From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Holloway v. Station Bar Corp.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Dec 18, 2013
112 A.D.3d 784 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)

Opinion

2013-12-18

Kyana HOLLOWAY, appellant, v. STATION BAR CORP., etc., respondent.

Sim & Record, LLP, Bayside, N.Y. (Sang J. Sim of counsel), for appellant. Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Nicholas Hurzeler of counsel), for respondent.



Sim & Record, LLP, Bayside, N.Y. (Sang J. Sim of counsel), for appellant. Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Nicholas Hurzeler of counsel), for respondent.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, PLUMMER E. LOTT, and LEONARD B. AUSTIN, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Partnow, J.), dated November 27, 2012, as granted that branch of her motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 only to the extent of precluding the defendant from offering any testimony at trial from two of its employees named “Juan” and “Jose.”

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

As a sanction against a party who “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed,” a court may issue an order, inter alia, “prohibiting the disobedient party ... from producing in evidence designated things or items of testimony” or “striking out pleadings” (CPLR 3126[2], [3] ). A court may invoke the drastic remedy of striking a pleading, however, only upon a clear showing that the failure to comply with court-ordered discovery was willful and contumacious ( see Facey v. Silver Express Cab Corp., 87 A.D.3d 1053, 929 N.Y.S.2d 755; Patel v. DeLeon, 43 A.D.3d 432, 433, 840 N.Y.S.2d 632; Williams v. Ryder TRS, Inc., 29 A.D.3d 784, 785, 816 N.Y.S.2d 126). Here, the record does not support a finding that the defendant willfully and contumaciously failed to produce for depositions two of its former employees identified only as “Juan” and “Jose.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 only to the extent of precluding the defendant from calling “Juan” and “Jose” as witnesses at trial ( see Viteritti v. Gelfand, 289 A.D.2d 566, 567, 735 N.Y.S.2d 801).

The plaintiff's remaining contention is without merit.


Summaries of

Holloway v. Station Bar Corp.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Dec 18, 2013
112 A.D.3d 784 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)
Case details for

Holloway v. Station Bar Corp.

Case Details

Full title:Kyana HOLLOWAY, appellant, v. STATION BAR CORP., etc., respondent.

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Date published: Dec 18, 2013

Citations

112 A.D.3d 784 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)
112 A.D.3d 784
2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 8408

Citing Cases

Gripe Serv. v. PUR PAC Inc.

3 (2d Dep't 1986) (where hospital personnel having knowledge of case were no longer employed there, hospital…

Romano v. Persky

However, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs'…