Opinion
Case No. 97 C 6328
January 16, 2002
Ernest N. Powell, Jr., Esq. Chicago, IL Attorney for Plaintiff
Robert A. Egan, Esq. Chicago, IL Attorney for Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Robin Hollis seeks relief from this Court's December 8, 2000 order granting Hollis's Motion for Voluntary Dismissal without prejudice. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41. Hollis asks this Court to grant relief pursuant to clause two or clause six of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
Relief under Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy that is granted only in exceptional circumstances. Provident Sav. Bank v. Popocich, 71 F.3d 696, 698 (7th Cir. 1995). One such circumstance is where the moving party presents "newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2). Another such circumstance is where the moving party presents "any . . . reason [besides the other five enumerated reasons contained in Rule 60(b)] justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). A motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time, and a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) must be made not more than one year after the order was entered. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
First and foremost, we deny Hollis's motion under Rule 60(b)(2) because her motion was filed more than one year after this Court's December 8 order was entered. Hollis filed the instant motion on January 7, 2002. But even if that were not the case, we would deny Hollis's motion under Rule 60(b)(2) on substantive grounds. She has failed to present this Court with any facts to show that her "newly discovered evidence" is actually new. She has also failed to present this Court with any facts to show that she could not have discovered her "newly discovered evidence" with due diligence prior to the entry of this Court's December 8 order. Hollis only provides this Court with the most general statements to support her motion such as "Plaintiff . . . identified new evidentiary matters, and additional, relevant facts." (Pl.'s Mot. Vacate ¶ 3.) General statements of this sort are wholly deficient to support a motion for extraordinary relief under Rule 60(b)(2).
The same problems plague Hollis's motion under Rule 60(b)(6). Because Hollis has failed to present any facts to show that her motion was filed within a reasonable time, we deny Hollis's motion under Rule 60(b)(6) as untimely. Alternatively, we deny Hollis's motion under Rule 60(b)(6) because she has failed to present any facts to show that extraordinary relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is warranted. In this regard, we cannot even discern the basis of Hollis's motion under Rule 60(b)(6).
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For the reasons stated, this Court denies Hollis's Motion to Vacate. We note that neither this order nor this Court's December 8 order precludes Hollis from filing a new lawsuit.