Holmes v. Finney

21 Citing cases

  1. Martinez v. Winner

    548 F. Supp. 278 (D. Colo. 1982)   Cited 25 times
    Dismissing civil rights claims against federal agencies

    "[I]nfringement of some federally protected right independent of § 1985(3) is required for a violation of the conspiracy statute to be demonstrated." Holmes v. Finney, 631 F.2d 150, 154 (10th Cir. 1980).

  2. Lessard v. Cravitz

    No. 16-1351 (10th Cir. Apr. 25, 2017)   Cited 2 times

    Our reasoning also applies to his conspiracy-based claims alleging malicious prosecution. See Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 339-40 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that viability of § 1983-based civil conspiracy claim based on malicious prosecution was contingent on success of underlying malicious prosecution claim), abrogated on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 948-49 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Holmes v. Finney, 631 F.2d 150, 153-54 (10th Cir. 1980) (conspiracy-based claims under § 1985(3) and 1983 require the showing of the violation of an underlying federal right).

  3. Hill v. Ibarra

    954 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1992)   Cited 68 times
    Holding that, under a judgment requiring the father to pay child support, the mother of the child "clearly does have a state-created property right to current child support"

    Section 1983 has been construed to provide a cause of action not only for violations of the Constitution, but also for violations of federal statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980); Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1380 (10th Cir. 1981); Holmes v. Finney, 631 F.2d 150, 154 (10th Cir. 1980). However, there is no cause of action under § 1983 where the underlying statute does not create an enforceable right. Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 1386 (10th Cir. 1989) ("Section 1983 does not provide a remedy if federal law does not create enforceable rights."); see Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1545, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Wright v. Roanoke Redev. Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423, 107 S.Ct. 766, 770, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987).

  4. Dixon v. City of Lawton

    898 F.2d 1443 (10th Cir. 1990)   Cited 332 times
    Holding to establish § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must prove an agreement and an actual deprivation of a constitutional right

    First, § 1983 and § 1985(3) do not create independent substantive rights; they are procedural statutes which provide a remedy for deprivation of existing rights. Great Am. Fed. Sav. Loan v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372, 376, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2349, 2351, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979) (interpreting § 1985(3)); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1916, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979) (interpreting § 1983); Holmes v. Finney, 631 F.2d 150, 154 (10th Cir. 1980). Second, the complaint never mentioned the thirteenth amendment as a basis of liability, see rec. vol.

  5. Owens v. Rush

    654 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981)   Cited 124 times
    Holding that husband's private activities in support of his wife were protected activities and the discharge of the husband for such activities would be unconstitutional

    "[S]ubstantive rights conferred in the 19th Century were not withdrawn, sub silentio, by the subsequent passage of the modern statutes." Great American Fed. S. L. Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 377, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2351, 60 L.Ed.2d 957; see also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 457-61, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1718-1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1019-1020, 39 L.Ed.2d 147; Holmes v. Finney, 631 F.2d 150, 154 (10th Cir.); cf. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 247, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2277, 60 L.Ed.2d 846. Unlike Novotny, such independent substantive rights are here averred to have been violated by retaliating against plaintiff James Owens for the exercise of his own First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to assist his wife in her litigation, in addition to alleged infringement of plaintiffs' rights relating to their Title VII charges.Cf. Briscoe, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 946, 952 (3rd Cir.). Plaintiff James Owens alleged a conspiracy to retaliate against him in violation of Title VII and to deprive him of rights secured to him by the Constitution and laws in violation of §§ 1983 and 1985(c).

  6. Stout v. U.S. ex rel. U.S. Marshal's Serv.

    Case No. 13cv753 WJ/GBW (W.D. Okla. Nov. 4, 2013)   Cited 4 times

    It must then assert that one or more of the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done, "any act in furtherance of the object of (the) conspiracy," whereby another was (4a) "injured in his person or property," or (4b) "deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States."Holmes v. Finney, 631 F.2d 150, 153 (10th Cir. 1980). Section 1985(3) "does not apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others, but rather, only to conspiracies motivated by some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.

  7. Schmidt v. National City Corporation

    No. 3:06-CV-209 (Phillips) (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 17, 2008)   Cited 8 times
    Granting summary judgment against the plaintiffs

    Cinel v. Connick, 15 f.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994). A mere allegation that a conspiracy occurred is not sufficient. Homes v. Finney, 631 F.2d 150 (10th Cir. 1980); Spear v. Town of West Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 68 (2nd Cir. 1992). A complaint must allege an agreement between two or more persons to injure someone by unlawful action under a single plan, that the alleged co-conspirators shared in the general conspiratorial objective, and that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused a constitutional tort.

  8. Harris v. Mullin

    Case No. CIV-05-183-SPS (E.D. Okla. Jul. 13, 2006)

    Thus, any 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) conspiracy claims based on an alleged Eighth Amendment violations by Defendants must likewise fail. See Holmes v. Finney, 631 F.2d 150, 154 (10th Cir. 1980) ("[W]e feel that the Court has indicated that a violation of an independently created right is required. Section 1985(3)". . . by contrast, creates no rights. It is a purely remedial statute, providing a civil cause of action when some otherwise defined federal right — to equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws-is breached by a conspiracy in the manner defined by the section."

  9. Mazloum v. District of Columbia

    442 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006)   Cited 21 times
    Stating that plaintiff's complaint failed to meetHarbury's threshold requirement because it did not provide an underlying cause of action that had been rendered ineffective

    Since plaintiff's cover-up allegations fail to implicate a constitutional right, a conspiracy that has as its purpose the very same non-cognizable cover-up also fails to state a legal claim. See Wiggins v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 458, 467 (D.D.C. 1994) (dismissing § 1985(3) claim where plaintiff failed to allege underlying violation of federal law); Holmes v. Finney, 631 F.2d 150, 154 (10th Cir. 1980) (conspiracy must concern "infringement of some federally protected right independent of § 1985(3) . . . for a violation of the conspiracy statute to be demonstrated"). In other words, the second element of the prima facie case — the purpose of violating a federally protected right — has not been pled, because the Supreme Court has not recognized a boundless constitutional right of access to a judicial forum untethered to the loss of any particular claim and remedy.

  10. Kelley v. City of Albuquerque

    375 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D.N.M. 2004)   Cited 57 times
    Finding dispute of material fact on summary judgment when employee was forced to resign when faced with threat of termination

    In addition, for a § 1985 violation, the Tenth Circuit has held "that infringement of some federally protected right independent of § 1985(3) is required for a violation of the conspiracy statute to be demonstrated." Holmes v. Finney, 631 F.2d 150, 154 (10th Cir. 1980) ("Section 1985(3) . . . creates no rights. It is a purely remedial statute, providing a civil cause of action when some otherwise defined federal right-to equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws-is breached by a conspiracy in the manner defined by the section.") (internal quotations omitted). Because the Court has already determined there was no underlying constitutional violation — resulting in the absence of the "an essential element of the conspiracy claim," Thompson v. City of Lawrence, Kan., 58 F.3d at 1517, — the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Kelley's conspiracy claims.