Opinion
No. 01-08-00094-CV
Opinion issued May 28, 2009.
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 907809.
Panel consists of Justices JENNINGS, KEYES, and HIGLEY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Melvin Holloway ("Holloway") appeals from a county court judgment awarding possession of real property to appellee Bank of New York in a forcible entry and detainer action. In his sole issue, Holloway argues that Bank of New York engaged in wrongful foreclosure of his property, thereby depriving him of rightful possession of his property.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Background
On October 3, 2007, Bank of New York filed a forcible entry and detainer action in Harris County Justice Court, Precinct No. 7, Position No. 1 against appellant Holloway to obtain possession of real property located at 12123 Carrswold Drive in Houston Texas ("Property"). Holloway was both tenant and mortgagor of the property; Bank of New York acquired title to the property through a non-judicial foreclosure sale. The justice court ruled in favor of Bank of New York and gave it possession of the property.
Holloway timely appealed to the County Civil Court No. 2 in Harris County. The trial commenced on February 4, 2008. The trial court granted judgment to Bank of New York, declaring that Bank of New York "is entitled to and shall have judgment against Defendants Melvin Holloway and all other occupants of the Premises for possession of the Premises and that, in the event Defendants and all other occupants of the Premises do not vacate the Premises on or before February 15, 2008, a writ of possession shall issue to enforce this judgment and such [other] writs as are necessary to enforce this judgment shall issue." On February 7, 2008, Holloway filed his notice of appeal.
Waiver
In his sole issue, Holloway argues that Bank of New York engaged in wrongful foreclosure of his property, thereby depriving him of rightful possession of his property. However, Holloway's brief does not contain any discussion of the facts of the case. Nor does his brief contain any legal authority for his arguments.
This issue is inadequately briefed and is, therefore, waived. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h); see also Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling USA, 106 S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex.App. 2002, pet. denied) (stating that Rule 38 requires appellant to provide reviewing court "with such discussion of the facts and the authorities relied upon as may be requisite to maintain the point at issue").
Texas courts have held that "pro se litigants are not exempt from the rules of procedure" and that a "pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure." Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978); Holt v. F. F. Enterprises, 990 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex.App. 1998, pet. denied). To do otherwise would "be to give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is represented by counsel." Holt, 990 S.W.2d at 759.
We overrule Holloway's sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.