Opinion
2002-07519
Submitted May 13, 2003.
June 2, 2003.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Werner, J.), dated June 11, 2002, which granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and denied her cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Cullen and Dykman Bleakley Platt, LLP, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Kevin C. McCaffrey of counsel), for appellant.
Robert Purzak, Garden City, N.Y., for respondent.
Before: A. GAIL PRUDENTI, P.J., DAVID S. RITTER, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, BARRY A. COZIER, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
A rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on the operator of the moving vehicle to provide a non-negligent explanation for the happening of the accident to rebut the inference of negligence (see Ziminski v. Rosenthal, 276 A.D.2d 790; Lopez v. Minot, 258 A.D.2d 564; Leal v. Wolff, 224 A.D.2d 392).
In instances where the operator of the moving vehicle alleges that the rear-end collision was caused by brake failure, the operator must present evidence demonstrating that the brake problem was unanticipated, and that reasonable care had been exercised to keep the brakes in good working order (see Elgendy v. Pilpel, 303 A.D.2d 446 [2d Dept, Mar. 10, 2003]; Vidal v. Tsitsiashvilli, 297 A.D.2d 638; Schuster v. Amboy Bus Co., 267 A.D.2d 448).
Here, the plaintiff established a prima facie case of negligence by presenting evidence that the defendant's vehicle struck the rear of the vehicle in which she was a passenger while the latter vehicle was stopped for a red light (see Ziminski v. Rosenthal, supra; Lopez v. Minot, supra; Leal v. Wolff, supra). Although the defendant maintained that the rear-end collision was caused by brake failure, the defendant did not submit admissible evidence, and, in any event, did not rebut the inference of negligence, since she failed to submit evidence that the brake problem was unanticipated and that she exercised reasonable care to keep the brakes in good working order (see Elgendy v. Pilpel, supra; Schuster v. Amboy Bus Co., supra; cf. Vidal v. Tsitsiashvilli, supra). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and denied the defendant's cross motion for summary judgment.
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
PRUDENTI, P.J., RITTER, LUCIANO and COZIER, JJ., concur.