Opinion
LLIFA954015038S
05-17-2016
Michelle Holly v. Terry Holly
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Elizabeth A. Gallagher, Judge Trial Referee.
The plaintiff, Michelle Holly, and the defendant, Terry Holly, were married, and on May 29, 1996, a judgment of dissolution was entered by the court, Hull, J. From 1996 to the present date, the Bureau of Child Support Enforcement Services (Support Enforcement), a Title IV-D agency, assisted the plaintiff in collecting overdue child support payments. During that time, Support Enforcement also engaged in enforcing an additional, separate interstate child support order for Julia Holly, the mother of the defendant's other child, who is not a party to this action.
Julia Holly v. Terry Holly, Interstate docket #652-11-13.
On September 19, 2013, the defendant injured his knee at his workplace. He filed a claim against his employer for workers' compensation benefits, and Support Enforcement intervened as an interested party.
On October 1, 2014, Support Enforcement filed a contempt citation and application for income withholding (#112) (contempt citation) against the defendant for $22,060.56 owed in child support in the present case.
As of April 29, 20016, the arrearage in the instant case is $20,461.85, and the arrearage in the Interstate case is $59,905.98.
The Workers' Compensation Commission held a hearing on November 24, 2014, and the defendant was awarded $1,942.48 in workers' compensation benefits. Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-362d, Support Enforcement acquired a lien against the defendant's workers' compensation settlement.
On March 2, 2015, the court, Schulman, F.S.M., ordered that the defendant pay the lump sum of approximately $1,942.48 to the plaintiff on or before the next court date scheduled for April 20, 2015 (#120).
On April 20, 2015, the defendant and Support Enforcement appeared before the court, Schulman, F.S.M, and the following exchange occurred: " [Support Enforcement]: The balance owed to [the plaintiff] is $21,866.23. [The defendant] does have another case, it's an interstate case so it charges monthly with current support. So the way it's splitting, most of the payment is going to the other order . . . And the $2,000 lump sum that was . . . going to be a lien, we do have a letter from his attorney, we just haven't received [the lump sum] yet." Tr., April 20, 2015, p. 3. " [The Court]: [B]ut is this gonna split or is it exclusively for this case? I don't want it splitting." Tr., April 20, 2015, p. 4. " [Support Enforcement]: That, I would have to contact Department of Social Services, I would have to talk to the worker, and as I said she's not there right now." Id. " [The Court]: Okay, well I'm ordering . . . then it should be applied to this case." Id. As a result, the court, Schulman, F.S.M., ordered: " Lump sum of approximately $1942.48 secured by a lien letter. The defendant has another case, but the entire lien amount is to be applied to this case only as a lump sum payment." (#221.)
On May 1, 2015, the State of Connecticut (State) filed an appeal, challenging the court's April 20 order. The State, in its petition for appeal, argues that: (1) the court's April 20 order was in violation of federal and state statutory provisions, which requires Support Enforcement to allocate support amounts amongst all open child support orders; (2) the court's April 20 order was in excess of statutory authority and an abuse of discretion because the court's order favoring one open child support order, at the expense of another, is a clear violation of controlling federal and state statutes; and (3) the court's April 20 order, directing Support Enforcement to apply all of the proceeds to one party's open child support order and to the detriment of the other party's open child support order without notice or an opportunity to be heard, constituted a violation of due process.
On December 18, 2015, the court, Gallagher, J., issued an interim order regarding the appeal. The court requested that the State file a brief addressing the issue of its standing to file an appeal from an order made in a case in which it was not an aggrieved party, and in which the aggrieved party did not take an appeal. The State filed a brief on January 19, 2016.
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDING
" If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause . . . Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented . . . These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy . . . The requirement of directness between the injuries claimed by the plaintiff and the conduct of the defendant also is expressed, in our standing jurisprudence, by the focus on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to assert the claim at issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 429-30, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).
" Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory . . . Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share . . . Second, the party must also show that the [alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest . . . Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 430-31.
In order to determine whether the State has standing to appeal the court's April 20 order, it is necessary to address the origin and responsibilities of Support Enforcement. Title IV requires that individual states establish procedures to improve the effectiveness of child support enforcement, which is known as the Title IV-D program. See Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 713-14, 595 A.2d 297 (1991). Pursuant to this legislative requirement, the State enacted the Family Support Magistrate's Act, and in accordance with that act, Support Enforcement, a Title IV-D agency, was created as a branch of the Connecticut Department of Social Services. See General Statutes § § 46b-231 through 46b-236; see also General Statutes § 17b-179. Section 46b-231(s) provides in relevant part: " Support enforcement officers of Support Enforcement Services of the Superior Court shall : (1) Supervise the payment of any child or spousal support order in IV-D support cases . . . Supervision of such orders is defined as the utilization of all procedures available by law to collect child . . . support . . . including (A) issuance and implementation of income withholdings ordered by . . . a family support magistrate . . . (D) if necessary, bringing an application for contempt to a family support magistrate and, in connection with such application, issuing an order requiring the obligor to appear before a family support magistrate to show cause why such obligor should not be held in contempt for failure to pay an order for child . . . support entered by . . . a family support magistrate . . . (4) Review child support orders (A) in . . . IV-D support cases . . . (C) as necessary to comply with federal requirements for the child support enforcement program mandated by Title IV-D . . ." (Emphasis added.)
" The . . . Family Support Magistrate's Act . . . was first enacted . . . in response to federal legislation providing federal funds for states that complied with federal requirements for the expeditious enforcement of child support orders in cases arising under Title IV-D." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sierra v. Lozada, 31 Conn.App. 114, 117, 623 A.2d 1045 (1993).
Additionally, § 52-362d, which grants Support Enforcement the authority to impose liens against property of the noncustodial parent for unpaid child support, forms " one component of a comprehensive child support enforcement plan mandated by Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq." Jarmon v. Commissioner of Social Services, 47 Conn.Supp. 492, 497, 807 A.2d 1109 (2002) . Section 52-362d (a) provides in relevant part: " Whenever an order of . . . a family support magistrate for support of a minor child or children is issued and such payments have been ordered to be made to the state acting by and through the IV-D agency and the person against whom such support order was issued owes past-due support in the amount of five hundred dollars or more, the state shall have a lien on any property, real or personal, in which such person has an interest to enforce payment of such past-due support." According to § 52-362d(f): " Support collected pursuant to this section shall be distributed as required by Title IV-D . . ." Further, Title IV-D requires in relevant part that " [i]f there is more than one notice for withholding against a single noncustodial parent, the State must allocate amounts available for withholding giving priority to current support . . . in no case shall the allocation result in a withholding for one of the support obligations not being implemented." (Emphasis added.) 45 C.F.R. § 303.100(a)(5).
As part of the State's duties, the Attorney General is responsible for representing Support Enforcement in Title IV-D support cases. See General Statutes § § 46b-231(t) and 17b-179. Section 46b-231(t) provides in relevant part: " The Attorney General shall . . . (3) Represent the IV-D agency in providing support enforcement services in . . . IV-D support cases . . ."
Pursuant to this statute, the State becomes and remains a party in dissolution actions if any party to the action is receiving support enforcement services pursuant to Title IV-D. See General Statutes § 46b-55(a). With this background and these principles now in mind, the court turns to the issue of standing.
" The purpose of statutory standing in IV-D cases is to insure the State and the children's interests." In re Miriam A., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CP-11-002826-A (September 2, 2011, Sommer, J.) (52 Conn. L. Rptr. 587, 592). In Testa v. Geressy, 286 Conn. 291, 293, 943 A.2d 1075 (2008), the Connecticut Supreme Court analyzed the issue of statutory standing in a Title IV-D case, in which the State attempted to appear before the family support magistrate to enforce an interstate child, support order. An Illinois child support order was registered in Connecticut, and the plaintiff, Steven Testa, filed a motion to vacate the registration and enforcement of the order. Id. The family support magistrate granted the motion to vacate and terminated any enforcement of the Illinois order, and the State subsequently appealed to the trial court. Id., 298-99. The plaintiff flied a motion to dismiss the State's appeal, arguing that the State and Support Enforcement lacked standing to appear in the action. Id., 299. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss and remanded it to the family support magistrate, concluding that " since the State is providing necessary legal services to Support Enforcement . . . in seeking to enforce a child support order, pursuant to General Statutes § § 46b-212a(21) and 46b-212t(a), both the State and Support Enforcement . . . have the statutory authority to appear . . . in this action." Id. On remand, the family support magistrate agreed with the trial court on the issue of standing, and denied the plaintiff's motion to vacate. Id., 302. The plaintiff subsequently filed an appeal to the Appellate Court, and it was eventually transferred to the Supreme Court. Id., 303-04.
Section 46b-212a(21) provides in relevant part:
" Support enforcement agency" means a public official or agency authorized to seek: (A) Enforcement of support orders or laws relating to the duty of support; (B) establishment or modification of child support; (C) determination of paternity; or (D) the location of obligors or their assets.Section 46b-212t(a) provides in relevant part:
The Attorney General shall provide necessary legal services on behalf of the support enforcement agency in providing services to a petitioner under sections 46b-212 . . .
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in affirming the decisions of the family support magistrate and the trial court, considered the statutory language of § § 46b-231(s) and 46b-213f and concluded that the language of those statutes " plainly and unambiguously provides Support Enforcement . . . with statutory authorization to assist the defendant in seeking enforcement of the 1990 [child support] order." Id., 309. The Court also concluded that, " the unambiguous text of both § § 46b-212t(a) and 46b-231(t)(2) gives the State express statutory authority to provide legal services on behalf of Support Enforcement . . . in assisting the defendant in this action." Id., 310. In sum, the Supreme Court held that the State had statutory standing to file an appeal pursuant to the aforementioned statutes, and therefore, it did not have to address the issue of whether the State had been classically aggrieved. Id., 312-13.
Section 46b-231(s) provides in relevant part:
Support enforcement officers of Support Enforcement Services of the Superior Court shall . . . (2) enforce foreign support orders registered with the Family Support Magistrate Division . . . and file agreements for support with the assistant clerk of the Family Support Magistrate Division . . .Section 46b-213f provides in relevant part:
(a) A party seeking to enforce a support order or an income withholding order, or both, issued by a tribunal of another state may send the documents required for registering the order to Support Enforcement Services. (b) Upon receipt of the documents, Support Enforcement Services, with the assistance of the Bureau of Child Support Enforcement within the Department of Social Services, as appropriate . . . shall consider and, if appropriate, use any administrative procedure authorized by the law of this state to enforce a support order or an income withholding order, or both.
Similar to the court in Testa, this court concludes that the language of § § 46b-231(s)(1) and (4), and 52-362d (a) and (f), are applicable to the present case, and plainly and unambiguously provide Support Enforcement with the statutory authorization to assist parties in seeking enforcement of their Title IV-D child support orders. This statutory authorization includes allocating the defendant's workers' compensation settlement amongst his two open Title IV-D child support orders, which Support Enforcement attempted to do in order to remain in compliance with 45 C.F.R. § 303.100(a)(5) and § 52-362d(f).
Additionally, this court concludes that the unambiguous language of both § § 46b-231(t)(3) and § 46b-55(a) gives the State express statutory authority to provide legal services on behalf of Support Enforcement. Therefore, on the basis of on the authority granted to Support Enforcement pursuant to the aforementioned statutes, both the Attorney General and Support Enforcement, by way of the State, have statutory standing to appeal the court's April 20 order.
Like Testa, this court has concluded that the State has statutory standing to appeal the court's April 20 order, and therefore, this court does not find it necessary to address whether the State has been " classically aggrieved."
FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
The State argues that the Family Support Magistrate's order, requiring Support Enforcement to apply all of the proceeds received from the defendant's workers' compensation settlement to only the child support order in the present case and not allocate it amongst both open Title IV-D child support orders, was a clear violation of § 52-362d(f) and Title IV-D, specifically as interpreted by 45 C.F.R. § 303.100(a)(5). The State contends that those two statutory provisions require Support Enforcement to allocate, divide, and distribute lien proceeds amongst all open child support orders.
Section 52-362d(f) provides: " Support collected pursuant to this section shall be distributed as required by Title IV-D of the Social Security Act." Title IV-D requires in relevant part that: " If there is more than one notice for withholding against a single noncustodial parent, the State must allocate amounts available for withholding giving priority to current support . . . in no case shall the allocation result in a withholding for one of the support obligations not being implemented." (Emphasis added.) 45 C.F.R. § 303.100(a)(5).
On the basis of the plain language of 45 C.F.R. § 303.100(a)(5), it stands to reason that the legislature chose to use the word " must" to indicate that the State is required to allocate amounts available for withholding amongst all open child support orders. Therefore, the State does not have the discretion to allocate amounts withheld to one open child support order and not the other. As a result, the Family Support Magistrate's April 20 order directing Support Enforcement to apply the $1,942.48 to the present case only is in violation of § 52-362d(f) and 45 C.F.R. § 303.100(a)(5).
CONCLUSION
Both federal and state law require a division of the defendant's available funds for withholding amongst all his open child support orders. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the court, Schulman, F.S.M., with direction to divide the defendant's workers' compensation settlement amongst both open Title IV-D child support orders.