created under this instrument shall be sold by the trustee upon the surviving spouse's death, if it has not been sold prior to such time." Also on May 21, 1998, Richard and Jackie transferred into the 1998 Trust an "80% Interest" in the property.
On May 24, 1999, a grant deed was recorded transferring from Richard and Jackie, as to an undivided 80 percent interest, and Mike, as to an undivided 20 percent interest "who erroneously took title as an undivided 10% interest," an 80 percent interest to Richard and Jackie, and a 20 percent interest to Mike.
On January 11, 2016, Richard and Jackie executed a restatement of the Trust (the "2016 Restatement"). The 2016 Restatement provides that "[t]he Settlors' interest in the real property located at 2157, 2159 and 2161 Hayes Street in San Francisco, California shall be allocated for the benefit of Settlors' son, GILBERT MICHAEL HOLMES. If GILBERT MICHAEL HOLMES does not survive the Settlors, his interest in this property and the other gifts described below shall instead be distributed to a separate share for his husband, THOMAS HILL if living and if not these gifts shall lapse."
The 2016 Restatement also appointed Mike and Patrick as successor co-trustees if for any reason Richard and Jackie should cease to act as trustees, with James Wilder acting as "tiebreaker" in the event of a dispute between them.
On July 26, 2019, Richard and Jackie executed an amendment to the Trust, providing that "[i]f for any reason both Settlors shall cease to act as Trustees, and there should be no one appointed in the preceding provisions who is able and willing to act as Trustee, then JAMES WILDER is appointed as Successor Trustee, with the power and discretion while serving as Trustee to appoint Co-Trustees, Successor Trustees or Successor Co-Trustees. If JAMES WILDER is unable to act, declines to act, or ceases to act or has not made any appointment as described herein, then GILBERT MICHAEL HOLMES shall act as Successor Trustee."
The Proceedings Below
On June 23, 2020, Angus filed a petition to invalidate the 2016 Restatement and the subsequent amendment on the grounds of lack of mental capacity, undue influence, and mistake, and to confirm the validity of the 1998 Trust. The petition alleged that Richard suffered an intracranial bleed in 2012 and that he suffered increasing cognitive impairment over the subsequent four years. It also alleged that Jackie had also been suffering from cognitive decline for several years leading up to the 2016 Restatement.
On September 16, Mike filed a petition for transfer of property in the trustee's possession pursuant to California Probate Code section 850. The petition alleged that shortly after acquiring the property in 1986, Richard, Jackie, and Mike executed a "Management/Ownership Agreement," attached as an exhibit to the petition. The agreement provided that Mike "will be the day-to-day manager of the three-unit apartment" located at the property with various responsibilities, and continued as follows:
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code.
"The apartments located at 2157-2161 Hayes St. is owned as follows: "Jacqueline B. Holmes and Richard L. Holmes, as joint tenants, own 90%
"Gilbert Michael Holmes owns 10%
"Each year he completes as manager of the apartment building, Gilbert Michael Holmes's ownership of the building will increase by 2 points."
Richard and Jackie signed the agreement on October 24, 1986, and Mike signed on November 26, 1986.
The petition alleged that Mike has resided at the property and continually managed it since the agreement was signed in 1986, but that Richard and Jackie ""have never formally transferred any additional ownership interest" in the property to him. Mike "is entitled to transfer of an additional 68% (34 years at 2% per year) of the Property as of October 10, 2020. Thus, [Mike]'s total interest in the property will should be 88% as of October 10, 2020." The petition sought an order directing the trustee to transfer to Mike "the additional 68% interest he is entitled to pursuant to the parties' agreement."
On January 14, 2021, Mike's three siblings-Angus, Patrick, and Maureen-filed objections to the petition and a request for an evidentiary hearing. They alleged that "shortly after the parties signed the document attached as Exhibit A to the Petition ('1986 Agreement'), any agreement was mutually rescinded by Richard, Jacqueline, and Mike." And, they alleged, Mike's yearly interests in the property were not transferred because Mike did not want to report the value of his services as manager on his personal income tax return, and that Mike instead performed his services as manager in exchange for reduced rent for his own apartment at the property.
Richard died on April 9, 2021.
On April 29, pursuant to a stipulation, the trial court issued an order appointing Audrey Gerard as guardian ad litem for Jackie, on the grounds that she was incapacitated, in conjunction with both the trust petition and the section 850 petition.
On October 27, the trustee, James Wilder, filed a petition for instructions pursuant to section 17200, including requesting instructions as to whether the trustee should respond to the section 850 petition. Wilder's petition asserted that "based on all of the evidence presented to him to date and his own personal experiences and knowledge of the understanding of the business relationship between Mr. and Mrs. Holmes and their son with respect to the Hayes Street Property, not only has no objection to the petition, but believes it correctly states the relationship between the parties as to the ownership and management of the Hayes Street Property," and concluded that there was no "lawful, legal basis" to object to the petition.
On December 14, 2021, Mike filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings addressed to the objections. The motion was based on Code of Civil Procedure 438 "and on the grounds that [objectors] lack standing to Object to the Petition." Mike argued that only parties to an agreement can assert rescission as a defense to the enforcement of the agreement, and that the objectors rights were limited to enforcing the terms of the trust, but the 1986 Agreement was never transferred to the trust.
On January 27, 2022, Gerard, Jackie's guardian ad litem, filed a report regarding the petition for instructions, asserting this: "Given the evidence provided to me to date, including documents and information received from individuals who discussed the matter with Jaqueline and Richard Holmes and do not have a financial interest in the outcome, I have concluded that it is more likely than not that it was Mr. and Mrs. Holmes's intent that Michael receive whatever interest they still had in the Hayes Street property following their deaths. However, my conclusion is obviously not dispositive of this issue," and she did "not believe it is in [Jackie's] interest to use funds that should remain available for her needs to defend against" the petition.
Hearing on the petition was held on February 4, 2022, at which the court adopted its previously published tentative ruling, concluding as follows:
"The Court concludes and finds that Objectors may not proceed on a claim of rescission. Rescission of a contract is limited to the parties thereto and even a third-party beneficiary may not assert rescission of a contract. [Schauer v. Mandarin Gems of Cal., Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 949, 959].
"The Court further finds that Objectors have no standing to object to or otherwise oppose the Petition of Gilbert 'Mike' Holmes. The term 'beneficiary' means a person who has a present or future interest, vested or contingent, in the trust. [Prob. Code, § 24, subd. (c).] There is no dispute among the parties that Objectors' are 'beneficiaries' of their parents' trust. The controversy lies in whether their status as beneficiaries entitles them to respond to Mike's petition filed under Prob. Code, § 850. The Court concludes they do not.
"Objectors are beneficiaries as defined by Prob. Code, § 24, but they are not 'interested' persons who have standing to respond to the Petition under Prob. Code § 852. Under subdivision (a)(1) of Probate Code section 48, a 'beneficiary' must have' "a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding'" in order to be an 'interested person' with respect to that proceeding.' [Lickter v. Lickter (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 712 at 728, 118 Cal.Rptr.3d 123]."
The trial court entered an order granting the motion without leave to amend, from which the objectors appeal.
On January 4, 2023, after the objectors' opening brief was filed, they filed a petition for a writ of supersedeas, indicating that on December 21, 2022, the probate court had granted the guardian ad litem's petition to approve a June 2022 settlement agreement among the guardian ad litem, the trustee, and Mike, transferring all of the interest held by the trust in the property to Mike. On February 10, we granted the petition and stayed execution of the April 14, 2022 order appealed from as well as the December 21, 2022 order approving the settlement agreement pending the resolution of this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Applicable Law
Section 850 provides: "(a) The following persons may file a petition requesting that the court make an order under this part: . . . (3) The trustee or any interested person in any of the following cases: (A) Where the trustee is in possession of, or holds title to, real or personal property, and the property, or some interest, is claimed to belong to another." Section 1043, subdivision (a) provides that "[a]n interested person may appear and make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing."
Section 48, subdivision (a) provides: "Subject to subdivision (b), 'interested person' includes any of the following: [¶] (1) An heir, devisee, child, spouse, creditor, beneficiary, and any other person having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding. [¶] (2) Any person having priority for appointment as personal representative. [¶] (3) A fiduciary representing an interested person." Section 48, subdivision (b) states "The meaning of 'interested person' as it relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding."
Standard of Review
The parties do not agree on the standard of review. Appellants argue that we review the court's ruling under the de novo standard of review. Mike argues that we review the ruling for abuse of discretion. Appellants are correct-first, and fundamentally, under the law of judgment on the pleadings.
Here, as noted, Mike moved for judgment on the pleadings based on Code of Civil Procedure section 438, which provides in relevant part that a defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that "[t]he complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant." (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) Such a motion "is equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of review." (Kapsimallis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672; McCormick v. Travelers Ins. Co. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 404, 408.)
Thus, "we accept and liberally construe all properly pleaded factual allegations, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Sprague v. County of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 119, 127.)" (Environmental Health Advocates, Inc. v. Sream, Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 721, 728-729; see Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 551, disapproved on another ground by Black Sky Cap., LLC v. Cobb (2019) 7 Cal.5th 156 ["On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a demurrer, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the pleader"].)
In sum and in short, we exercise independent, de novo review of the trial court's ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Gerawan Farming v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515-516; Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2023) Proceedings Without Trial, § 239; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals &Writs (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 8:148.2 ["appeal [from judgment on the pleadings] presents a mixed question of law and fact that is predominantly legal, subject to the appellate court's independent review"].) Our review "involves the same acceptance and liberal construction of the factual allegations in question." (Gerawan Farming v. Lyons, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 516.)
De novo review of the trial court's determination is appropriate for other reasons. First, standing is typically a question of law that we review de novo. (See People for the Ethical Operation of Prosecutor's etc. v. Spitzer (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 391, 408-409 (Spitzer); San Luis Rey Racing, Inc. v. California Horse Racing Bd. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 67, 73; IBM Personal Pension Plan v. City &County of San Francisco (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1299 ["Standing is a question of law that we review de novo"]; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals &Writs (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 8:114.9d.) Second, "standing usually arises in the context of a demurrer, which we review de novo. (Stonehouse Homes LLC v. City of Sierra Madre [(2008)] 167 Cal.App.4th [531], 539.)" (Spitzer, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 409.)
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822 (Barefoot) is persuasive. There, Maynord established the Maynord family trust, of which his daughter was a beneficiary and successor trustee. (Id. at p. 825.) Maynord later executed a series of amendments to the trust, eliminating his daughter's share of the trust, expressly disinheriting her, and removing her as successor trustee. (Ibid.) After Maynord's death, his daughter filed a petition in the probate court alleging that the amendments were invalid because they had been procured through fraud and undue influence, and that Maynard was incompetent when they were executed. (Id. at p. 826.) Defendants then moved to dismiss the petition "under sections 17200 and 17202 (authorizing dismissal of a petition if reasonably necessary to protect the Trust), arguing that plaintiff lacked standing because she was neither a beneficiary nor a trustee under the Trust." (Barefoot, at p. 826.) The probate court agreed, as did the Court of
Appeal. The Supreme Court reversed (id. at p. 830), and with respect to the standing question, began with these observations:
"Initially, we note that when a demurrer or pretrial motion to dismiss challenges a complaint on standing grounds, the court may not simply assume the allegations supporting standing lack merit and dismiss the complaint. Instead, the court must first determine standing by treating the properly pled allegations as true. If, having taken the allegations as true, the court finds no standing, it should sustain the demurrer or dismiss the petition. If it finds standing by contrast, the court should allow the litigation to continue. (Warth v. Seldin (1975) 422 U.S. 490, 501 [standing in federal courts]; Estate of Plaut (1945) 27 Cal.2d 424, 426, 429-430 [will contest].)" (Barefoot, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 827.) This description is consistent with the de novo standard of review that we apply to a demurrer, or, as here, a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Star v. Ashbrook (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 999 (Ashbrook) is similar. There, Jonathan Starr brought a petition challenging the actions of the trustee of his father's revocable trust, including a surcharge cause of action alleging that the trustee had wasted and misused trust assets by pursuing a meritless petition for instructions and using trust assets to fund litigation against Jonathan and his brothers. (Id. at p. 1005.) The trustee brought a special motion to strike the surcharge cause of action pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. (Ashbrook, at p. 1005.) The Court first considered the argument that Jonathan lacked standing to bring the petition because the trust was revocable. (Ibid.) Relying in part on Barefoot, Ashbrook held: "Ashbrook's challenge to Jonathan's standing is the equivalent of a demurrer or pretrial motion to dismiss. Jonathan's allegations that Arnold is incompetent, accepted as true, support Jonathan's standing to bring the petition. Jonathan must, at some point, prove Arnold's incompetence, but that is for a later day." (Id. at p. 1017.)
Mike cites four cases in support of his assertion that we review the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion: Estate of Maniscalco (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 520 (Maniscalco); Arman v. Bank of America (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 697 (Arman); Estate of Prindle (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 119 (Prindle); and Estate of Sobol (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 771 (Sobol). None is apt: none involved a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and none considered or analyzed the question of the proper standard of review. Instead, each case simply stated, without analysis, that an appellate court reviews a probate court's determination whether a person is "interested" under section 48 for abuse of discretion, a statement that Arman and Prindle followed with citation to Maniscalco, and Sobol with citation to each of the other three cases. (See Arman, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 702; Prindle, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 126; Sobol, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 782.) But Mansicalco, on which the other three cases rely, does not anywhere state that the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion.
So too here. Mike's challenge to appellants' standing was raised in the form of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, resolution of which requires that we accept the allegations of the objections as true-allegations that demonstrate appellants had standing.
Appellants Had Standing to Object to the Petition
The allegations of the petition bearing on this question, which we must accept as true, are as follows:
Mike's parents' "purpose in gifting Mike a 10% interest in the Hayes Street Property was to allow Mike to live in one of the units and to be an onsite manager for the other units." On May 21, 1998, Richard and Jackie established the 1998 Trust, which provides that, upon the death of the surviving spouse, the assets of the 1998 Trust are to be divided "equally among the four children," with the trustee "specifically directed to sell the interest held by the Trust in the 'Hayes Street Property.'" Between 1990 and 2018, Richard and Jackie repeatedly expressed their intent to" 'treat all [their] children equally," and for the property to" 'pay [their] old age expenses.' "
In late 2012, Richard was in a vehicle accident and suffered an intracranial bleed, and he experienced cognitive impairment over the following years. Jackie likewise experienced cognitive decline for several years leading up to 2016, was prescribed medication for dementia, and in October 2016, a representative of the local Alzheimer's Association met with Jackie and recommended "24/7 care."
"On January 11, 2016, Mike arranged for Richard and Jackie to sign what Mike described as a 'draft' of a new trust.... Richard and Jackie were led to believe that this 'draft' was prepared by Patrick's attorney. Richard and Jackie informed [Angus and his spouse], Patrick, and Maureen, that Patrick's attorney prepared the trust and that it continued to treat all of the children equally." However, the 2016 Restatement makes an "outright gift of the Hayes Street Property to Mike and, if Mike should not survive the survivor of Richard and Jackie, the Hayes Street Property is to be distributed to Mike's husband." The 2016 Restatement also names Mike as trustee if Richard and Jackie cease acting as co-trustees.
"In May 2018, Jackie stated to [Angus] that the 2016 Restatement she signed was 'just a draft' and that 'I will treat all of my children equally.' "
"[I]n December 2015, Mike informed Patrick that the 1986 Agreement was never carried out by Richard, Jacqueline, and Mike. Mike informed Patrick that, in 1987 when Richard and Jacqueline were having their 1986 tax returns prepared, their tax preparer correctly informed Richard and Jacqueline that, because the 1986 Agreement provided that Mike would receive '2 points' for each 'year he completes as manager of the apartment building,' Mike would be required to report the value of his services as manager as income on his personal income tax return. Mike informed Patrick that he did not want to report the value of such services on his personal income tax returns and, for that reason, the '2 points' were never transferred by Richard and Jacqueline to Mike."
In short, appellants stood to inherit equal shares of the property under the 1998 Trust, and according to their allegations, the 2016 Restatement providing the property instead to Mike (or his husband) was invalid, because Richard and Jackie lacked the capacity to execute it, or its execution was obtained by fraud or undue influence. However, granting Mike's petition to transfer the property out of the trust estate based on the alleged agreement would cause the objectors to lose their interest in the property and receive nothing based on any eventual sale.
Mike argues that appellants lack standing to object based on the rule that "[a] trust beneficiary has no legal title or ownership interest in the trust assets[, and] his or her right to sue is ordinarily limited to the enforcement of the trust according to its terms," citing to Saks v. Damon Raike &Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 419, 427; Pillsbury v. Karmgard (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 743, 753 (Pillsbury); and Estate of Sayles (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 275 (Sayles). The cases are distinguishable.
In Saks, two beneficiaries of a testamentary trust filed a complaint for negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty against an attorney and real estate broker employed by the trustee, claiming that the assets of the trust were depleted through certain "imprudent transactions." (Saks, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 422.) The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that "[u]nder both the common law and the provisions of the Probate Code governing the administration of trusts, [the beneficiaries'] only proper course was to proceed against the trustee in the probate department," which had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over their claims. (Id. at pp. 427-430.) Saks did not address or interpret "interested person" under section 48.
In Pillsbury, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th 743, the trustee of an express trust, Wells Fargo Bank, decided not to bring a malicious prosecution action against a prospective buyer of a piece of real property held by the trust who had sued the bank for specific performance of his alleged contract to buy the property. (Id. at pp. 750-752.) The beneficiary then sued the prospective buyer himself, in his fiduciary and individual capacities as "limited co-trustee and a beneficiary" of the trust. (Id. at p. 752.) The Court of Appeal held that "the [trial] court did not err in determining beneficiary Pillsbury would lack standing to pursue this action against third party defendants unless trustee Wells Fargo's failure to bring the lawsuit was negligent, wrongful or otherwise improper" (id. at p. 756), and concluded that "because Pillsbury did not prove Wells Fargo acted improperly in declining to sue, the court properly found Pillsbury lacked standing to pursue this lawsuit." (id. at p. 763). Again, Pillsbury did not interpret "interested person."
In Sayles, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d 275, the decedent executed a promissory note and deed of trust with respect to real property in favor of his niece, then passed away without repaying the note. (Id. at pp. 276-277.) His niece filed a petition pursuant to section 851.56, the predecessor to section 850, seeking to enforce the promissory note and deed of trust against the decedent's estate. (Id. at p. 278.) After reviewing various authorities, the Court of Appeal held that the niece did not hold an "interest" in the property for the purposes of section 851.56:
Section 851.5 provided, in relevant part, "If a person dies in possession of, or holding title to, real or personal property which, or some interest in which, is claimed to belong to another . . . any claimant may file . . . a verified petition setting forth the facts upon which any claim is predicated ...." (Sayles, supra, 130 Cal.App.275 at p. 278.)
"The common denominator in all of these authorities, consistent with the history behind the enactment of that statute, is that the claimant in each instance sought a declaration of title, ownership, or possession of the property at stake. By contrast, the claimant here would not obtain a declaration of title, ownership, or possession of the property involved here. The creditor's 'interest' in the property is limited to the security it represents for payment of the promissory note/debt. Assuming the creditor were a senior lienholder of the property and a foreclosure sale were held to satisfy the debt, the most the creditor would receive would be the money owed-$11,700-not the property itself. This sort of 'interest' in the property is too remote and far afield from the meaning given to that word in other cases decided under section 851.5. We conclude that the trial court properly denied the petition under section 851.5. Moreover, we strongly suspect that the claimant's entire argument concerning an 'interest' in the security (property) is a moot point, since the property was sold to a bona fide purchaser before the claimant's petition was ever filed, and is no longer an asset of the estate." (Sayles, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at pp. 279-280.)
The facts of Sayles are plainly distinguishable from the situation here, where appellants seek not repayment of a debt but something much closer to "a declaration of title, ownership, or possession of the property at stake."
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed, and the matter is remanded with instructions to enter a new order denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Appellants shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(4).)
We concur: Stewart, P.J. Miller, J.