Opinion
C/A No. 2:20-01748-BHH-BM
08-05-2020
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The pro se Plaintiff, Cynthia Holmes, brings this civil action asserting claims under state law against Defendants. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(D.S.C.).
Although Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis, this filing is nonetheless subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that the case is not frivolous. See Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App'x 405, 406 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2012); Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995)(noting that although 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) was not applicable where a pro se party filed an appeal and paid the filing fee, the court had "inherent authority, wholly aside from any statutory warrant, to dismiss an appeal or petition for review as frivolous"). "[I]t is well established that a court has broad inherent power sua sponte to dismiss an action, or part of an action, which is frivolous, vexatious, or brought in bad faith." Brown v. Maynard, No. L-11-619, 2011 WL 883917, at *1 (D.Md. Mar.11, 2011) (citing cases). Therefore, a court has "the discretion to dismiss a case at any time, notwithstanding the payment of any filing fee or any portion thereof, if it determines that the action is factually or legally frivolous." Id.; see also Carter v. Ervin, No. 14-0865, 2014 WL 2468351 (D.S.C. June 2, 2014); Cornelius v. Howell, No. 06-3387, 2007 WL 397449, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2007), report and recommendation adopted, 2007 WL 4952430 (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2007).
Pre-screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is inapplicable in pro se, non-prisoner, fee-paid cases. See Bardes v. Magera, No. 2:08-487-PMD-RSC, 2008 WL 2627134, at *8-10 (D.S.C. June 25, 2008) (finding persuasive the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999) that § 1915(e)(2) is inapplicable to actions that are not pursued in forma pauperis).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that she owns property on Sullivan's Island, South Carolina, which is adjacent to property "titled in the name of Granuaile, LLC, and/or J. P. Walsh and/or L. Walsh." Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 3. She asserts that this Court has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, because there is complete diversity of citizenship (Plaintiff is a citizen of South Carolina, and Defendants are citizens of Ohio) and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. at 1-3. Plaintiff pleads claims, pursuant to South Carolina law, for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and unjust enrichment.
Plaintiff previously filed an action (the Prior Action) against these same Defendants, specifically Granuaile, LLC; James P. Walsh, individually and as related to Granuaile LLC; and L. Walsh, individually and as related to Granuaile LLC). See Holmes v. Granuaile LLC, et al., No. CV 2:16-3969-BHH, 2019 WL 350391 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2019), aff'd, 778 F. App'x 222 (4th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in the Prior Action, which is nearly identical to the Complaint in this case, in which she alleged the same claims for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and unjust enrichment concerning a dispute as to the property adjacent to Plaintiff's property. Compare ECF No. 1, with Holmes, No. CV 2:16-3969-BHH at ECF No. 36. The motion for summary judgment of the defendants in the Prior Action was granted, and Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied. Holmes, supra. at ECF Nos. 129, 138. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. Holmes v. Granuaile, LLC, et al., 778 F. App'x 222 (4th Cir. 2019).
The Court found that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to present any evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to her claims: "(a) that the construction of the driveway on the neighboring property caused an unreasonable interference with Plaintiff's use and enjoyment of her property; (b) that the Defendants were negligent in the construction of the driveway; (c) that the construction of the driveway resulted in an unlawful trespass by Defendants onto Plaintiff's property; or (d) that the construction of the driveway unjustly enriched Defendants by causing a reduction in the value of her property." Holmes v. Granuaile LLC, 2019 WL 350391, at *2.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). Even so, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that a court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions"). In this instance, Plaintiff has not set forth a cognizable claim because her Complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
"Res judicata is applied to prevent the re-litigation of claims, and thus prevent the unsettling of a prior judgment, whether by increasing or decreasing the award or by reversing the result." In re Heckert, 272 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 2001); Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1057 (4th Cir. 1991). For the doctrine of res judicata to be applicable, there must be: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit; (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and later suit; and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the two suits. Martin v. Am. Bancorp. Ret. Plan, 407 F.3d 643, 650 (4th Cir. 2005); Nash Cnty Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 1981). Further, res judicata not only bars claims that were raised and fully litigated, but also "'prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.'" Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc. v. E. Auto Distributors, Inc., 892 F.2d 355, 359 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979)); see also Meekins, 946 F.2d at 1057.
Here, there was a final judgment on the merits in the Prior Action, the causes of action in the Prior Action and this lawsuit are the same, and the identity of parties is the same in the two lawsuits. See Complaint, ECF No. 1; Holmes v. Granuaile, LLC, et al., No. CV 2:16-3969-BHH. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to bar Plaintiff's claims, and the present lawsuit is subject to summary dismissal as it is frivolous. See Brown v. South Carolina, No. 3:13-2983-MBS-PJG, 2014 WL 4826152, *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2014) (determining that because pro se litigant had filed another case reasserting the same claims against the same parties as in a prior case, "all three elements of res judicata have been met, subjecting Plaintiff's action to summary dismissal as frivolous"], aff'd, 589 F. App'x 190 (4th Cir. 2015). "[D]istrict courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits." Cottle v. Bell, No. 00-6367, 2000 WL 1144623, *1 (4th Cir. Aug.14, 2000); see also MacKinnon v. City of N.Y., 580 F. App'x 44 (2d Cir. 2014) ("[w]e have regularly upheld a district court's authority to dismiss sua sponte a pro se complaint on res judicata grounds"), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 2316 (2015); Paul v. de Holczer, No. 3:15-2178-CMC-PJG, 2015 WL 4545974, *6 (D.S.C. July 28, 2015)(holding that "repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action" may be dismissed as frivolous), aff'd, 631 F. App'x 197 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2016).
III. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court summarily DISMISS the above-captioned case without prejudice. See Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App'x at 406; Fitzgerald, 221 F.3d at 363-64.
Plaintiff is advised that this Report and Recommendation constitutes notice to her of material defects in her filing. Additionally, Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Plaintiff should note that if she attempts to amend her complaint, she must file a complete, proposed amended complaint. "A plaintiff may not amend a complaint in piecemeal fashion by merely submitting additional factual allegations." McClary v. Searles, No. 3:15-cv-77-FDW, 2015 WL 2259312, at *1 n. 1 (W.D.N.C. May 13, 2015). Additionally, an amended complaint replaces the original complaint and should be complete in itself. See Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001)("As a general rule, an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.")(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
/s/_________
Molly H. Cherry
United States Magistrate Judge August 5, 2020
Charleston, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).