Opinion
IP 01-1851C M/S
March 28, 2003
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on defendants', City of Crawfordsville, Kenneth Maynor ("Maynor"), and Hall Utterback ("Utterback") (collectively "Defendants"), motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, Brent Hollingsworth ("Plaintiff"), brought his complaint pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988, the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and for violations of state law. Defendants argue judgment should be entered in their favor and against Plaintiff because probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff, thus his civil rights were not violated and Plaintiff cannot claim false arrest or false imprisonment. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
Maynor's name is incorrectly spelled in the caption.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 27, 2001, Jeremy Teague ("Teague") came to the Crawfordsville Police Department to report that he had been battered by Plaintiff. Statement of Material Facts ("Stmt. of Facts") ¶ 5. Teague specifically told Utterback of the battery, then prepared a statement of his version of the battery. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7. Teague alleged that the previous evening, Plaintiff knocked Teague down in a grocery store parking lot, kicked Teague in the head, and attempted to slam Teague's head against the pavement. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Response to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Response") at 2. Teague did not report any eyewitnesses to the battery. Id. Utterback had the opportunity to observe Teague and determined that Teague had injuries consistent with Teague's version of the battery. Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 8, 9. Thus, Utterback determined that Teague's allegations were credible. Id. ¶ 9. Utterback subsequently prepared a case report of the incident and prepared an affidavit of probable cause with the assistance of a deputy prosecutor. Id. ¶¶ 11, 12. The deputy prosecutor prepared a charging information, which Utterback reviewed and signed. Id. ¶ 14.
On April 10, 2001, Maynor, also an officer with the Crawfordsville Police Department, was dispatched to a bar in Crawfordsville in response to a complaint by the bartender that a male subject was present who had been battered. Id. ¶ 18. The bartender told Maynor that Teague had come downstairs to the bar and stated that his boyfriend had beaten him in Teague's upstairs apartment. Response at 3. Maynor then spoke with Teague, who informed Maynor that Teague's ex-lover had beaten him. Stmt. of Facts ¶ 20. Maynor inspected Teague's apartment and observed signs of a struggle consistent with Teague's allegations. Id. ¶ 21.
Teague subsequently was transported to the hospital, where Maynor spoke with Teague again. Id. ¶ 22, 23. Teague told Maynor that Plaintiff had entered into Teague's apartment without his permission and the two had an altercation. Id. ¶ 23. Maynor photographed Teague's injuries, which included a bump on his forehead, a bleeding scratch on his left leg, and swelling around the torso. Id. ¶ 24. Maynor believed Teague's allegations were credible because he observed that Teague's injuries were consistent with his allegations. Id. ¶ 30. Teague prepared a written statement about the incident. Id. ¶ 25. Subsequently, Maynor prepared a case report and an affidavit of probable cause, with the assistance of a deputy prosecutor. Id. ¶ 26, 27. The deputy prosecutor prepared a charging information, which Maynor reviewed and signed. Id. ¶ 28.
Paragraph 28 of the Statement of Material Facts states that Utterback signed this charging information, but that is a scrivener's error.
There were no eyewitnesses to either alleged battery. Response at 2, 4. Neither Maynor nor Utterback contacted Plaintiff before executing the respective affidavits of probable cause. Id. at 3, 4. Plaintiff notes that the affidavits of probable cause allege the officers "had an occasion to come into contact with the above-named accused [Plaintiff]", that "the accused was investigated" and that "Other witness(es) that corroborate [Teague's] statements are/is Witnesses." Id. at 7, 8. Plaintiff was arrested on March 4, 2001, on a warrant issued upon the motion of the deputy prosecutor. Neither Maynor nor Utterback participated in Plaintiff's arrest. Both criminal proceedings were dismissed upon motion by the State of Indiana, and Plaintiff's arrest records were expunged. Complaint ¶ 8.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Constitutional rights in that no reasonable investigation was made before his arrest, the affidavits of probable cause contained misleading statements, and that as a result of the City of Crawfordsville's "business routine" of making arrests without proper investigation Plaintiff was falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned under color of law. Complaint ¶¶ 16, 17. Plaintiff also brings state law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. Id. ¶ 22.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment is granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A disputed fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law. See id. The moving party has the initial burden to show the absence of genuine issues of material fact. See Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1999); Schroeder v. Barth, Inc., 969 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1992). This burden does not entail producing evidence to negate claims on which the opposing party has the burden of proof. See Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1994). The party opposing a summary judgment motion bears an affirmative burden of presenting evidence that a disputed issue of material fact exists. See Wollin, 192 F.3d at 621.
When considering a summary judgment motion, a court must draw all reasonable inferences "in the light most favorable" to the opposing party. Id. at 621; Thomas Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 291 (7th Cir. 1998); Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1992). If a reasonable fact finder could find for the opposing party, then summary judgment is inappropriate. Stop-N-Go of Madison, Inc. v. Uno-Ven Co., 184 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 1999); Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chi. Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992). When the standard embraced in Rule 56(c) is met, summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Thomas Betts Corp., 138 F.3d at 291; Shields Enters., Inc., 975 F.2d at 1294.
III. DISCUSSION A. MAYNOR AND UTTERBACK ACTED ON PROBABLE CAUSE
Because Maynor and Utterback had probable cause to execute the affidavits of probable cause, Plaintiff has no claim for a violation of his civil rights. Existence of probable cause is an absolute bar to a section 1983 action. Potts v. City of Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106, 1112 (7th Cir. 1997); Williams v. Kobel, 789 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1986); Mark v. Furay, 769 F.2d 1266, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1985). "Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed." Williams, 789 F.2d at 470 (citations omitted).
Here, Teague identified Plaintiff as having battered him. Utterback and Maynor observed physical injuries consistent with Teague's story and Maynor observed indications that a struggle had taken place inside Teague's apartment, which also corroborated Teague's allegations. Teague signed statements of his allegations. These facts provide probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest. Utterback and Maynor had reasonable grounds to believe that Plaintiff had caused Teague's physical injuries.
Plaintiff disputes that Utterback and Maynor made a reasonable investigation into Teague's allegations before securing the arrest warrants. However, further investigation was neither required nor warranted and Utterback's and Maynor's failure to further investigate is not a violation of Plaintiff's rights. "Under the Fourth Amendment arrest standard, considerable uncertainty must be tolerated on occasion because of the need to allow police to take affirmative action in ambiguous circumstances." Holdeman v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 649 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (N.D.Ind. 1986) aff'd, 840 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1988). Probable cause turns on an exercise of judgment, and does not require good police practice or an inquiry that would be necessary to prevail at a criminal trial. Id. While further investigation might be the best recommended police practice, the Constitution does not require it. See id.
Thus, when a policemen arrests a person based on information he/she has received from some person, usually a putative victim or eyewitness, whom it seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth and which information, if true, would justify an arrest, the policeman has probable cause and cannot be held liable for a violation of the Constitution merely because later it turns out the witness was not right or was not telling the truth.
Id.
Moreover, here there was a facially valid warrant, which also generally precludes a claim for civil rights violation under section 1983. See Mark, 769 F.2d at 1268. Plaintiff argues that his rights were violated because Utterback and Maynor included misleading statements in their affidavits of probable cause used to secure the warrant. Plaintiff notes that the affidavits of probable cause allege the officers "had an occasion to come into contact with the above-named accused [Plaintiff]", that "the accused was investigated" and that "Other witness(es) that corroborate [Teague's] statements are/is Witnesses." It is clear from the face of the affidavits that they are forms regularly used by the Crawfordsville Police Department. Further, Maynor has testified that the affidavits are preformatted. Deposition of Kenneth Maynor at 47. The affidavits also contain material, accurate accounts of Teague's allegations. Regardless, it is clear in the Seventh Circuit that probable cause "totally precludes any section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, regardless of whether the defendant had malicious motives for arresting the plaintiff." Mark, 769 F.2d at 1268-69. In other words, even where evidence has been fabricated, which did not happen in this case, no constitutional violation occurred if probable cause existed independent of that false evidence. Smith v. City of Chi., 913 F.2d 469, 473 (7th Cir. 1990). Even without the statements Plaintiff claims are misleading, probable cause existed based on the affidavits' specific accounts of the incidents. There is no issue of material fact that Utterback and Maynor met the threshold requirement of probable cause.
B. CRAWFORDSVILLE IS NOT LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Because Plaintiff has failed to raise a disputed issue of material fact concerning probable cause for his arrest, it is unnecessary to address whether any policy or practice of the Crawfordsville Police Department caused a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Mark, 769 F.2d at 1271. "The question of whether a municipality caused a constitutional deprivation does not even arise absent proof that a deprivation in fact occurred." Id. (emphasis in original).
C. PROBABLE CAUSE PRECLUDES LIABILITY UNDER STATE LAW
The Court's finding that Utterback and Maynor had probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest also bars Plaintiff's state law claims. The absence of probable cause to arrest is a necessary element of claims for false arrest or false imprisonment. Miller v. City of Anderson, 777 N.E.2d 1100, 1104 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002). Plaintiff has the burden of proving that probable cause did not exist. Garrett v. City of Bloomington, 478 N.E.2d 89, 94 (Ind.Ct.App. 1985). Plaintiff has failed to present any disputed issue of fact as to whether Utterback and Maynor had probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest.
The Indiana Tort Claims Act bars any state law claim against Defendants other than false arrest or false imprisonment. That Act "renders immune from liability police officers acting in the course of their employment and their governmental employers if a loss results from `the adoption or enforcement of . . . a law" other than false arrest or false imprisonment. O'Bannon v. City of Anderson, 733 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) (citing Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(7)). Utterback and Maynor clearly were enforcing state laws, in their role as officers of the Crawfordsville Police Department, during the time of which Plaintiff complains. Thus, Defendants are immune from liability to Plaintiff.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Each party to pay its own costs.