Opinion
NO. 2012 CA 0754
12-21-2012
SHARON HOLLOWAY v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, RAYBURN CORRECTIONAL CENTER
Sharon Holloway Bogalusa, Louisiana Plaintiff/Appellant Pro Se Susan Wall Griffin Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Department of Public Safety and Corrections
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from a
Decision of the State Civil Service Commission
Docket No. S-17187
The Honorable David Duplantier, Chairman
Shannon S. Templet, Director
Sharon Holloway
Bogalusa, Louisiana
Plaintiff/Appellant
Pro Se
Susan Wall Griffin
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
Department of Public Safety
and Corrections
BEFORE: CARTER, C.J., GUIDRY, AND GAIDRY, JJ.
GAIDRY , J.
In this case, a former civil service employee appeals the decision of the Civil Service Commission Referee upholding her termination. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Sharon Holloway, was a permanent employee of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("DPSC") at the Rayburn Correctional Center ("RCC"). Ms. Holloway had been employed at RCC since February 4, 1991. Over the course of her employment, she was written up for rule violations at least eight times, resulting in disciplinary action including suspensions of up to twenty days and a year-long demotion to cadet. She was terminated from her employment following a March 11, 2011 off-duty exchange of offensive and derogatory text messages with a coworker.
An investigation was conducted into Ms. Holloway's possible violations of the Employee Code of Conduct after her coworker informed the administration at RCC of the offensive text messages she received from Ms. Holloway. Ms. Holloway denied ever sending the text messages and claimed that her adult daughter sent the messages from her phone. The investigation ultimately led to a finding that Ms. Holloway, and not her daughter, sent the text messages.
Ms. Holloway also claimed that the phone used to send the text messages belonged to her father and not her.
Ms. Holloway was issued a rule violation report citing her with violations of Department Regulation #A-02-010, entitled "Sexual Harassment," for creating a hostile work environment with her texts, and Department Regulation #A-05-011, entitled "Social Networking," for engaging in cyber harassment of an employee by text messages. After an initial review hearing, it was recommended that Ms. Holloway be dismissed from her employment based upon the seriousness of the offenses, as well as the fact that she had been written up at least eight times in the past. A second level hearing was held at Ms. Holloway's request, after which it was again concluded that Ms. Holloway, and not her daughter, sent the text messages. This conclusion was based upon a number of facts: the texts were sent in first-person style, the texts were sent from the cell phone number listed in Ms. Holloway's employee contact information, and a polygraph examination showed deception in Ms. Holloway's statement that her daughter sent the texts. The deputy warden concurred with the recommendation of dismissal. Ms. Holloway was finally informed via a June 16, 2011 letter from the warden of RCC that she was being dismissed from her position effective June 20, 2011, as a result of the rule violations stemming from the March 11, 2011 text messages.
Ms. Holloway appealed her dismissal to the Civil Service Commission, arguing that she did not commit any rule violations and that the penalty of dismissal was too harsh. A hearing was held before a Civil Service Referee, after which the referee issued a decision concluding that Ms. Holloway did in fact send the text messages, that the text messages and Ms. Holloway's actions in lying about sending them constituted rule violations, and that the penalty of dismissal was commensurate with the offenses, particularly in view of Ms. Holloway's extensive prior disciplinary record. Ms. Holloway has appealed the decision of the referee to this court.
DISCUSSION
Generally, decisions of Civil Service Commission Referees are subject to the same standard of review as decisions of the Commission itself. Decisions of the Commission are subject to the same standard of review as a decision of a district court. Lasserre v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 2004-0615, (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/8/05), 903 So.2d 474, 477.
In Bannister v. Department of Streets, 95-040 (La. 1/16/96), 666 So.2d 641, 647 (cited with approval in Lange v. Orleans Levee District, 2010-0140 (La. 11/30/10), 56 So.3d 925), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
In civil service disciplinary cases, an appellate court is presented with a multifaceted review function. Walters v. Department of Police of the City of New Orleans, 454 So.2d 106 (La. 1984). First, as in other civil matters, deference will be given to the factual conclusions of the Commission. Ld.; Newman [v. Department of Fire, 425 So.2d 753 (La. 1983)]. Hence, in deciding whether to affirm the Commission's factual findings, a reviewing court should apply the clearly wrong or manifest error rule prescribed generally for appellate review. Walters, supra; see also Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La. 1978)....
Second, in evaluating the Commission's determination as to whether the disciplinary action is both based on legal cause and commensurate with the infraction, the court should not modify the Commission's order unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion. Walters, supra; Newman, supra; cf. La. R.S. 49:964. "Arbitrary or capricious" means the absence of a rational basis for the action taken. Shields v. City of Shreveport, 579 So.2d 961 (La. 1991), citing Bicknell v. United States, 422 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1970).
Thus, in determining whether an action of the Commission is based on legal cause and the articulated punishment is commensurate with the infraction, a reviewing court should not modify an order of the Commission unless such order is arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion. Lange, 56 So.3d at 934. "Cause" for termination of an employee includes conduct prejudicial to the public service involved or detrimental to its efficient operation. Id. Since "arbitrary or capricious" means the absence of a rational basis for the action taken, each case must be decided on its own facts with substantial deference afforded to the appointing authority. Deference must also be given to the factual conclusions of the Commission. Bannister, 666 So.2d at 647.
Reviewing the record before us, we cannot say that the Referee's factual conclusion that Ms. Holloway, and not her daughter, sent the offensive texts was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Further, we agree that Ms. Holloway's conduct violated the rules against sexual harassment and cyber harassment of a coworker, and that this prohibited conduct was prejudicial to the public service involved or detrimental to its efficient operation. As such, cause existed for her termination and the penalty of dismissal was commensurate with the offense. Therefore, the Commission's action in upholding the termination was not arbitrary or capricious.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Civil Service Commission Referee is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff, Sharon Holloway.
AFFIRMED.