Opinion
C/A No. 6:20-cv-04472-JMC-KFM
04-05-2021
Kevin Chance Hollis, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Palmer, Captain Toth, Mental Health Counselor Phillips, Mr. Holbrooks, Warden Stonebreaker, Major Graves, Ms. Stronge, Ms. Harper, Ms. Byrd, Captain Harouff, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on December 28, 2020 (doc. 1). On March 8, 2021, the undersigned issued an order informing the plaintiff that his complaint was subject to dismissal as drafted and providing him with time to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies noted in the order (doc. 13). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that his claims be dismissed (id. at 11). The plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided; accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the instant matter be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC") and located at Broad River Correctional Institution, brings this action regarding his placement on Security Detention ("SD") status at Evans Correctional Institution ("Evans") and Perry Correctional Institution ("Perry") (doc. 1).
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants have violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as SCDC policy regarding placement of inmates on SD status (id. at 4, 12). He contends that following some sort of altercation at Evans, he was placed on SD status, although there was no evidence or charges served on him (id. at 5, 8). The plaintiff contends that being placed on SD status affected his mental health because he is classified as a "mental ill inmate," although that classification allegedly violates the South Carolina Constitution (id. at 5). The plaintiff further contends that he is being denied medical treatment in violation of the South Carolina Constitution (id. at 5-6). The plaintiff alleges that Maj. Graves and Warden Stonebreaker directed that he be placed in a holding cell on February 5, 2020 (id. at 8, 9). The plaintiff was then quickly transferred to Perry (id. at 9). At some point, the plaintiff alleges he discovered that Deputy Warden Palmer was investigating his involvement in an event that occurred at Evans (id.).
After being placed on SD status in the Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU"), the plaintiff had two hearings regarding his custody status, wherein he sought a return to general population because he had not been charged in relation to the event at Evans (id. at 8, 10). The first hearing took place on February 20, 2020, and the second hearing took place on March 5, 2020 (id.). The plaintiff contends that Capt. Harouff notified him that Deputy Warden Palmer requested the second hearing because of the plaintiff's behavior since being placed in the RHU (id. at 10). At the second hearing, Deputy Warden Palmer, Capt. Toth, Classification Officer Holbrooks, and Counselor Phillips determined that the plaintiff should remain on SD status (id. at 10, 12-13). The plaintiff filed a grievance after the March 5, 2020, hearing, allegedly presenting evidence of his innocence and requesting that video evidence be reviewed (id. at 12-13). After the plaintiff filed his grievance, the defendants changed their reason for keeping him on SD status, indicating that the plaintiff was on SD status because he had three disciplinary offenses within a year (id. at 11). While placed on SD status, the plaintiff requested mental health treatment, alleging both that his request was denied as well as that Ms. Stronge and Ms. Harper came to provide the plaintiff with mental health treatment (id. at 9-10).
For injuries, the plaintiff alleges a mental breakdown (id. at 14). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages, a declaration that the defendants violated the plaintiff's rights under the South Carolina Constitution, and an order from this court requiring SCDC to provide better treatment for mentally ill inmates (id. at 11, 14).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c)), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the defendants when he was falsely imprisoned and placed on SD status without receiving a disciplinary charge (doc. 1 at 4, 11, 12, 13). To state a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process. See Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). First, to the extent the plaintiff seeks damages based upon his custody classification, seeking transfer to a different custody level, the claim is subject to dismissal because prisoners generally do not have a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in a particular security classification or prison placement. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (finding no constitutional right under the due process clause to a particular security classification or prison placement), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Indeed, as noted by the Supreme Court, a change in a prisoner's conditions of confinement only gives rise to a federally-protected liberty interest if it "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483, 485 (finding no liberty interest when inmate placed in segregated confinement). Here, the plaintiff's complaint does not allege an atypical or significant hardship. Moreover, even if the plaintiff had asserted a protected liberty interest, he has not plausibly alleged that the deprivation of his protected liberty interest has been without due process. See Griffith v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., C/A No. 2:12-cv-00239-DCN, 2012 WL 2048200, at *1 (D.S.C. June 6, 2012) (finding that the plausibility standard requires more than "'an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'" (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))). Indeed, the crux of the plaintiff's claim appears to be that the defendants (many of whom voted to place him on SD status) made the wrong decision in placing him on SD status, not that he was denied a hearing/proceeding regarding his custody status. Moreover, the plaintiff's complaint and attached exhibits make it clear that the plaintiff's custody status has been reviewed at least three times, with at least two separate hearings (see docs. 1 at 5, 8, 9-13; 1-1). As such, the plaintiff's due process claim is subject to summary dismissal.
Additionally, to the extent the plaintiff's complaint can be construed as asserting an equal protection claim against the defendants, such a claim is also subject to summary dismissal. An equal protection claim requires demonstration that the plaintiff was "treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination." Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). After making such a showing, the court determines whether the disparity in treatment is justified under the appropriate level of scrutiny. Id. Here, however, the plaintiff has not plausibly alleged how he was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates and his complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendants' actions in placing him on SD status were the result of discrimination or exhibited a discriminatory purpose. As such, the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims are subject to summary dismissal.
Conditions of Confinement Claims
Liberally construed, the plaintiff's complaint also appears to assert conditions on confinement claims relating to his belongings being thrown on the floor following a search of his cell, and that being on SD status is cruel and unusual punishment (see doc. 1). The Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment regarding the conditions of his confinement, a prisoner must prove that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that significant physical or emotional injury resulted from it, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
As an initial matter, the plaintiff's only asserted injury is emotional distress and mental anguish; however, there is no federal constitutional right to be free from emotional distress, mental anguish, or psychological stress. See Williams v. Pruitt, C/A No. 8:13-cv-01812-JMC, 2013 WL 4500436, at *2 n.2 (citing Grandstaff v. City of Borger, Tex., 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987); Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899, 903 (1st Cir. 1989)). As such, the plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal because he has failed to allege a constitutionally cognizable injury.
Nevertheless, even presuming a cognizable injury, the plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations that his property was thrown on the floor when his cell was searched does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298) (noting that the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only deprivations which deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to provide the basis of a § 1983 claim); Thompson v. Brown, C/A No. 3:11-cv-318-TMC-JRM, 2011 WL 6012592, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2011) (rejecting conditions of confinement claim where the plaintiff claimed "his mattress and blanket were confiscated for six days, he was not allowed to have any toilet tissue for six days, his clothes were taken away from him for six days, his cell was cold, he had no running water in his cell, and he was forced to sleep on a steel cot for six days"), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 6012550 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2011). Moreover, the plaintiff's allegations that being on SD status constitutes cruel and unusual punishment likewise fails to state a constitutional claim because the plaintiff does not have a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in a particular security classification or prison placement, and his allegations do not plausibly allege an atypical and significant hardship. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483, 485; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) (noting that the "fact that such detention interferes with the detainee's understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into 'punishment.'").
In addition to the foregoing, the plaintiff's complaint fails to allege facts showing that the defendants are personally involved in the purported deprivations, beyond his assertion that some of them "voted" to place him on SD status. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) ("[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the constitution."); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that an official must be personally involved in the alleged deprivation before liability may be imposed). Additionally, to the extent the plaintiff seeks to hold the defendants liable in some sort of supervisory capacity, the plaintiff's claims are subject to summary dismissal because the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are generally not applicable to § 1983 suits. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."); Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that "Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability" (emphasis in original)). Indeed, to allege a plausible claim requires a showing that the supervisor (1) had actual or constructive knowledge that his/her subordinates engaged in conduct posing a pervasive or unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor's response to the knowledge was "so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;" and (3) an affirmative causal link between the inaction by the supervisor and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Green v. Beck, 539 F. App'x 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff has not alleged how each of the above defendants are personally involved with the plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivations, and his vague and conclusory allegations do not plausibly allege a challenge to an institutional policy. As such, these claims are not cognizable against these defendants in their supervisory capacities under § 1983. See Ford v. Stirling, C.A. No. 2:17-02390-MGL, 2017 WL 4803648, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2017); London v. Maier, C.A. No. 0:10-00434-RBH, 2010 WL 1428832, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2010). Therefore, the plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims are subject to summary dismissal.
Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs Claim
The plaintiff also contends that the defendants have denied him appropriate mental health treatment by placing him on SD status (doc. 1). Not "every claim by a prisoner [alleging] that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the [Constitution]." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). The government is required to provide medical care for incarcerated individuals. Id. at 103. However, to establish deliberate indifference, the treatment "must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness." Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
In order to state a claim, a plaintiff must show a serious medical need as well as that the defendant "knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed." DePaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218-20 (4th Cir. 2016); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-11 (4th Cir. 2017)). A "serious medical need" is a condition "diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Heyer, 849 F.3d at 210 (citation omitted). "Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either actual intent or reckless disregard. A defendant acts recklessly by disregarding a substantial risk of danger that is either known to the defendant or which would be apparent to a reasonable person in the defendant's position." Miltier, 896 F.2d at 851-52 (citation omitted). "It is only such indifference that can offend 'evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. Moreover, disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care do not state a Section 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir.1985).
Here, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. First, as noted, supra, the plaintiff has failed to allege a constitutionally cognizable injury. See supra pp. 6-7. Nevertheless, the plaintiff appears to assert that the defendants, especially Ms. Stronge and Ms. Harper, have failed to provide him appropriate mental health treatment, especially because he has been placed on SD status. However, the plaintiff's allegations regarding mental health treatment rely on the plaintiff's preference for different medical attention than he has received, to which the plaintiff is not constitutionally entitled. See Sharpe v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., 621 F. App'x 732, 733 (4th Cir. 2015) (unpublished per curiam opinion) (noting that "mere disagreement between an inmate and medical staff regarding the proper course of treatment provides no basis for relief" under § 1983 (citing Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975))). Indeed, the plaintiff's own allegations make it clear that once he requested mental health treatment, he was treated by Ms. Stronge and Ms. Harper (see doc. 1). His dissatisfaction with the treatment provided does not state a plausible deliberate indifference claim. As such, the plaintiff's medical indifference claim is subject to summary dismissal.
South Carolina State Law Claims
To the extent the plaintiff's complaint alleges violations of the South Carolina Constitution with respect to adequacy of medical treatment and cruel and unusual punishment, as outlined above with respect to the plaintiff's Section 1983 claims, the plaintiff has failed to state a constitutional claim for relief; as such, the plaintiff's claims that rely on violations of the South Carolina Constitution are likewise subject to summary dismissal.
No Personal Allegations
Defendant Sgt. Byrd does not appear in the plaintiff's complaint beyond the caption and being named as a defendant (see doc. 1). Indeed, it is unclear in what capacity Sgt. Byrd was involved in the plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivations. Although the plaintiff's allegations must be liberally construed, the plaintiff must provide more than general and conclusory statements to allege a plausible claim for relief. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (noting that liability under § 1983 "requires personal involvement"). As such, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted against Sgt. Byrd, and this defendant should be dismissed.
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued March 8, 2021, the undersigned provided the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment (doc. 13). The plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided. Accordingly, in addition to the reasons discussed herein, this action should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x 280, 281 (4th Cir. 2018) (in a case where the district court had already afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, directing the district court on remand to "in its discretion, either afford [the plaintiff] another opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order") (citing Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015)); see also Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2020). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge April 5, 2021
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).